Signs and signals: The conception of communication in U.S. telecommunications rhetoric. by Eriksson, Kai Teppo
Kai Teppo Eriksson 
London School of Economics 
PhD in Information Systems
Signs and Signals
The Conception of Communication in 
U.S. Telecommunications Rhetoric
2 August, 2001
UMI Number: U154791
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U154791
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
T  H<5S£S
r
iHoy
Abstract:
The thesis at hand will investigate communication and its changing conditions with respect to 
the thinking of the political community in the United States. The central aim is to deliberate 
upon the relationship between communication and specific telecommunication systems during 
the period ranging from the telegraph to computer networks. Together with related discourses 
and practices, systems of communication have formed an environment wherein 
“communication” as such has become thought about That is, taken as both the object and the 
means of administrative practices, communication has come to be regarded as communication. 
It is in these practices that the inherent relationship between communication and control can be 
found, which makes them the main focus for an administrative history of communication and 
a history of the administration of communication. Thus, we will analyze the relationship 
between historical forms of communication and the ontology of communication to the extent 
that this relationship is built up through socially institutionalized communication systems and 
related discourses.
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1. Introduction
The thesis at hand will investigate communication and its changing conditions with respect to 
the thinking of the political community in the United States. The central aim is to deliberate 
upon the relationship between communication and specific telecommunication systems during 
the period ranging from the telegraph to computer networks. Together with related discourses 
and practices, systems of communication have formed an environment wherein 
“communication” as such has become thought about That is, taken as both the object and the 
means of administrative practices, communication has come to be regarded as communication. 
It is in these practices that the inherent relationship between communication and control can be 
found, which makes them the main focus for an administrative history of communication and a 
history of the administration of communication. Thus, we will analyze the relationship between 
historical forms of communication and the ontology of communication to the extent that this 
relationship is built up through socially institutionalized communication systems and related 
discourses.
The analysis here is thus not centered exclusively around any communication system as such, 
as technology—although this aspect cannot be separated from the emergence of modem 
communication and social order, but, on the contraiy, constitutes its precondition; rather, the 
emphasis is on the changes in and of communication during the period in question. The central 
purpose is to deliberate upon the relationship between communication and telecommunication, 
which has been approached as a question of a community and its fate. What we will undertake 
in the thesis, then, is to look at how conception of communication as yieldd and organized by 
communication systems has been entwined with thought on the political. The systems and 
constellations of communication—alongside the communicative relationships opened up within 
these contexts—are included in the sphere of political thinking not only from the point of view 
of the communication industry but more importantly, from that of a body of thought that 
attempts to articulate the political as a question of communication. What has to be scrutinized 
is the way in which communication is organized in relation to the political, investigating the 
particular relationship each conception of communication creates to and within the political: 
how does communication constitute the political community in the era of telecommunications?
4
Modern Communication
The development of communication technology has undoubtedly been characterized as one of 
the grand narratives of our time. In this narrative, differences (fissures, alterations, 
displacements) cannot be taken fully into account because the main conceptual tools are based 
on types of totality. From Samuel Morse’s “one neighborhood” to Marshall McLuhan’s 
“global village,” the theoretical discourse of communication has been bound by thinking 
motivated by the idea of a uniform, consistent whole. The old demarcation between science and 
nature, subject and object, drawn from the idealized model of the natural sciences, led social 
scientists also to analyze their objects as isolated and relatively coherent. The attempt to justify 
one’s disciplinary approach in a way that would meet the criteria of scientificity, by defining its 
object as being real in some objective sense as well as being separate from the observer, had 
been established in the social sciences already by fimile Durkheim, and took firm root in its 
subsequent development in thought about “communication.” This way of conceptualization 
has served some apparent aims. It has become much easier, for example, to speak about the 
“impacts” of certain forms of communication on different sectors of society. Similarly, 
processes such as design, implementation or management of given types of communication 
technology can be organized as a systematizable part of academic discourse. Communication 
can be seen as forming part of the historical-cultural environment, the human horizon, the 
being-there in the words of Heidegger, to which we belong originally and which we construct 
and reconstruct incessantly in the process that discloses what we are at any given moment of 
time. However, in its modem history, it has been conceived of in and as a distinct conceptual 
whole, the characteristics of which have become more mathematical the more 
telecommunication systems have developed.
It was only from intraurban telegraph systems onwards that communication assumed a truly 
positive character, developing into a productive force that represented the core of the modem 
society. It was this new positivity that made it an object of systematic thought: concurrently 
with the development of communication technology, a theoretical interest in its hidden 
mechanisms and its underlying laws arose, attempting to encapsulate them in a rational model 
in order not only to ensure the dependability of certain communication systems, but also, and 
most importantly, to understand communication in its essence.1 Thus, as telecommunications 
became established and its cultural implications visible, communication was conceptualized 
increasingly as an object of action, not only as a means to that end. While it began to be 
thought of in itself, however, communication also lent itself to being captured in theoretical 
formulations which effaced the very historicity it was a manifestation of.
5
During the process of becoming established, conceptions and discourses of communication 
were articulated mutually with contemporary political thinking. If political sentiment found its 
expression in the discourses of communication, these discourses served as vehicles for 
thinking about and advancing some general political objectives, such as unification of the 
nation. In this way, they provided a conceptual environment for different projects of 
communication—timely interpretations concerning the political nature of communication. 
There was always an inherent tendency within those projects to formalize the models they 
constructed into a general mechanism of communication, thus depriving understanding of 
communication of its own historical time. This is what, from the perspective of the work at 
hand, is of importance: to think about how communication projects continued, broke off, 
reorganized, and reinterpreted not only the social production and sharing of conceptual 
identities but also the things shared, the shared tradition, and communality. If prevailing 
communication projects embodied communication predominantly as something expressible in 
quantitative terms, this is perhaps best understood as being a testimony to the relationship to 
perception of the social at that time. We have, however, to define our approach to this history 
more precisely.
Communicating instances originally presuppose communication: they do not take place in 
relation to others as if already perfect subjects of communication (as was thought in the era of 
the telegraph as well as, although in a different way, at the time the telephone became common 
and the conception of communication was rationalized), but this 
relationship—communication—is exactly what enables the subject positions and the 
production of meaning. In consequence, communication is the constitutive condition for both 
subjectivities and community, which is why they have to be understood on the basis of the 
ontological dimension of communication. In the process of the rationalization of 
communication, this dimension becomes unimportant: communicating subjects’ relationships 
to communication is seen on the basis of a model wherein a subject assumes an originality 
which it expresses by means of communication. Subjects here are conceived as not having an 
inherent, only an external, relationship between each other, and communication is the rather 
superficial mediator between original intentions and the needs of interacting subjects. What has 
been lost in this conception is the fact that the subject of communication always already 
presupposes others as interlocutors: the other is not an external object of speech but more 
fundamentally constitutes the ontological condition of a speaking subject, of a social being who 
presupposes communication as his condition of existence. It is not possible to think of a 
subject separated from this communicative relationship. This is why thinking about 
communication should not take as its point of departure supposedly independent subjects and
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the external communicative relationship postulated between them, but on the contrary the 
constitutive movement of communication, which here is analyzed through different nodes and 
constellations of communicability. This is not anything new as such, as it has been customary 
to treat communication in terms of general “trends” or “principles.” That however, is not our 
purpose here.
It is clear that communication has been articulated both as open, unpredictable, and 
untotalizable interpersonal relationships and as contained, determined, and hierarchical lines 
and structures. Similarly, it is possible to show the ways in which a given communication 
technology appears to support differentiating and specializing movements, on the one hand, 
and strongly centralizing ones, on the other. Yet the principal conceptual framework here is 
based neither on differentiation of the vertical and the horizontal relationships of 
communication, nor on centralization and decentralization. It is true that the horizon of centrally 
directed hierarchical systems has characterized the history of communication brought up and 
discussed here, but instead of taking this horizon as our starting point, what we will do is to 
make it our object of study and investigate its historical and conceptual conditions. At the same 
time, when rejecting the primacy of these dichotomies, we also abandon the theoretical 
conception underlying them. This conception was epitomized by Ferdinand Tonnies in his 
1887 division between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or “community” and “association,” 
by means of which he distinguished two types of social grouping, a natural living society and a 
formal organization. It has been especially a twentieth century peculiarity of the social sciences 
to operate with strict dichotomies, a practice which has only recently been widely questioned.
Instead of remaining within this tradition, we maintain that communication is always mediated 
along lines that cannot be completely contained within some pure types and controlled in 
entirely rational manner, and that in contemporary societies these mediating instances have 
risen to a pivotal position. It is therefore of the highest importance to identify the forms in and 
through which organization of communication has been exercised successfully and which have 
spread across society and become generalized social techniques. Some of the most influential 
loci of the organization of communication have been those contexts in which it has been 
approached as an internal question within a given whole. Generally speaking, these are the 
contexts in which communication has been given a systemic character and in which the project 
to rationalize communicative relationships was inaugurated. Rationalization here is understood 
as the systematization and optimization of communication within an organizational framework.
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As institutional practices always both presuppose and create knowledge, this relationship 
between systems and techniques of communication, on the one hand, and communication “as 
such,” on the other, insofar as it reveals the underlying conditions of communication, must be 
understood not only as political, but, and perhaps above all, as ontological. In these 
connections—in organizatory schemes, managerial ideas, and political innovations—in which 
communication has been posed as a question of internal communication, it has laid the 
foundation for thinking about the relationship in which communication and noise, and 
communication and multiplicity have been connected to each other within the framework of a 
controlled whole. Noise can be viewed here as the enemy of communication, whereas the 
multiplicity represents something that can swamp the voices and established order within a 
given system. This point is of utmost significance for an administrative history of and by 
communication for it is in this context that communication in general has become thought of as 
a distinct theoretical object with both an “inside” and an “outside”; that is, as an object that 
has its limits. Relating to this, there is a change in emphasis during this study. At the 
beginning, more weight has been placed on historical material, as distinct from theoretical 
material, because of the scarcity and state of uninstitutionalization of theoretical discourses on 
communication at the time. The differences in emphasis change proportionately as discourses 
become organized and theoretically articulated; that is also when the limits of communication 
become explicitly thematized.
These discourses and systems of communication are the principal arenas for its 
organization—implying its being thought of as a relationship between the organized and its 
outside—where communication as such becomes an object of societal thinking. This is of 
uppermost interest, for even though thought about the conditions of communication has found 
expression within the history of western philosophy, in the context at hand the question is 
posed in historical and contingent terms, which is exactly what has been ignored in the 
philosophical tradition. Thus expression of the question of communication as a practical 
problem always expresses the experience of the finiteness of communality in a way that does 
not relate, or has commonly been regarded as not relating, to the philosophical tradition. 
However, it does address essentially philosophical questions.
Now, if some forms of communication in certain historical conjunctions were generalized out 
of the particular contexts and discursive fields under examination, how is this process 
demonstrated here? It can be roughly shown by means of referring to two instances. In the first 
place, the generalization is seen as the spreading of some influential conceptions of 
communication across society, thus coming to constitute a common horizon for thinking about
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and organizing communication. Secondly, a series of philosophical interpretations from Martin 
Heidegger to Giorgio Agamben has thematized language and communication becoming 
independent. In both cases, there is no general form or course of development to be discovered, 
but instead either a heterogeneous yet distinct communicative constellation or a loose 
theoretical tradition which serves as a frame of reference within which communication’s 
generalization has been thematized. This is what we will discuss in detail at the Conclusion, as 
this interpretation is the foundation for the most cogent and powerful philosophical analysis of 
the fate of communication studied here. Heidegger figures in this study not only as part of the 
thematical subject matter, so to speak, but also as part of the theoretical background, along with 
Foucault and some other continental thinkers. There is no discrepancy here, however, because 
it is quite possible to accept some concepts without having to accept the whole philosophical 
system, whatever that might mean, from a given thinker.
What we have adopted from Heidegger is a method of analysis that enables us to identify a 
certain continuity, and not a mere succession of events, in the historical material and a certain 
thematical consistency between the writers analyzed. If there are some normative remnants in 
the analysis, that is because the line of development in and of communication can be exposed 
only in the context of some theoretical background through which it assumes its identity. Thus, 
the point of view, although incorporating inevitably some normative elements, is not evaluative 
per se but retains a critical stance as a technical tool for enabling us to discern some continuity 
in the line of development of communication being used both as an object and means of 
administration.
Communication systems, in discussion about their increasing influence in contemporary 
societies, have been addressed mainly in terms of the mass media. How then can the 
communication systems investigated here which transmit primarily interpersonal 
communication play a role in the articulation of communication as societal communication? 
The answer lies in the fact that the main line of demarcation here does not run through the axis 
of public/private, because even private communication is always socially mediated and 
structured. What is important instead is to analyze the forms and domains of the social 
organization of communication. It is here that interindividual communication technology, with 
the conceptual tools and the rhetoric relating to these technologies, provides the essential means 
of organization. Whereas the significance of the mass media is connected to wide 
dissemination of similar meaning-contents, intercommunication has to do with the functionality 
of social institutions. What is central is the way the social is institutionalized in 
intercommunication as structured interaction. Following Jacques Derrida, one can even risk
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proposing that there is nothing outside these systems, from the point of view of the 
administrative history of and by communication, as it is within and through them alone that 
communication is thought of as communication.
Systems of communication consist of a set of technical inventions, industrial and commercial 
organizations, financial institutions, legal frameworks and political interests, with diverse 
methods, rules, and strategies, constantly varying their shape and structure. All this is linked to 
different degrees with the interests and rationalities that connect communication to the 
framework of governance. It is sufficient for my purposes to define the term governance 
according to Foucault as “the conduct of conduct,”2 which refers to the activities, methods, 
and principles aimed to shaping the conduct of persons, groups or institutions. Rose and 
Miller have demonstrated that the problematics of governance can be articulated with respect to 
three dimensions: political rationalities, programs of government, and technologies of 
government. These refer, respectively, to the changing discursive fields conceptualizing the 
exercise of power, the theoretical formulation of specific tasks, and the complex of programs, 
techniques, and procedures through which authorities seek to embody governmental 
ambitions.3 The authors point out that the relationship between these dimensions is not one of 
derivation or determination but one of translation; that is, political rationalities can be articulated 
in various ways in a political program, which, for its part, can have multiple expressions in a 
domain of political technology. As for the thematics of the thesis, the amalgam of specific 
discourses, practices, and technologies of the time in question, it can be said, constitutes a space 
in which the particular programs and approaches gaining importance in interpreting and 
organizing “communication” intersect It should be borne in mind, however, that the object of 
these programs in this study—communication—is also a kind of intersection space in its own 
right, for it offers a space in which the disparate movements of operative strategies and societal 
rationalities available come into contact
The problematics of governance is inherently linked to not only political rationalities, programs, 
and technologies, but also the broader historical field of events that defines the particular 
meaning-contents of the said dimensions of governance. That is to say that to be able to trace 
the relationship between communication and telecommunication in the rationalities of 
governance, one must be sensitive to the nature of the specificity of the historical contexts 
within which communication has been institutionalized in the societal information economy. As 
Foucault would put it, one must look at the singularities in their historical assemblages. Thus, 
the constellations of communication, even though they can be linked in some cases to an 
influential program, theory, or the like, belong in a much deeper way to the social world they
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come from. An idea can reflect the dreams and aims of diverse social forces and become 
embodied in a political program, and yet a similar thought can be considered as de facto basis 
for explicit objectives irrespective any particular person’s or group’s aspirations. Therefore, no 
attempt is necessarily made to trace political rationalities, translated into separate programs or 
objectives relevant to this study, to some particular origin. This is because, for the 
aforementioned reasons, the logic of a given program or political objective reflects, or is the 
expression of, multiple both discursive and nondiscursive (and if discursive, articulated and 
unarticulated) interests of the social dynamics, which do not have any clear or coherent origin; 
or if they have, it is already unoriginal.
These constellations should not be seen as a privileged source of a historical “truth” either, 
but rather as arenas in which both agreement and disagreement are articulated as concrete 
tactical positions—positions which are always predicated on some existing conception of 
communication regarding its alleged “nature.” For this reason, those conceptions of 
communication constitute in this study more fundamental an object of analysis than any 
established institution, doctrine, or technology: they open up and delimit the field in regard to 
which diverse programs and systems of communication are proposed, assessed, and brought to 
fruition. In this way, conceptions of communication that enable the “being” of communication 
(which is nothing being-like or articulable) to be taken as an object of thought in a given 
historical situation emerge as primary with respect to any particular communication-related 
institution, whether it be linked with communication policy, legislation, or industry.
This brings us to our last point. As this study does not travel exclusively along the lines of 
national politics or established institutions, but seeks its way to communicative practices that 
cannot be contained within the abovementioned terms, it is clear that some points need to be 
made. It should be mentioned, for example, that for a long time the communication question 
was not central to national politics, and that other questions, particularly those concerning 
transportation, were considered more significant. However, as already said, in this study we 
have approached the history of communication not at the level of governmental policies or 
institutions but instead at that of conceptions of communication. Therefore, insofar as it seems 
that the role of communication has been exaggerated, it is because of the perspective chosen: it 
is not our purpose to write a general history of social development in which different things 
have a “correct” weight with regard to each other, assuming this were even feasible at all. This 
is not to say, however, that the study does not have a relationship to the general. Whereas 
communicating instances are integral parts of the whole to which they are related and thus
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express its occurrence, conceptualization of communication, being often expressed in 
metaphors, can be said to be an attempt to describe the form or shape of this taking place.
Contextualizing the Thesis
A  study, especially a doctoral thesis, is expected to place itself in some theoretical context, 
"which implies the explication of its intellectual presuppositions. This is particularly important 
'when the thesis is located in a specific discursive tradition. If there is no such a tradition, 
Ihowever, the matter becomes more problematic, which seems to be the case here. The subject 
matter of the thesis is the relationship between communication and telecommunication seen 
from the point of view of thought about the political, but this has not been systematically 
investigated in any established theoretical tradition. Most of the available research literature on 
telecommunication, excluding media studies, is concerned either with communications 
technology or communications policy, neither of which is our concern here. Communication 
research and media studies, for their part, have mainly occupied themselves in investigating 
different media effects with regard to mass communication, which is beyond our sphere of 
study. Moreover, in most of these discourses, the concept of “communication” has been taken 
rather narrowly. Whereas the Shannon-Weaver model of communication, for example, 
dominated the thinking of communication in more culturally oriented approaches until about 
the 1980s, it is our aim here to bring out the conditions of this and some previous hegemonous 
constellations. This is why the work at hand cannot be located as such in any discursive 
tradition proper, for there is no established tradition concerning telecommunication and the 
political. It is only possible to refer to some individual writers who have treated the thematic of 
the thesis but who, however, remain fairly alien to its ethos. Let me introduce briefly three 
interesting writers, by way of which we can approach the theoretical and methodological 
questions characterizing our study. The writers are James R. Beniger, Paul N. Edwards, and 
Regis Debray, respectively.
In his much discussed book The Control Revolution,4 James Beniger traces the technological 
and economic history of what came to be called an information society. Unlike many previous 
writers in the same field, he takes into account the lines of historical development in their 
specifity yet puts them into an interesting interpretative framework. Central to this framework 
is the concept of control, which Beniger understands largely in terms of technological practices 
and systems. They were responses to what he calls “the crisis of control,” manifesting 
themselves first in the form of formal bureaucracies, and secondly in that of “rationalization.”
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Although he was insightful in many of his interpretations, there is also a crucial difficulty in his 
approach for our perspective. It lies in the fact that Beniger presupposes a consistent social 
system based on consensus, in this respect coming close to the American functionalist 
tradition. He tends to treat historical processes as if determined by the assumed needs and 
functions of the social system, which is essentially based on mutual agreement. This is why we 
cannot position our study in relation to Beniger, although he discusses many of the same 
themes. Let me now turn to a book that is closer to our objectives.
It has increasingly been acknowledged in recent years that computers and the information 
systems into which they have been incorporated do not constitute exclusively technological 
artifacts. With the rise of Foucauldian diagnostics of power, social histories “from below,” 
and the Italian micro-histories, which have all rejected the relevance of traditional accounts of 
great events and persons analyzed on one, usually political level, histories that have attempted to 
trace an inner, functional logic in a given phenomenon irrespective of its social context have 
become increasingly problematic. It is possible to discern a Nietzchean influence in many 
current reformulations of the tasks and aims of a historical study. Thus, it has become clear 
that the history of the computer (and that of communication in general) does not exhaust itself 
in a frequently reiterated succession of technical inventions and devices. The sense of a 
computer cannot be articulated fully on a technical level, as it forms only one constitutive part 
of its social configuration. In fact, the history of telecommunication comprises a whole variety 
of intersections; it offers a contact point for the disparate movements of operative strategies and 
available societal rationalities.
Paul Edwards has written a study, entitled The Closed World, on the history of the computer in 
accordance with these principles.5 His work stands in contrast to previous computer 
historiography, which has understood its object in terms of either computer engineering or 
business. The history of the computer generally has been conceived as the linear development 
of an information processing device, or a tool of computer or cognitive science, in which it is a 
conceptual model for the handling of information and symbols. In contrast to these 
approaches, Edwards sees the computer not as an information machine, nor as a cognitive 
model, but rather as a common denominator in constantly changing social constellations within 
academic research, engineering practice, industrial aims, and political interests, all of which have 
been linked with distinct discursive practices. His idea is first to analyze social and academic 
speech about the computer, and after this, to examine the construction of national computer 
systems for defense purposes in Cold War America, using the double image of the computer 
as both a tool and a metaphor. In his study, speech about the computer and the machines
13
themselves do not form two independent strands, but are instead inherently interconnected. In 
this way, he brings out the reciprocal relationships between distinct discourses, communities, 
practices, and technologies relating to speech and the construction of centralized command and 
control systems.
Although interesting, the study still maintains strong links to the arsenal of traditional 
historiographies, as it documents important persons, years, and even dates with 
uncompromising accuracy. Without being unanalytical, Edwards is more concerned with the 
coherent and continuous narrative which advances largely at the level of individual, 
interpersonal relationships than with the thematic possibilities provided by the richness of the 
theoretical material in question. This is why we have to turn to our third writer, as it is only 
through him that we can truly link our study to a theoretical discourse, if not with regard to the 
subject matter, then at least for its approach.
Regis Debray is a French philosopher and essayist who, after a period of intensive political 
involvement in the 1960s and 1970s, has devoted himself to develop what he has termed 
“mediology” (mediologie). The underlying purpose of his book Transmitting Culture6 is to 
continue legitimizing this research program. What the author does here, not unlike what he did 
in Media Manifestos (1996), is to endeavor to open up and explicate a distinct theoretical 
approach to communication and culture, especially from the point of view of the cultural 
transmission of symbolic systems, by means of diverse technical and institutional forms and 
routes. Mediology is thus interested in the continuously redefining and redefined boundaries 
and intersections of technological tools, systems, and strategies, on the one hand, and cultural 
practices and social institutions, on the other. At its core are the particular ways different 
conceptual assemblages and cultural systems have unfolded and found their historical ways of 
realization over generations in and by some very mundane yet indispensable material means 
traditionally overlooked by the research literature. It is this incessant interplay between the 
processes and vectors of symbolic transmission and the networks and bases of technological 
mediation that defines the field and scope of mediology. It thus comes near, if not being 
identical, to the study of the materiality of communication.
Although not completely new, this is all very refreshing, because despite the earlier works 
sharing similar orientations and conceptualizations, existing disciplines with cultural 
transmission as their research object tend to simplify the complexity of the process. From the 
viewpoint of symbolic systems, semiology seems a natural competitor to mediology. Yet 
Debray points out that whereas semiology focuses on the meanings and interrelationships of
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signs, what is of importance in mediology is not the literal meaning-contents but the 
“frameworks that administer belief in that content.”7 Here, mediology studies not the 
meanings produced as such but rather the conditions and structures that allow those meanings 
to be formulated in the first place. In a similar vein, though from a different direction, sociology 
is close to mediology. However, with its emphasis on social institutions and structures, it tends 
to ignore the processes of technological transmission, argues Debray. What mediology is 
undertaking is a material study of the process of reorganization of cultural systems. This is not 
primarily a question to be approached through some supposed social constants, be they 
classes, structures, or institutions, but rather with a special sensitivity to the material forms and 
means of cultural self-articulation in time. In this sense, mediology is the study of the technical 
trajectories of cultural transmission.
As for the history of ideas, Debray holds that it tends to overlook technical systems of 
transmission, transportation, and communication in the same way as sociology, and to 
concentrate on the successive forms of historical processes where social agents, especially 
remarkable individuals, play an important part without noticing that technology is not only an 
instrumental object of action but also what engenders subject positions and social-historical 
states of affairs. Thus, while sociology and history tend to underrate the role of technology by 
focusing on social institutions and historical consecutiveness, respectively, and while 
semiology does the same by concentrating on meaning structures, it is the task of mediology to 
take cognizance of the productive nature of technology. By this gesture, Debray transgresses 
the old dichotomy, deeply integrated into the repertory of social sciences’ conceptual arsenal, 
between what is an action’s instrument and what is its goal. This dichotomy, of course, has its 
foundation in the differentiation between technology and the social, a differentiation which 
mediology refutes. It points out that drawing of a line between these elements is always an 
analytical operation performed afterwards. This is the essential point of departure of mediology 
that determines the whole program; but at the same time, it is also a juncture that connects the 
project to its historical predecessors.
Despite Debray's claims of novelty, most if not all of the main ideas in the research program 
advocated here have already been articulated elsewhere. It is Foucault, together with Deleuze 
and Nietzsche, to whom Debray owes perhaps his greatest intellectual debts. Foucault accepted 
and further elaborated the way in which Nietzsche moved analysis from the object proper, be it 
a value or a conception (what Debray called the literal meaning-content), to the conditions and 
circumstances where it is seen as true and meaningful. In this way it is indicated that the object 
of interpretation cannot be understood without taking into account the interaction of forces that
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have produced it as an outcome. Therefore, what is to be done is to determine the way in which 
the setting has been formed in which certain values and conceptions have come to be seen as 
relevant objects of speech and how the values in question have formed in that setting. What is 
at issue here is nothing other than Debray’s cultural transmission.
Now, the aim of research is to take up a chosen alignment of interlinked entities, both 
discursive and nondiscursive (Foucault), or human and nonhuman (Bruno Latour), and to 
analyze the formation process of a given power configuration in terms of movements, 
struggles, alliances and displacements. This type of approach traces and constructs the 
“effective history” of discursive and institutional practices, arrangements and formations of 
controversies, their transformations and dissolutions in a certain historical setting. Gilles 
Deleuze, working with Felix Guattari, conceived “becomings” as more important than history, 
and took up the task of mapping the philosophical conditions of the interplay of machines, 
assemblages, flows, and events which cannot be described in terms of power. For Deleuze, it 
was desire—an event at the micro-level—that conditions power, not the other way around. 
Whereas Foucault positioned strategy in place of social contradiction, Deleuze replaced 
strategy by lines of flight and the movements of deterritorialization—in other words, 
uncontrollable events in the disintegration of an order.
Notwithstanding some of their doctrinal differences, both Foucault and Deleuze shared similar 
kinds of perspectives, inspired in the main by the influence of Nietzsche, of the nature and aim 
of philosophical work. Central to that approach was to investigate the conditions and 
actualizations of both the interlinks and their dissolutions between macro-level structures and 
micro-level movements and flows within a certain context, whether in terms of history or of 
micro-movements. That was accomplished mainly by using the notion of an assemblage as an 
operational device, the aim of which, although inevitably a construction as with any 
interpretative tool, was “not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under one concept 
but rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations,”8 as Deleuze put i t  
Foucault called it “dispositif,” whereas Deleuze preferred the term “agencement.”9 Bruno 
Latour has recently coined the concept of “collective” in this specific connection.
Through the interpretative concept of dispositif,\ it becomes possible to transgress the rigid 
subject-object axis still extent in social scientific thinking. Now entities that were previously 
isolated or interrelated only at a veiy general level can be seen as constituting an interlinked set 
in a far more concrete and specific sense. In the case of information technology, the inventors, 
technologies, commercial and financial institutions, technical theories and discussions,
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standards, political interests and legal frameworks can all be subjected to the same level of 
analysis. They do not belong to distinct realms but instead constitute a circle of mutual 
interaction, with an effective history of its own, in which it becomes clear that the interrelations 
between them are inherent, not external, and that their separation from each other is always an 
interpretative act, not a “natural” state of affairs. Thus, they are not seen, in this framework, as 
stagnant, stable, or unified components of an idealized model of stationary relationships, but 
rather as ingredients of an open formation constantly changing its internal distribution of 
power. This is why it becomes more appropriate to analyze this process in terms of flows, 
movements, alliances, and dissolutions, rather than essences or structures.
Without doubt, it is in this theoretical context that we must situate Debray’s demand to study 
the historical interrelationships between the technological and the social by taking into account 
the various agents, processes, materialities, and institutions needed in the production of a given 
cultural formation. Given the debt to the thinkers mentioned above, Debray’s mediology can 
hardly be called a novel approach. Moreover, though the program is presented interestingly in 
the book referred to, actual research, where it can be found, remains fragmentary and is used to 
exemplify the cases in point only. Yet when it comes to work undertaken within the 
departmental contexts of many of those disciplines that have taken culture and communication 
as their research objects, Debray’s criticism has its point. Communication and cultural 
transmission are to be treated not as phenomena that can be adequately dealt with by traditional 
research traditions, but as objects that, incessantly recreating the conditions of their own 
mediation, need the question of ontology of communication to be posed. Mediology is one 
name for this continuous questioning.
What is important in this type of approach, of which Debray’s contribution is an example, is 
the way it provides a framework for thinking about the linkages and fields of interaction 
between questions relating to communication systems and new practices developed, the 
administrative and scientific interests concerning those systems, the cultural sentiment and the 
discourses connected to telecommunication, and finally the concept of communication yielded. 
Instead of confronting a technological totality, we see a heterogeneous constellation of linkages 
and alliances between a number of distinct formations. Let me delve into the Foucauldian 
concept of dispositif a little deeper, as it is mainly this conceptual tool, in the genealogical 
analysis to which it belongs, that provides a methodological orientation for us here, too.
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The Communicative Dispositif
Genealogy as a general Nietzschean research perspective characterizes the whole later Foucault, 
although a change of course seemed to occur from the L ’usage des plaisirs10 on. Genealogy, 
as is known, is a philosophical-critical study in the form of historical research that is intensified 
by the concepts of event and struggle. It focuses on events which reorganize the network of 
relationships between “words” and “things” into confrontations, disputes, alliances or 
coalitions—that is, as changes in power relationships. Whereas for Nietzsche history was an 
endless confrontation and a mutual contest between energies, for Foucault it was also an 
incessant struggle between powers, which was not, however, characterized by destruction but 
by creation of something new. It is not reduced into any single paradigmatic opposition but is 
conceivable only as discontinuous and local changes in relationships of power. Genealogy as a 
kind of effective history does not regard historical conditions, permeated by the relationships 
of power/knowledge, as a foundation but rather as a “complex strategical situation in a 
particular society.”11
Foucault’s dispositif is the central operational tool for carrying out such an effective history. It 
is a conceptual construction that refers to an apparatus or assemblage. By means of it, Foucault 
could articulate the direction of action of a power that is seen no longer as being based on a 
sovereign: power does not manifest itself as an institution but rather as continuously 
functioning nets of relationships which form into chains with each other. In genealogical 
analysis, power is not concretized within the indefinite boundaries of a general concept but 
instead in local microrelationships that are defined and formed into an object of analysis by the 
assemblage. Therefore, the dispositif is not expressive of anything general but rather of the 
particular and singular. It gathers local and historical relationships under a given constellation, 
but it is not the “totality” of these relationships, let alone that of all social relationships. It 
is—insofar as it “is” —only in relation to the object of analysis which, in the context of the 
study at hand, is the history of telecommunication. This thematical core here defines an area of 
experience that manifests itself in and through the mutually constitutive interrelationships 
between theoretical discourses, social power relationships, and self-relationships of the self, as 
well as in the whole range of different practices, institutions, and systems involved. Dispositif 
here, is to be understood as a constellation of relationships which, in a given historical period, 
organizes communication as both an object of speech and a field of experience.
Constellations of communication enable one to analyze the institutions, practices, and 
discourses inherently related to the constitution of the social phenomena in question not, as has
18
been usual in the academic division of labor, as independent and separate from each other, but, 
on the contrary, in terms of their historical interrelationships, as they shape each other and 
become, in the course of this process, redefined and reorganized. They do not belong to 
separate realms of institutional practice and scholarly discourse but presuppose each other in 
order to be conceivable. They form a mutual effective history which dissolves only to regroup 
again depending on the historical circumstances and thematic frameworks in question. In this 
way the constellation helps research practice to take into account that effects have an inherent, 
not an external relationship between each other, and that their separation is always an analytic 
operation, not a “natural “ state of affairs. At the same time it emphasizes that they should not 
be seen as coherent components of an idealized, static scheme of relationships but instead as 
ingredients of an open formation, the inner power distribution of which changes logically when 
seen in retrospect but always unforeseeably at the time of the change. For this reason the 
constellation enables articulation of thematic relationships, not in terms of essences or 
structures, but rather in terms of flows, movements, alliances, and detachments.
What is central concerning a constellation is that the specific relationships in and through 
which it is actualized do not constitute a “totality” independent of the analysis, on the one 
hand, or of the ingredients of these relationships, on the other. Although theoretical discourses 
and social practices have an inherent relationship with communication as both an object and a 
tool, it is only through a research program that this relationship is constituted as an object of 
thought. Furthermore, a constellation of communication is not a totality of all social 
relationships either. This is first because, as mentioned above, a constellation always thematizes 
a certain constellation of power relationships centered around some specific phenomenon or 
experience from which it receives its meaningfulness. Therefore, the constellation is to be 
understood only in relation to an experience thought of in this way. This is also why the 
conditions of communicative constellations are determined on the basis of different 
circumstances and of the regional and temporal relationships operative within them, although 
they may have convergent or analogical characteristics and connections. But the constellation is 
not the totality of power relationships even if it were applied only to relationships and fields of 
relationships actualized in this way because it is not independent of or preceding these 
relationships: it is nothing other than the occurrence of these relationships.
Although the areas of experience to be analyzed in genealogical research practice always take 
shape within some definable configuration of power relationships, which occur in both 
constant institutionalization and disintegration, talking about a general constellation with 
respect to these experiences is not nonsensical. It has a realness of its own as a unifying
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principle that gathers together diverse communicative practices and institutions. Even so, a 
constellation cannot present itself as a united, harmonious, and as if already completed order, 
for these fragmentary and ever-changing chains of relationships and practices constitute 
precisely what it is. It is nothing other than the economy of the occurrence of the phenomenon 
under analysis, in this case, the administrative history of and by communication, and does not 
precede this occurrence in any way. Thus communication is inherently divided into an 
irreducible plurality of heterogeneous events. Of course, communicative relationships are not 
independent of the constellations of systems and conceptions to which they pertain and which 
they, as an experience, necessarily presuppose. If human language is thought as a general 
medium, history can be viewed as a diversification of different forms of communication. As 
every form produces its own relationship to the limits of communication, and as these 
relationships coexist together, partly overlapping but in any case always influencing each other, 
communication is a phenomenon that can be understood only with reference to this 
fragmentary concatenation of events. This is to say that although there is no constellation of 
communication as such, as an isolated phenomenon, that even though it gets its sense and 
significance exclusively by way of a plurality of communicative action, even this experience of 
the multiplicity of communication does not exist in itself “before” the constellations and 
systems that precisely produce it as an experience. On the contrary, communication “is ” the 
social relationships that determine this constellation; it is the realization, expression, and mark 
of these relationships. Yet, as has become clear by now, the constellations of communication 
should not be taken as independent either, for they are determined, in turn, by the taking place 
of communication. Ultimately, the very movements and rhythms of communication are what 
provide a voice for the integrating and productive tactics of constellations of communication.
A communicative constellation, strictly speaking, is therefore not an area, principle, category, or 
a level of analysis. It is rather a texture of mutual relationships between institutions, practices, 
and sentiments, which are interwoven in a particular historical system and its discourses. For 
this reason this system is to be understood, like discourse in Foucault’s analysis, as a series of 
discontinuous segments, the tactical function of which is not coherent or stable: it is a point of 
intersection of social forces where it both unifies and disperses existing groupings, but is also 
produced itself out of the interaction of these same forces. But above all, a constellation of 
communication is the coming about, the continuous unveiling of society itself, because for 
instance the formation of discursive practices and power constellations related to the telegraph 
system is mediated and guided by the very assemblages that allow telegraphic communication. 
Thus attempts to replace communication with a new term in the hope of emphasizing its 
openness and eventual character must be welcomed, though propositions such as Nancy’s
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“sharing,” often have other, equally unwanted connotations. Communication, in this 
conception, as in Foucault’s notion of sexuality, is neither a “primitive, natural, and living 
energy welling up from below,” nor a “higher order seeking to stand in its way.”12 Not 
unlike Foucault’s sexuality, communication here is not a pure positivity, and not exclusively an 
effect of a law either. While it endlessly escapes the functionality imposed on it from outside, 
communicative constellations constantly introduce meaning structures and circumstances 
through which it is experienced and perceived. Similarly, whereas communication systems 
produce and institutionalize communication, the taking place of communication and the 
practices it gives rise to constantly reorganize the contexts of communication. This mutual 
relationship is the object that is posed as a problem in this study, as it is in this connection that 
“communality” becomes articulated and can be taken as a problem and an object of reflection 
in itself.
Systems of communication here are nonplaces that establish the site for communicative action. 
Communication takes place temporally and regionally in separate assemblages that—although 
overlapping and interrelated—are, however, distinguishable from each other. This is also why 
communication is always discontinuous and heterogeneous, and can be separated from social 
relationships only analytically, for it “is ” this sociality, its realization: it is the realization of the 
social.
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2. On Thought About Communication
Telecommunications bring two things together that were previously thought of independently: 
language and technology. If we combine them together, we have communication by technical 
means. The word “communication” is derived from the Latin word communication which, in 
turn, has its root in communis, meaning “common to several, or to all.”13 Telecommunication 
systems, for their part, have been defined as “devices and techniques used for the transmission 
of information over long distances via wire, radio, or satellite,” in the New Encyclopaedia 
Britannica.14 Technical devices, in their ordinariness and mundaneity, tend to reduce 
telecommunication to the sphere of human control and possession. Whereas 
language—although similarly to hand, like a manageable tool—remains fundamentally 
unachievable and uncontrollable. Thus, telecommunication opens up a horizon in which the 
interrelationships between language and technology appear on the one hand as ordinary and 
orderly, and on the other hand as strange and fundamentally uncontainable. These two 
dimensions are not exclusive but, on the contrary, presuppose each other.
“Communication” is surely not to be reduced to the (technical) transmission of singular 
linguistic meanings as has been the case, as a rule, over past decades. Rather it “is ” the daily 
realization of “the social,”15 in at least two senses: it is its happening, the voice and trace of it, 
and at the same time its mechanism, too, the vehicle for what is to be articulated. Although they 
are realized in communication, are social relationships precisely what communication “is ” all 
about? They presuppose it as their precondition, but are also at the same time communicative 
events themselves, events in communication, in the field determined and delimited by 
communication. Therefore, communication is also, and perhaps most fundamentally, the 
constitutive condition of this sociality and its expression, for without it the social would not be 
a possible object of thought and action. This constitutive dimension remains at root always 
inarticulable: it is what enables articulation but is not articulable in itself. Hence, it can be said 
to be transcendental with respect to the day-by-day realization of communication, as it 
constitutes its precondition. Yet this transcendental dimension does not form any infinite, 
unchanging structure external to the veiy historicity and finiteness of communication, and
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cannot be thought as being “before” its occurrence. On the contraiy, it is fundamentally 
historical, marked and implemented by the daily rhythm of communication.
Is it possible to consider “communication” as an attribute of anything actual? This question 
becomes relevant as we understand that we cannot approach the phenomenon of 
communication in itself by interpreting communicative situations and processes. The system of 
communication, or what allows communicative events to take place in an organized manner, 
cannot itself take part in communication and enter the communicative world. Similarly to 
Heidegger, when he was deliberating upon the concept of “worldhood” in his book Being and 
Time}6 we can notice a certain undecidability at play here. On the one hand, this kind of 
communicative event (discourse, discussion, speech act, message transmission etc.) is based 
and built on the item of its structure that is communication itself. As “ worldhood” in the 
Heideggerian sense, “communication,” is for us an ontological term, referring to the 
constitutive movement of communication. Yet on the other hand, we know “communication” 
only in terms of the actual events in and through which it manifests itself. Hence, there is no 
way to investigate it other than by actual communication events and systems. Communication 
“is ” the expression of difference and the production of identity, but this expression and this 
production neither become articulated nor assume any detectable identity. Although 
inarticulable, it always leaves a trace—a trace that tends to vanish and be forgotten in 
communication.17 Communication, insofar as it is understood precisely as the occurrence of a 
difference, cannot be defined in any specific sense: it manifests itself only as differences, not as 
differences of differences, which constitute its conditions. It is in this sense that 
communication is fundamentally incommunicable.
It is worth considering how the conditions of communication relate to the historical conditions 
of the knowledge/power relationships Foucault studied in his genealogical works. It was 
Foucault, after all, who replaced the concept of episteme (which had a touch of built-in 
structuralism) by that of dispositif,\ determined entirely in a finite, discontinuous social realm, 
thus allowing the conditions of a given institution to be thought as historical and within the 
historical. Like the conceptual operations of dispositif thought about the conditions of 
communication refers to a certain extent to a “wholeness” (insofar as this “wholeness” is 
perceived as always implying not a totality but a radical incoherence and discontinuity) of the 
occurrence and formation of a certain type of social experience. The former is 
conceivable—although as inconsistent and fragmentary—in terms of some particular 
experience (whether that of madness, criminality, or sexuality, for instance) that enables its 
identity as an object of analysis. The conditions of communication, however, are not
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expressible as such, for they do not constitute any comparable experience—not even an 
incoherent or temporary one—but are instead the precondition of any social experience. This is 
because the idea of communication’s constitutiveness, its being the condition of the social, of 
what is shared and the fact of this sharing as well, must be conceived in its whole 
fundamentality and irreducibility.
However, it is true that both are determined within the social. Although the conditions of 
communication have a transcendental status with regard to the coming about of communication, 
this status is constituted entirely within the ever-reshaping domain of sharing, in its 
unconstrained historicity. This means that the conditions of communication do not retain any 
ahistorical structure or unchanging nature, which would constitute the ultimate law for the 
production of any meaningful communication—a law that was thought largely to exist without 
a history of its own.18 On the contrary, it is precisely the occurrence of communication which 
yields, renews, and reorganizes its own conditions in the course of its realization, in the daily 
communication. In this sense, the positivity of communication, communication as 
communication, does not depend on individual decisions involved in communicating instances, 
but rather on the constitutive movement of its going on, independent of any particular subject 
positions. It is rather the fact of its occurrence which allows us to form relationships, identities, 
and subjectivities during this occurrence. It is by and during this forming of relationships 
within communication that the historicity of the human being and the community it is a 
member of is articulated, not in any definite terms but always on an experimental and 
contentious basis. It thus also forms the conditions of communication, but there is nothing 
transhistorical in this as there is no other law than the thoroughly historical law of the 
communication occurring that constitutes the conditions of the articulable and objectifiable, in 
other words, human institutions and communities.
A clarifying note should be made concerning the dispositif or constellation of communication. 
When we are discussing a communicative constellation or its displacement, we are always 
referring to the administration of and by communication: displacements in or between 
communicative constellations are always displacements within this history of communicative 
administration and administration of communication. Although these constellations do not, 
therefore, relate to communication “as such” but only to one of its historical lines of 
development, it is evident that they cannot present themselves as consistent or dominant 
totalities even within this one line of development. Communication is a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous series and fields, and this multiplicity is irreducible into any single identity in 
principle. In spite of this, the communicative constellations and their displacements traced here
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are significant—in all their impurity and porousness—since they have without doubt shaped 
the thinking of communication in a way that surpasses the scope of their specific contexts of 
origin. Let me venture a generalization. Although new starting points and perspectives for 
thought about communication have increasingly arisen during modernity, many of them share 
the same conception of communication. Although it has died out in the form being discussed, 
this tradition has been one of the most effective in constituting thought about communication in 
the modem age.
Our main object of interest here is thus not communication or its conditions as such but rather 
the relationships between communication and specific telecommunication systems and 
discourses that has been constructed through certain nodes or points of intersection. It is in 
this connection that “communication” has become thought of as such, which makes these 
nodes the main focus for an administrative history of communication and the history of the 
administration of communication. This is why we have to turn to systems of communication as 
the main loci where communication has been regarded as both a means and an object of action.
Communication Systems
Communication is neither homogeneous or uniform, and it does not determine a subject that 
can be understood as unitary or composed of similar units. It always takes place in some 
locatable situation which is made up of a given assemblage of social forces, and is thus never 
separate from the power effects actualized by way of this set of relationships and groupings. A 
central part of the constitution of communication, so to speak, in modem societies consists of 
different communication systems—the systems which produce and transmit communication 
within an institutional framework. They engender communication by establishing a network of 
principles, techniques, institutions, standards, and codes, which together determine not only the 
practical conditions of communication, but also to a great extent its conceptual form. Of course, 
these systems do not form a constant in the changing and reorganizing economy of power 
relationships either. Like singular communicative events, the loci of which they predominantly 
constitute, they take shape within the prevailing groupings, strategies, and objectives, the 
movement of which they follow. Moreover, they are not homogeneous entities. By defining 
them in terms of diverse techniques and practices, one could still stick to some kind of uniting 
logos which, seen from a certain conceptual viewpoint or operational function, would bind 
these dispersed elements together. However, a given communication system is not reduced to 
any whole but is connected unrestrictedly to two separate dimensions. It is coupled firstly with
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other systems with similar form, and secondly, with expressions dealing with their “material,” 
namely, communication.
Yet it is precisely through systems of communication that we can approach communication as 
communication: it is in intercommunication systems that “communication,” properly 
speaking, has been made both an object and a means of administration. Once 
telecommunication was established, “communication” was set up as a new aspect of 
administrative practices. It was linked not only to interorganizational schemes but increasingly 
also to plans on a national scale, based on its integrating functions. What is more, 
communication by its systemic nature became a presupposition for thinking about the political 
community. However, in order to be practicable, communication had to be formalized in a 
consistent theoretical framework, which made it an object of ever intensifying investigation. As 
in the previous case, this formalization was not restricted to a few specific telecommunication 
systems alone but characterized the general attitude towards communication during the modem 
period with the institutionalization of communication research. In this sense, systems of 
communication and related discourses and metaphors have invariably engendered frameworks 
within which communication has been systematically thought about in itself.
What is of importance is this institutionalization of communication through diverse technical 
and cultural systems, which constitute the environment for its becoming an object of thinking. 
Those systems organize communication, which, then, “reflect” or “reveal” the historicity of 
the prevailing social dynamics: communication systems and discourses acquire their conditions 
of possibility always in a particular historical situation and through the relationships and 
circumstances prevalent in i t  In addition, if we believe that communication constitutes the 
community, as Jean-Luc Nancy has stated,19 then these communication systems have a 
necessary and intrinsic relationship to the processes that make up society. Yet there is nothing 
original about them: they must be seen as being produced by the same constellation of 
relationships in which their incessant mutual functioning becomes possible.
In the light of Nancy’s meditations, it can be thought that communication “is ” the endless 
dissolving, reorganizing, and intertwining of identities which are exposed, over the course of 
time, as not having any lasting authenticity. They thus do not make it possible to identify any 
collective project which could provide a foundation for society. Yet there are also institutions 
and discourses of a more influential and long-lasting nature, which form contexts for new 
meanings and interpretations. By drawing one’s attention to systems and theories in which 
“communication” is regarded as a problem of intercommunication, it becomes possible to
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discern a line of development of and within communication, a line that gave rise to 
communication as communication. It is obvious that internal communication systems do not 
occur in a cultural vacuum, but on the contrary are themselves part of the prevailing political 
culture from which alone they obtain their social significance. While communication systems 
take their positions within and through the constellation of relationships they belong to, they 
also lead to redefinition of the latter by changing the conditions through which the social is 
conceptualized.
Communication does not appear here only as an object of representation but also as a locus for 
social orders to take shape, as a place in which those orders can be articulated, as well as an 
agent of their realization and as a factor that maintains and embodies their formation. What is 
of interest here, is the way communication systems bring about this happening of 
communication, its institutionalizing and, on the other hand, its disintegration and the 
emergence of new forms of communication and their adjustment to the prevailing constellation. 
Those systems constitute inherently the conditions for communication taking place, though 
clearly this taking place is never reduced to the structural conditions alone. Communication is 
not, of course, totally assimilated into the techniques and systems which shape its forms of 
realization but constantly escapes their functionality: new modes of communication ensue from 
the coincidence of heterogeneous forces in the communicative event It spawns new, 
unprecedented practices, develops ramifications in fields and directions calling for 
institutionalization, and endlessly yields interaction that is beyond the reach of governance. 
Consequently, communication systems constantly take new forms to meet emerging practices 
as communicative events constantly reconstitute the institutional conditions of these systems.
In this sense, communication always takes its place in some system of communication, which 
organizes and mediates it as an internal communication, although the perpetual realization of 
intercommunication generates new arrangements and forms of communication. These forms 
are natural candidates for the objects of “pure sociology,” proposed by Georg Simmel, 
namely, the “societal forms themselves.” He distinguished the “pure” element of sociation 
from its heterogeneous and variable embodiments.20 What Simmel had in mind were objective 
forms with positive contents rather than different communicative forms, although he ultimately 
failed to formulate a satisfactory theory of this kind of interaction. That there seemed to be no 
model for a form that comes into existence through communication has been regarded since 
Simmel as simply a challenge. For instance, communication theoretician Hugh Duncan tried to 
draw up a model in 1962 that would explain a reciprocal relationship in which the forms of 
sociation are determined through communication which, in turn, is constituted by these same
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forms.21 It seems that the type of approach endorsed by Duncan and many others, which seeks 
to construct a positive model for communication, fails to take into account that lack of such a 
model is perhaps not due to a failing of theory, a problem which could be redressed by more 
resolute investigation, but instead a permanent state of affairs which any analysis of 
communication has to take into account. Now, by examining communication systems as points 
of intersection of diverse technical, political, theoretical, and juridical practices, we have the 
possibility of thinking about communication in a Simmelian spirit as something pivotal to 
sociology, but without Simmers (and Duncan’s) positivistic frame of analysis. This is because 
the systems in question do not passively reflect the functionality of social practices, but rather 
create fields of knowledge and practice in which this functionality is exposed to systematic 
thinking and reorganized along the lines forged in this thinking.
This is where the ambivalence of communication can clearly be seen. On one hand, the general 
category of communication as constituting the social is not formally equal to other ontological 
categories: it has a special relationship to ourselves. The category of communication is 
principal with respect to other ontological ones, for it constitutes the possibility of existence for 
those categories, which, as possible objects of thought, are revealed to us only in 
communication. Yet, on the other hand, communication is not independent of culturally 
institutionalized practices and systems. It is, in fact, always defined by the specific forms of 
regional and historical practices, and thus deprived of any permanent identity or “logic.” The 
meaning of the concept of communication varies according to different qualifiers 
(geographical, temporal, strategic, theoretical, technical, etc.). However, these are far from 
neutral, immutable coordinates, but instead facts that become intelligible and relevant only in 
communication and for this very reason cannot be analyzed independently from the 
development of communication itself.
That communication lacks a lasting identity becomes clear from the diverse communication 
systems studied below: one can see that telegraphic communication has a different ontological 
constitution from that of telephonic communication—which is not so much a comment on their 
mutual technological differences as more importantly on the distinct realms of action they 
make possible. Hence, “communication” does not have conditions of possibility that would be 
valid in all communicational activity. Yet on the other hand, in order to talk about the history of 
“communication” in the first place, some continuity has to be discernible, some sort of 
succession, not necessarily a coherent line of development but rather a set of practices and 
conceptions sharing the same ethos. It should be emphasized that this history should not be 
conceived of as narrative about “communication,” implying that what is studied could be
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reduced to an object like any other. Keeping in mind that what is at issue is simultaneously the 
ontology of communication that cannot be analyzed on the “ontic” level, as Heidegger would 
say, and its historical forms, it is in the systems of communication that both these dimensions 
find an expression that is both theoretically interesting and historically representative.
Thus, although it is always already impure and instrumental in view of the ends it is connected 
with and whose functions it performs, communication is never purely external in the 
relationships it expresses. This is because, although it is an instrument with certain practical 
ends, it constitutes the communicative context in which those ends are conceptualized and 
become intelligible objects of thought. In this way, “communication” is essentially the 
constellation of a given social situation and related power relationships and discursive 
practices. Without an objective frame of reference, it is not sensible to assess its purity or 
quality; clearly, in any case it immediately exposes the experience of a given historical 
constellation, of the particular state in which local relationships are given their place and 
meaning. Communication, thus, does reveal anything but itself, its own course of happening.
“Communication” always takes place through certain practices and systems only in and 
through which it “is .” Thus, it functions here rather as an effect of a law than as an 
independent entity. Yet, unlike in many comparable interpretations that emphasize its position 
with regard to the singularities relating to it, law is understood in this study not in terms of a 
totality but rather as an essentially heterogeneous assemblage, in which relationships of power, 
bodies of knowledge, cultural discourses, and material contexts are under a continuous process 
of reorganization in which they constantly produce and are produced within a field of effective 
relationships. “Communication” can be seen as an effect of this network of relationships, the 
dynamics of which it expresses, but at the same time also the mechanism through which the 
network in question functions, by means of which it gets restructured, and which, thus, is not 
only the voice but also the mechanism of this process.
If my sketch is plausible, we have next to investigate the relationships between distinct 
communication systems and the ontology of communication. Here, these systems are 
conceived of as forming separate, though interrelated domains of interaction that are structured 
around arrangements based on specific communication technologies and, on the other hand, 
discourses and practices pertaining to those. These systems must not be viewed as conditions 
of communication as such, for they only open up certain kinds of relationships that allow 
communication to become actualized. Yet, talking about communication in general, as we have 
pointed out, is problematic, as it cannot be thought of in terms of a whole. Instead, these
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systems can be regarded as necessary for the functioning of a modem society in two senses: 
both as an essential technological infrastructure and as a conceptual precondition for i t  
Communication, as has been said, is not an unchanging constant but always dependent on the 
social relationships which it expresses and carries out. Thus, the daily evolution of modem 
societies cannot be separated from the particular communication systems which have operated 
as integral parts of the relationships determining the social. Yet it is not exhausted in the 
functioning of these systems either. In this sense these systems constitute the ontological 
condition of technologically institutionalized communication—not as a foundation for it but 
rather as a nonplace of the historical constellation of societal relationships, as the site and tool 
of their creation—from circa the first half of the nineteenth century on. They make up the 
intermediary between human community and language, a construct that brings these together as 
an experience of the present time.
In modem societies from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the need to have 
organized communication networks has increasingly meant the strengthening of the position of 
telecommunication systems. They occupy a pivotal position as the precondition for thinking 
about these societies. In fact, it is only in recent decades that they have emerged as the 
mechanisms for manifesting what is common: interlinked with all the other technological and 
cultural institutions that together make up society, they reveal the modem experience of being 
in common. Whilst setting the frameworks for communication, they also execute it, and in the 
process of this communication its very point of departure, the context of its birth, is revised and 
transformed. It is this relationship that determines the constitutive status of communication 
within the actual operation of communicative practices in their social functions.
Conceptions of Communication
It is possible to trace the birth and consolidation of certain conceptions of communication in 
relation to new communication systems. These systems inescapably give rise to 
conceptualizations, in each historical period, which seek to consider and position 
communication as a conceivable entity and a rational object of thought, and thus try to capture 
its always elusive “essence” or being. These projects, of course, are illegitimate: if 
communication can be thought of as having a character of its own, it resides precisely in its 
nature as denying or repelling any single essence. In any case, these conceptualizations express 
the necessity to take communication in itself as an object of thought, although these projects 
understandably cannot ever be successful in their goal of presenting what is ultimately
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unpresentable. Because they relate to modem communication systems, and because these 
systems were considered as representing the advanced state of contemporary society, the 
concepts of communication were also inevitably linked to attempts to describe and account for 
the specific character of the experience of modem society; they were endeavors to think about 
its “logic” within a general framework. This is why these concepts must be seen above all as 
testimonies to social self-conception, for they encapsulate conceptions concerning what is most 
characteristic and illustrative of the particular social constellation they belong to.
Those conceptualizations define communication in a way that always retains an intrinsic 
relationship to thought about the nature of community. This is because, whilst they determined 
the new positions assumed by communication, these conceptions came de facto to define a 
certain understanding of the realization of communality, for communication is this very taking 
place of communality. In this sense, by trying to encapsulate the “essence” of communication 
and systematize its logical structure, those formulations always reflect prevailing historical 
conditions: through them communication could be comprehended as an experience of the 
present. Consequently, one can view them, to a certain extent, as expressions of their own kind 
of the same amazement that can be found in more theoretical form in Martin Heidegger, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and recently in Giorgio Agamben, that there is language. It is not a 
matter among others but the condition of possibility of all thinkable matters—and thus 
indescribable.22 Communication is possible because of language but should not be likened to 
language as such, as the former primarily expresses the facticity (factizitdt) of the social. It is 
situated in the historicity of human communities and follows their “logic” alone—logic, which 
cannot present itself, not even regionally, in the form of common rules but is divided within the 
fragmentary movement of heterogeneous forces into discontinuous series and repetitions. This 
is to say that what is most fundamental in communication is not to be found in any distinctive 
meaning-content, but rather in the fact that it is always the condition and expression of the 
experience of the social. And it is exactly in this respect that it corresponds to the experience 
before the “wholeness” of language, because it is at the same time the condition of the “w e” 
and our society.
In this sense, the diverse conceptions of communication analyzed in what follows—which 
could provisionally be referred to as organic, mechanical, and self-regulating—should be seen 
as attempts to encapsulate and preserve something that is inherently inarticulable: the fact of 
communication, its happening. Although it is true that specific viewpoints are always articulated 
by particular individuals, conceptions of communication should not be seen as being dependent 
on a single individual: what is central is that certain sentiments concerning communication
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gained ground across diverse discourses and became a common horizon that shows 
communication in a new light In fact they are best seen as having been efforts to conceive the 
condition of possibility of communication. However, rather than being purely theoretical, these 
undertakings must be perceived as corresponding to particular historical experiences. As 
endeavors to capture in the most trenchant way what communication “is ,” and to encapsulate 
the nature of communication that corresponds to the experience of its historicity, those 
conceptions certainly did not stay merely within the discursive domain. Although the “logic” 
of communication is not consistent, and in fact not even representable in itself, it is clear that 
human life requires representations of this “nature” of communication for its everyday needs. 
What those representations really did, whilst trying to give expression to something that is not 
expressible, was to disclose the community’s historical experience of its present time. It is in 
this sense that these conceptions can be thought of in connection with Durkheim’s totems, as 
they are marks (voices and writings) of community’s experience of itself.
Seen from this perspective, in the act of reflecting general collective sentiments and self­
conceptions, systems of communication together with related discourses defined a place in 
which not only was communication manifested as communication, but also communality in 
itself was revealed. For instance, thought about the telegraph using the analogy of the nervous 
system introduced the idea of a system to communication. What it actually conceptualized was 
the experience of the present and the “logic” of the social. The specific historical character of 
this experience in any given period finds its expression precisely in and through discourses 
relating to these communication systems. Far from being the only or privileged loci for this 
experience, they nevertheless provide a consistent framework for its reflection. Conceptions of 
communication cannot be other than the effects of collective self-understanding—expressions 
of those discursive relationships in which social practice finds its interpretation—for no 
cultural identity can transcend in any definitive way the horizon of its birth, as it is this very 
horizon that makes it possible as an identity in the first place. It is exactly this issue that is at 
stake when it comes to the question of the impossibility of transcending the tradition of 
metaphysics, as every critical gesture inevitably gets articulated through and with regard to this 
same tradition.
Yet, evidently interpretations concerning the nature of communication contribute to the self­
constitution of communicative processes. Now, given that the constitutive horizon of 
communication cannot be “external” to its actual happening as it is always already part of its 
daily realization, clearly the juxtaposition between “discursive” conditions and “real” ones 
cannot be regarded as being valid. The conditions of communication can only be discursive,
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and insofar as interpretations of communication are constitutive to our collective landscape, 
they must also be an integral part of the historical conditions of communication. What is more 
important, however, is that alongside the occurrence of communication the conditions of 
interpretation are immediately conducive to collective self-conception, for insofar as 
communication manifests the social, the conditions of its conceptualizing are simultaneously 
those that allow for thought about the social. For is it not true, for instance, that contemporary 
society is increasingly spoken about in terms of a network, whereas the metaphor of a nervous 
system was absolutely essential when addressing modem society in terms of communication 
until about the 1970s? Our concern here is to ask how the diverse discourses, practices, and 
theories in conjunction with the telecommunication systems both organize and implement the 
experience of “communication” in the modem time.
It is not our purpose, however, to show that telecommunication systems and discourses would 
have produced the only or the most influential model of social dynamics. What we attempt to 
do is to point out that discourses relating to telecommunication systems do incoprorate 
elements that make it possible for us to analyze the historical relationship between 
communication and telecommunication. This possibility is related to the models of 
communicativity that can be found in these discourses—models (theories, conceptualizations) 
that constitute one of the most interesting attempts to think of and formalize social dynamics in 
terms of communication that respond to experience of the present.
As conceptions of communication do not establish any coherent line of development but are 
instead an intrinsically heterogeneous constellation, one should not seek a unifying principle or 
a hidden logic underlying them. Yet in any given period in the history of the administration of 
and by communication, there is a discernible constellation of diverse discourses and 
technologies that in the final analysis sets the limit of communication. “ Communication” 
always takes shape in the mutual effective relationship between the forms and directions of 
contemporary discourses and existing communication systems. It is always an effect of a given 
historical constellation, for it is this constellation which determines the functions of 
communication as well as opening up the areas of articulability. For this reason, as 
communication systems multiply and related discourses became fragmented, the conceptions 
of communication inevitably lose their specificity.
Communication is to be conceived as the effect of collective traditions and institutions, or, if 
you will, in the Foucauldian parlance, of the formations of knowledge and relationships of 
power, and not as an independent positivity. It is thus not a pure, privileged, and primary
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instance that would stand in contrast to something derived, artificial, and only apparent. Being 
always already nonoriginal and impure, it is determined and given its content in relation to a 
social set-up alone, only within which it becomes conceivable. Yet, this relationship is not 
unilateral because communication is the very condition of the self-determination and incessant 
reorganization of the constellation within which it is practised. This is the reason why 
communication can never be external with respect to society, which on the contrary it 
constitutes, and, on the other hand, is why communication cannot be thought of independently 
of social relationships, which determine its meaning.
Against the backdrop of what is said, it is easy to understand that communication is not 
singular but always plural. This is because it consists of numerous heterogeneous and 
irreducible events which do not make up a single, unitary system although they still belong to a 
whole that is the economy of its happening. Communication involves heterogeneity in at least 
three ways: first, in its capacity as a conveyor of meanings as it does not manifest itself at the 
same level as the signs transmitted; secondly, in the communicative event itself, for it is not 
reducible to a common structure; and finally, in its effect, since that is not necessarily what was 
intended by the initial act of communication.23 As it materializes in a multiplicity of 
connections, in which it performs diverse functions and pursues different purposes, 
communication—contrary to the connotations of the term, which make us think of a totality of 
some sort—does not form a complete whole or a single homogeneous realm either. This is 
why the “nature” of communication has to be thought of in the plural and always in 
connection with existing relationships and practices. Thus, without any permanent identity in 
the process in which it ceaselessly constitutes as well as is constituted, communication, in this 
study, is seen as fundamentally nonoriginal. This is to say that there is no deep, hidden 
foundation that would function as a final matrix for accounting for and determining the 
underlying truth of communication or community. Communication cannot claim to possess 
that kind of privileged instance as the ultimate point of reference, for it is nothing other than the 
trace and indication of these fleeting relationships and practices that constitute what society is, 
being constantly redefined along with the simultaneously institutionalizing and dissolving 
social constellations stemming from these practices. It is not something deep, layered and 
complex, something whose essential nature one could reveal through a thorough interpretation, 
but rather something the surface of which, the day-by-day realization of communication, is 
itself the infinite “unfolding” of communication.
It is possible to go even further by saying that, to the extent communication is an integral part 
of the social, there is no communication in itself whose character is established once and for all
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and which is independent of the relationships occurring in community. On the contrary, as has 
been emphasized, it is the very manifestation of these relationships that constitute what society 
is. So, instead of communication in general, we should speak of the relationships of the social, 
of the institutionalizing and reform of collective practices and the birth of new fields and orders 
of communication alongside disappearing, defunct ones. Similarly, the “nature” of 
communication is related to the context of its use, in which it is under constant rearticulation 
and disarticulation. The appropriate unit or type of communication must be determined through 
discretion, which, ultimately, relates to the social functions implemented by and through 
communication.
Because communication is understood here as possible only within a particular system, a point 
that entails a rejection of the notion of an authentic and original instance, the idea of its being 
corrupted or objectified in some way or other (customarily considered to be due to increasing 
system rationality in, for instance, circles influenced by the ideas of the original Frankfurt 
School) is not feasible either. This is the threat, however, that lurks at the core of Agamben’s 
thinking, and which is similar to the later Habermas’s conceptualizations. The threat consists 
of the belief that Being is institutionalized into a certain way of being and has thus lost its 
connection to existence. It is viewed as having been structured into a property or character, 
which, through becoming independent and isolated, encloses the realm of possibilities within 
the prevailing order. Accordingly, language is seen as having broken loose and separated itself 
from historical existence and become autonomous and primary with regard to human activity. 
It is said to be in this process that language is estranged from its own being. What for 
Agamben is under threat is the pure singularity, or “whatever” (based on the Latin term 
quodlibet ens), which does not have any determining identity but can be—yes—whatever.24 As 
human existence is, at root, communication of these pure singularities, the autonomization of 
language necessarily implies undermining the very basis of human community; namely, of its 
openness and its rejection of any collective identity. What then, can be said of this 
characterization? Without going into the richness of thematizations related to this basically 
Heideggerian line of thinking, and limiting our consideration to a single, though essential, 
aspect of the problematics presented, it can be argued that it is precisely the identities which 
constitute the togetherness of existence, not the communication of pure singularities, as these 
are always external to each other. The identities are not what they are presented as being, and 
can claim to be neither coherent (in themselves) nor permanent (over time). Nevertheless, 
identities are what we constantly produce and through which we conduct our existence: the 
endless construction and demolishing of identities is what the human horizon is about. In this 
sense the Nietzschean vision of an unending struggle, which is not marked by complete
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destruction but by creation of what is new, is closer to the perspective of this work. For an 
identity—as an object of contention—is seen here as always being only an indication of 
unequally visible social forces, though without becoming reduced to those.
Moreover, this kind of quodlibet ens or “whatever singularity,” which rejects every identity, is 
considered to be an authentic force, in relation to which production and generalization of 
identities in contrast represent repression. Yet, if we take seriously the idea that there cannot be 
any pure, original singularities, but that they are always determined by the constellation of 
powers they belong to—an idea powerfully formulated, for instance, by Foucault in his critique 
of the repression hypothesis in his Volente de savoir,25 this notion becomes problematic. 
According to this view, the singularities, far from being authentic, are always the effects of the 
related assemblages of power, which establish the area and open up the relationships through 
which alone the singularities can be thought as singularities. Furthermore, it can be noted also 
that representation of language as a pure or original entity which has become estranged from 
its own being is problematic. As language is always already segmented in terms of 
geographical, cultural, and functional modalities, and is for this reason to be conceived as a 
discontinuous and restless network of heterogeneous operations and structures not reducible to 
any single model, it must be thought about through the idea of original impurity. Language is 
not a coherent dimension or pure category, the movement of which would lead to its becoming 
independent from communication, leading to an autonomous, “technicized” entity, for it is 
always determined and modified on the basis of local and functional conditions. In this respect 
our present time does not represent any great historical turning point Insofar as it has to a 
certain extent become technical, which it certainly has, the present time with its functional 
requirements has imposed more technicized models and schemes of operation, of which 
language is an indication and expression.
Yet it would be implausible to view the process as a homogeneous and linear one—even given 
that language does form a constitutive horizon, and is not thus only an effect or reflection of the 
social—for it does not have a conceptualizable identity and cannot therefore be thought as a 
single “whole.” Language is the ultimate nonplace for quodlibet ens for it is exactly what can 
be whatever, there is no stable, positive collective content for it before its happening. In this 
way, its own nature seems to be revealed only as eternal deferral. Furthermore, while it is 
constantly determined and thus also produced through certain historical conditions, language at 
the same time escapes the functionality yielded by exteriority and develops practices and 
audiences of its own. This is why language must be analyzed in the light of its historical 
movement, not as an autonomous instance that has the same immutable temporal and physical
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coordinates over time and place—a condition one has to presuppose if language is to be 
thought as having a single essence. It is language that enables mutual coordinates to be plotted 
and negotiated, not the other way round.
Repetitive and Controlled Practices
Communication is the production of difference, but above all it is the practice which gets its 
driving force from the repetition of difference: what is central is not the differences as such but 
rather the movement of repetition through which prevailing forms are exposed to variations, 
thus bringing new and complex structures into being over time. It is in this respect that 
musician Charles Reich was right when proposing that by “changing harmonic rhythm against 
constant melodic pattern” it was possible to “vary that which is in fact unchanging.”26 What 
is significant here is not so much the effect of what is new but what is repeated, as controlled 
repeatability is one of the central principles that mark the industrial era. It is the weight of 
persistent repetition which, by way of gradual mutations and divergences, gives rise to 
something new without changing itself functionally. This implies that, in interpretations of the 
history of communication, perhaps too much attention has been devoted to the point that it 
appears only in the course of its own being-expressed, and thus the movement of repetition of 
the same, central to which is not production of a meaning but execution of an event is 
neglected. Although these repetitive events are clearly always given their meaningfulness in 
some determining context, it must be noted, that this constant repetition also transforms and 
reconstitutes the conditions of its own meaningfulness in its historical movement.
A communication system produces communicative events, which, in turn, constantly engender 
the community of communication: it is not only a question of producing communication but of 
producing by communication. Unlike in the case of the mass media, where interpretations 
presented constitute a kind of fictional discursive space, intercommunication is related largely 
to routines, to the accomplishment of daily tasks determined by the requirements of 
organizational objectives. In those routines, insofar as they serve some preset ends, the content 
of communication is usually formally subordinate to its functionality, and consequently the 
execution of an action is more significant than the individual meaning-contents transmitted. 
These routines reorganize social existence through constituting collective practices and 
exposing the occurrence of the social to these practices, rather than by interpretative 
representations in the first place. While necessary to the continuance of a given organization, 
these routines process the tasks involved performatively rather than discursively, revealing the
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incessant change and physical restructuring that an organization consists of on a day-by-day 
basis. Although routines are actualized only in specific contexts, determined by discursive 
practices, their daily movements nevertheless have their own dynamics independent of these 
discursive positions. Thus, by focusing on these communicative routines and on their 
conditions, we are able to approach the constitutive horizon of communication in a way that 
does not presuppose any given transcendental principle external to the historicality of 
communication.
What is the nature of the relationship between institutions that distribute information and 
interpersonal communication systems? As these institutions form an integral part of our 
cultural history, should we not turn our attention to centralization of interpretative material 
instead of looking at often mundane, repetitive communicational practices in organizational 
contexts? Would not one be inclined to think that the media, as the central agencies that 
disseminate information, have a privileged relationship with the institutions in question? In the 
research literature, much emphasis has been put on the political significance of the media, 
ultimately at the expense of internal communication systems. The latter are of particular 
significance, however, for through them communication takes place in direct connection to 
social functions without any generalizable interest in the content of communication. Of course, 
there is no communication independent of political interests as such for it can only come about 
in the political realm. But in internal communication, unlike in the media in which the level of 
interpretation is dominant, communication as such, that is, the occurrence of communication as 
a structured process inbuilt into the performance of the system itself, has come to constitute the 
central focus.
Secondly, intercommunication systems are constitutive to the daily functioning of a highly 
developed society. They form the basic structure of the transmission of communication and 
information and are thus a necessary condition of the day-by-day maintenance of modem 
societal institutions. These systems cannot, however, be categorically separated from the 
broadcasting systems, for the former largely enable the latter to function in a cost-effective way, 
as they require interpersonal communication systems to connect different broadcasting stations 
together to extend their area of coverage. Similarly, the functioning of the press is dependent 
on these systems. In this way, the features of these systems are incorporated in broadcasting, 
and their separation is only an analytic operation, not a “natural” state of affairs.
Although always based on a rational whole, organizational communication routines do not give 
rise to any unchanging order but only to series, repetitions, and subtle formal variations which
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serve as the basis of new repetitive programs. While becoming cumulative or concentrated, 
communicative routines are formed into hierarchical chains in accordance with the functionality 
they realize, yet they retain the singular, detached, and operational character peculiar to 
themselves. In this way, the being-articulated of society can be viewed not only as a process 
taking place through thematical interpretations—a process in which institutionalizing 
conceptual orders are exposed to the law of dispersion and reorganization—but also, and 
perhaps more importandy, as the discontinuous and unyielding thread of the daily exercise of 
socially necessary routines, as the flow of the regular and industrious execution of practical, 
mundane functions. To the extent that this flow opens up new channels in its course, repetition 
is the innate principle of the “inoperative community,”27 manifesting itself in the rhythm of 
ever proliferating and gradually varying routines organized within an institutional framework.
In the context of this investigation, communication is not only the existential condition of 
possibility of singularities but also a positive vehicle for expressing and performing social 
relationships. This aspect is explicitly what allows for its analysis from the point of view of its 
use, of the production of meanings, and, hence, allows the positivity of discursive practices to 
be taken into account But in addition to in the discourses proper, this “positivity” manifests 
itself also in the communication routines and in the social functions that organize them through 
diverse communication systems. For this reason communication is not viewed here as anything 
original but rather as always already mediated and impure. Thus, two central features of the 
examination of communication embraced here are as follows: First, “communication” is not 
thought about in itself, but always as something already interpreted and organized, the main 
instances of this in modem societies being the different communication systems studied below. 
What is at issue here is the position and conditions of the systems that produce, organize, and 
ultimately enable communication as communication. Secondly, communication (especially 
telecommunication, which is our subject matter) is not considered only as the condition of 
possibility of community and of discursive structures and practices of meaning, but also, and 
perhaps above all, as communicative routines—as operational communicative events. Both 
communication systems and routines have a positivity irreducible to individual activities.
What characterizes community—its instability, openness, and immunity to any founding 
collective identity—disappears in a perspective limited to a single expression or parole, which 
is always remained within its own interiority. Although communication presupposes the other, 
a single parole is of necessity already accomplished, at least in as far as it has been provided 
for communication. As communication in itself is something incessant, no individual 
communicative event can capture this persistent, continuously varying community that
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communication “is .” This is also the reason why it is not something one can easily refer to in 
numerical terms: although communication takes place through distinct units, the units cannot 
be enumerated. Communication is not the wholeness of all individual communicative acts; it 
cannot be divided into parts, which would then constitute what it is, for in that case the whole 
would be only one term in a series, namely the end product of a series in which all the 
attributes are moments in an infinite progression. If attributes were added to one another in a 
progressive series, they could inevitably be reduced to each other and thus lose their 
distinctiveness.28 This implies that communication is producible indefinitely and it does not 
have a final point that gathers together the wholeness of i t  On the other hand, the attributes are 
not comparable with one another, for they are heterogeneous and variable, and do not constitute 
a uniform series.29 As there is no communication independent of the relationships that 
permeate society, every communicative event is to be seen through the practices, strategies, 
institutions, and discourses which at each point in time constitute the relevant constellation of 
communication. The development of community by way of communication is given its 
continuance in the process in which any utterance, though distinct, cannot be understood as 
independent or uniform but must be thought of in relation to an unstable and continually 
reproduced field of heterogeneous discursive practices. This is also why in this study, unlike in 
the overwhelming mass of the literature, there are no references to relationships between 
quantitative units.
To emphasize the alleged repetitive nature of intercommunication in collective production of 
more or less shared meanings can cause some misunderstandings. It is not my intention to 
imply that the diverse interpretative discursive practices that can be seen, for instance, in the 
media and other information collection and delivery agencies, do not constitute a de facto 
precondition for our world-relation and perceptions. However, these practices, in turn, 
implicitly presuppose the possibility of free, unrestricted intercommunication. Therefore, to the 
extent that it enables interest articulations and interpretative representations to take place in the 
political realm, the possibility of intercommunication is a condition of the political and is never 
determinable or articulable in itself. It is thus “precedes” all utterances of meaning for it 
constitutes the condition of the possibility of meanings without being itself meaningful in any 
definite sense.
Let us now, having clarified our theoretical point of departure, turn to the main body of the 
thesis. In what follows, we will discuss the ontology of communication in relation to the 
telegraph, the telephone, and computer networks, respectively. Let us start with the telegraph 
system.
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3. Lightning Lines
The communicative sphere in the last half of the nineteenth century was structured as a result 
of the conjunction of two separate fields of forces. They were characterized by a concern for 
political unity, for securing the formal preconditions of a political system, on one hand, and the 
advent of telecommunication in the form of telegraph technology, on the other hand. Once 
interweaved, they formed a new communicative order in the place of a system of local and 
regional networks that lost its effectiveness by the late nineteenth century.
When the telegraph system came to characterize the self-conception of a whole era, modernity 
differentiated itself from its historical past and presented itself, especially in its American form, 
as new and ahistorical. In the eyes of the modems, the telegraph encapsulated something that 
had never found historical expression. If this experience of a new era could be crystallized, it 
would be the conception of the technical basis of the political. In other words, what is at issue 
is the fact that communication as technique (telecommunication) seemed to enable 
communication as community. What was conceived as a community was not only the nation as 
a political community but also, potentially, the whole world as a community of independent 
nations. Here, telecommunication was held to present community as a community, not to 
structure it from outside, as it were. Telecommunication, thus, secured and let community be 
what it was, that is, a community.
The development of telecommunication has always been essentially connected with the 
existence and history of a community. It has, in the first place, invariably been regarded in 
America as to have determined the national basis for the political.30 On the other hand, by 
engendering more or less common national publicity, telecommunication systems—with the 
telegraph leading the way—also created the network of conditions and possibilities necessaiy 
for business organization—the principal user and developer of this mode of communication. 
This is why the history of communal communicativity is closely tied to development of the 
communicative and organizatorial conditions of commercial activity. They constituted an 
environment for thought about communication, but to an ever greater extent
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communication—in the form of improving communication systems—formed the environment 
for social order.
Let me begin by examining the way the development of transportation and communications 
systems has been involved in forming a national community. This is followed, in the second 
section, by an examination of the telegraph’s role in the creation of centralized communication 
structures.
3.1. Coming Unity
The introduction of the commercial telegraph system can be seen as having been a process 
without a present tense. This is true in two senses. First, the telegraph inaugurated a new era of 
electric communications that, with the improving transportation systems, destroyed the 
traditional order of life and gradually made it necessary to erect institutional frameworks for its 
social control. The telegraph was thought about through existing social institutions and 
practices which provided insufficient yet indispensable cultural contexts for it. Secondly, and 
more generally, any event, it can be said, has no present. Rather an event retreats and advances 
in two directions at once, namely, to the past and the future. Both of these form complete and 
distinct realms in themselves, each excluding the other and dividing any singular event into the 
past and the future. An event is always determined by these two realms; it is a borderline case 
within the scope of a given temporal direction which it reflects and expresses. This is because a 
pure event is at the same time something which has just happened and something about to 
happen, never something which is happening: the event cannot produce its own frame of 
reference.
The event of the advent of the telegraph can be understood through this interpretation. Its 
development has been linked with either the past or the future. In the former case, the existing 
arrangement for information distribution—the postal system—served as the closest conceptual 
framework for thinking about the telegraph, whereas in the latter case the idea of the possibility 
of a universal language for connecting all peoples formed a horizon for this. On one hand, the 
telegraph was conceived in accordance with general aims which the postal system served, 
especially with that of integrating the nation by disseminating public information. On the other 
hand, when its unifying potential was understood, the telegraph soon captured public 
imagination as the bond enabling future peace and harmony among nations. Thus, it can be 
seen that these were not two separate phases of the development of the telegraph, but instead
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closely interrelated ones, centering around the telegraph’s unifying capabilities. In both cases 
there was the same underlying logic which reflected the contemporary conception of the nature 
of this first form of telecommunication: it was conceived of as a fundamentally neutral 
instrument of communication. That conception made it possible to formulate communication 
projects for national unification and to universalize the hopes and plans invested in those. Let 
me now elaborate on these themes a little further.
The Postal System
Socially institutionalized communication in nineteenth century America was realized mainly in 
terms of face-to-face relationships within local contexts. The nation was a loose association of 
poorly connected settlements, ’’island communities,” to use Robert Wiebe’s well-known 
expression. In this dispersed societal structure, based on the principle of local autonomy, weak 
communications rendered interregional interaction difficult, thus impeding public participation 
in politics and enactment of public policy.31 The problem of communication was one of the 
most important ones national government had to solve, being as much a technical as a political 
question. There was a general concern regarding the limits to extension of the Union as an 
integrated political unit in a period of rapid westward movement coupled with fragmentary and 
unpredictable communication and transportation systems. T. Ewing, Secretary of the Interior, 
urged “some means of communication across the continent, through our own territory, from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific” in 1849, thus expressing the need to link the two coasts.32 In the 
following year President Millard Fillmore brought up the same question—as Zachary Taylor 
had done earlier in his annual message as President.33 It was crucial to link settlements by 
reliable and effective means to the main body of the Union in order to maintain political order 
and coordinate the scattered system of regions into the framework of one political system.
Many plans and proposals for large-scale projects were presented, including roads, canals, and 
waterways, aimed at opening “speedy and easy communication” throughout the territories of 
the Union and thus improving intranational public communications.34 These routes were 
important not only for the military, but also to “facilitate the administration of Government: 
and more especially, in a country like ours, to make known, by a rapid circulation, the political 
disquisitions relative to public measures,” as the matter was put in “the Report upon a 
National Road, Washington to New Orleans.”35 The postal system was the foremost national 
institution developed in accordance with these objectives, attaining such a coverage and
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regularity of service that it came to constitute the basis of the American communications 
system until the introduction of the telegraph in 1840s.
The American postal system emerged as a focal governmental organization that linked the 
demands of communications and governance. It bound together scattered localities and 
facilitated their governance, becoming the central administrative apparatus of the nation by the 
early nineteenth century.36 There were at least two reasons to further effective and reliable 
dissemination of political information. First, according to a republican doctrine that was an 
essential part of the theory of government from Thomas Jefferson’s sponsorship of a “Bill for 
the More General Diffusion of Knowledge” onward, an informed and vigilant public 
constituted the foundation of a liberal governance, forming an ultimate defense against a strong 
government. Participation of a politically aware citizenry in the affairs of national politics 
became an essential republican principle.37 Secondly, a need to Americanize the growing 
number of immigrants forced the administration to seek means of developing a comprehensive 
system for information distribution.38 The policy of informing the public was conducive to 
growing a comprehensive communication and transportation network, which became the 
technical basis for an evolving institutionalization of the structure of information distribution.
The postal system was a tool under the government’s control for binding localities together, for 
decreasing the isolation of settlements, and for tightening the mutual interdependence of the 
regions, thereby enabling the feeling of a common national space in both political (a truly 
federal unit) and economic (a national market) terms. In fact, it seemed possible, as a 
commentator put it in 1829, that unlike any other mechanism of intercourse, the postal system 
could transform the whole country from a confederation of separate states into “one great 
neighborhood,”39 thus anticipating Samuel F. B. Morse’s similar description of the power of 
the telegraph. As Richard John pointed out, long before the telegraph was credited with having 
“annihilated” space and time, the postal system had been described in exactly the same 
terms.40
The concept of unification—an idea that did not always get explicitly formulated but became 
rather a de facto basis for thinking about communication—implied two interlinked political 
tasks. Firstly, it introduced the requirement to create physical communication and 
transportation connections. This was the dimension of roads, embankments, locks, 
intersections, and tracks constituting a network of trails over the surface of a wide terrain. 
Secondly, there was a need to construct a comprehensive and effective distribution system for 
public information. This latter task naturally relied on the existence of an adequate physical
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infrastructure, but it had a distinct dynamics of its own. More important than to coordinate the 
evolving set of tracks was to create an arrangement for securing unrestricted circulation of 
different types of information over distance.
On the other hand, if both of these tasks were necessary for unification, the objective in itself 
can be seen as having two distinct yet related parts, namely political stabilization and cultural 
homogenization. Political stabilization accounted for governmental attempts to mould the 
country into a coherent political unit with its central political institutions and legislative 
frameworks covering the whole country in an equal fashion. The need for cultural 
homogenization, for its part, showed itself in the emphasis on the common national ground of 
the American people, irrespective of differences in ethnic background, geographic location, or 
individual interests. However, connections between arrangements to develop a comprehensive 
informational environment and the construction of physical infrastructure networks should not 
be seen as separate from the prevalent economic activity surrounding them, which, in turn, was 
an essential prerequisite for formation of the national market.
Both processes were, however, centered around the same goal; namely, rendering the nation 
more like one political and economic unit And the postal system provided the vehicle to bring 
these objectives together in a way that allowed not only governance of the population but 
counter-governance of the government by the people as well, thus “drawing still closer the 
bond of union,” as a congressional committee put it in 1830.41 As telegraphic communication 
was introduced in the U.S., it was incorporated into this general political constellation. The 
urge for yet speedier communication had induced Postmaster General John McLean to 
consider the introduction of a telegraph system for postal use already in 1828. At that time the 
term “telegraph” referred to the system, invented by a French engineer called Claude Chappe, 
of transmitting visible signals between towers located about ten miles from each other in a 
chain. However, Congress never authorized the construction of this kind of optical telegraph, 
although pressure to restrain growing market speculation by some effective means of 
communication—faster than any private express service in delivering market information—was 
imperative. It seemed that the electric telegraph, the “last and most wondrous birth of this 
wonder-teeming age,”42 would suit this purpose perfectly.
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Wiring the Nation
Regarding the complex processes of territorial expansion and population increase with their 
unanticipated concomitants in the society of mid-nineteenth century America, the continental 
extension of communication and transportation systems became crucial in maintaining political 
consistency: the telegraph and the railway became pivotal technologies of social control. They 
facilitated communication to remote forts and settlements, thereby increasing capabilities to 
improve military defense and coordinate social processes. The growing network of connections 
was thus conducive to increasing safety, predictability and homogeneity.
Two events in the early history of telegraphy marked the phase when this technology started to 
play an important part in creating and maintaining areas of stability. First, telegraph lines, or 
“lightning lines” as they came to be known, started to spread vigorously under private control 
in the latter part of the first half of the nineteenth century. Secondly, connection of the 
telegraph to the railways was operationally a mutual triumph with profound repercussions for 
the whole of national industry and commerce. The telegraph provided the railways with a 
control mechanism required for effective operation of its intricate network, so that management 
could be kept informed of the location and movements of trains in its system. The railways, for 
their part, could provide the telegraph company with an exclusive right of way, free office space 
in the stations, and a commitment to keep rival telegraph companies away.43 The telegraph 
equipped the railroad company with an economical means of controlling traffic, thereby 
rendering management “prompt, consolidated and simple.” To the telegraph company it was 
“protection, economy, permanence and strength.”44 After the alliance between the telegraph 
and the railroad had been established, they developed largely hand in hand, forming a 
comprehensive network for transportation and communication. Together they provided the 
speed, regularity and reliability required to generate commercial relationships which, it was 
hoped, would lead to national cohesion.
Speed came to be established as a new factor that would rearrange the conditions of 
communication. The telegraph was fast: “thirty characters can be transmitted in a minute by a 
single instrument; and as these characters are conventional signs, they may mean either 
numbers, letters, words, or sentences.”45 Now for the first time communication could 
potentially become a continuous flow supplanting the preceding forms of intermittent waves of 
information supply. It was the telegraph that made communication a continual process, thus 
freeing it from the rhythmical motion of the postal service and from physical transportation in 
general. The advent of the telegraph did not, of course, take the place of the postal system as a
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mechanism for general information delivery, but what it did do was establish a brand new 
conception of communication, differentiating intermittent torrents from a continuous flow, and 
transportation from communication. This was the moment that marked the beginning of the 
course of action in which information came to be utilized as a means for controlling other 
technological processes, especially transportation systems.
The telegraph expanded the boundaries of a region within which the regular exchange of 
information could be routinely maintained by liberating information transfer from 
transportation.46 This required immense investments in the construction of a comprehensive 
system of communication lines. Making the West Coast reachable from the East by telegraphic 
means was a major development in the creation and extension of areas of stability 47 The first 
words of the President of the United States through the new line, which was completed on 26 
October 1861, eight years prior to the transcontinental railway, besides showing great relief, 
was indicative of the belief in the harmonizing effects of this new connection to “the stability 
and union of the Republic — .’,48
Now, it was evident that the telegraph, coupled with the railroad, played an essential part in 
plans for national unification and homogenization49 an idea which had strengthened by the 
time of the threat of, and continued to grow stronger especially after, the Civil War. Therefore a 
legislative framework was needed to create a predictable environment for favorable extension 
and consolidation of the nascent communications network. This was meant to ensure, first, 
protection of the telegraph lines {any injury to, or unauthorized interference with, the 
telegraph lines will be prosecuted); secondly, secrecy of dispatches {penal laws had been 
adopted to secure the secrecy o f messages transmitted over telegraph lines)', thirdly, 
indiscriminate transmission of dispatches {any dispatch, with the money for its transmission, 
offered at a station, cannot be refused by the telegraph company, except in cases where the 
transmission would be in violation o f the patent rights o f another company); and finally, right 
of way for the telegraph consisting of the right to build lines over public land and roads {any 
telegraph company shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate lines o f telegraph 
through and over any portion o f the public domain o f the United States). The act which 
Congress passed in 1866 granted telegraph companies the right to build lines “over and along 
any of the military or post roads of the United States”50 served as a basis for organizing not 
only a rudimentary form of regulation but also a way of supporting companies in their effort to 
spread telegraph lines across the country.
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As establishment of economic links between different regions was considered the primary way 
of consolidating the nation, the government’s endeavors were directed at encouraging an 
extension of the telegraph lines in addition to furthering a development of the railroad system. 
For as the then Secretary of State, William Seward stated: “Other conditions being equal, the 
country that has the largest extension and the most thorough radiation of the telegraph wire 
enjoys the most active and profitable system of domestic commerce.”51 In effect, the telegraph 
appeared a central mechanism for fostering truly national markets.52 Another reason for 
interest in the telegraph was a need to inform the public—a goal successfully advanced by the 
postal system. Increasing social circulation of information by means of the telegraph was an 
attempt to diminish differences in availability of information between regions and localities. 
Once the telegraph assumed the character of a network, it became an excellent means for this 
particular purpose. Thus, systems were established by which news and governmental 
information could be sent simultaneously from a central station to a number of points, enabling 
reception of congressional reports, for example, at the same time in Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
and New Yoik.53 In this respect, the Wire Service that later became a part of the New York 
Associated Press grew into a central institution, transmitting uniform news to numerous 
newspapers over the country by utilizing precisely the network nature of telegraph lines.
Improved communication and transportation capabilities coupled with expanding political 
reporting by wire service were seen as advancing the forming of public opinion, which, in turn, 
was as a quintessential element in a process of political integration. The rising public 
availability of information gave rise to an idea of political transparency. As James A. Garfield, 
then a member of Congress put it, “distance, estrangement, isolation, have been overcome by 
the recent amazing growth in the means of intercommunication. — Public affairs are now more 
public, and private less private, than in former ages.”54 If the telegraph had brought, in a certain 
crucial respect, transparency to the economic realm, it was hoped the same could take place in 
political domain as well. Although it constituted only the latest improvement in already 
relatively rapid and reliable communications and transportation systems 55 the telegraph was 
soon established as a basis for modem systems of information distribution allowing individual 
views and interests to get in touch with one another. By itself becoming part of an experience 
of the social, it redefined the conditions for a feeling of nationality, as, for example, the 
telegraph historian Robert Thompson observed 56 The telegraph thus constituted a means for 
national ends, but in addition to this and more importantly, a means for constitution of the 
political as a national experience.
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A sense of unity, enabled by the improving means of communication, was a popular theme in 
nineteenth century literature, as shown, for example, in a passage by Joseph Bradley in 1849:
“W hat constitutes the indissoluble bond which unites and keeps us together as one nation, 
as one people? What, but the mutuality of interests produced by the great variety of our 
industrial productions, and the consequent exchanges which the mutual supply of wants 
requires? It is this which lays down upon the map of our country the complicated network 
of our canals, our railroads, and our telegraphs. It is this which interlocks and weaves 
together all our public lines of communication and transportation; which carries life into all 
the breathing engines of social prosperity that labor around us, on the sea and on the land, 
by day and by night, unceasingly.”57
It is true that the telegraph and railroad made elements, sections and regions more 
interdependent in the late nineteenth century America. An assemblage of practices, institutions 
and technologies centering around the telegraph laid the foundations of a systematic and 
effective mechanism for channeling a continuous flow of information across the nation. It 
should still be kept in mind that the process of harmonizing the country was not a matter 
exclusively of the scope of information routes, of the nature of the material moving over and 
within these networks, or of the speed of individual pieces of information traversing a given 
delivery system. Instead and above all, it had to do with growing awareness of a common, 
although not always necessarily very tangible, political space. Accelerated pace and enlarged 
scope of distribution of information undoubtedly strengthened the sense of one nationhood, 
and of “one people.”58 With development of communication networks, the Union would 
become, it was believed, “more and more one people, thinking more alike, acting more alike 
and having one impulse.”59 However, this did not only enable the feeling of a shared political 
system—it constituted also the place where the political was presented as an issue. Forming the 
conditions for social communication, communication systems structured, to a certain extent, a 
space in which society could reflect itself, so to speak. It formed a space where this reflection 
could take place, allowing members of society to define an experience of the present.
Commitment to a social unity, to a truly cultural integration in which divergences and 
disparities can always be reconciled because of common national ground, was thus fostered 
and sustained by the ever-extending and deepening infrastructure of centers and links that 
together formed a mechanism for a comprehensive public to emerge. Thus, we can conclude, as 
Thompson has done, that “a stronger and more unified nation — emerged with the 
development of the telegraph and the railroad.”60 Notwithstanding improvements in
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transportation or communications, however, or perhaps precisely because of those, population 
was growing more diverse than ever before.61 Stable structures of meaning emphasizing unity 
that were linked to agricultural America were becoming transformed into something different 
through closure of the frontier, the rise of class divisions, rapid urbanization, and a massive 
influx of immigrants. Extension of markets and enhanced distribution of newspapers increased 
the possibility for unconnected local conflicts to become articulated as confrontations between 
political groups on a national level. As conditions of social information economy transformed 
from an arrangement based on local and regional news distribution to a national information 
market, patterns that had previously maintained social cohesion became a basis for social 
diversity.62 So, although the telegraph and the press did unify the country by taking up 
nationwide issues, they also rendered differences of opinion more clearly visible.
The telegraph constituted not only a tool for creating and fortifying connections, but far more 
importantly, also a system within which these connections could be thought about in and as a 
consistent whole. This horizon of multiplying and network forming links formed the 
prerequisites that to some extent allowed contemporaries to think in terms of cohesion and 
unity while at the same time it increased the overall complexity and uncontrollability of social 
processes. Whereas telegraphic communication indeed improved the means of administering a 
vast territory with its growing population as a federal unit,63 it also, and perhaps more 
importantly, laid the basis for a quickening pace of physical and informational entities to 
traverse the country. It thereby contributed to unleashing of multitude of movements with 
nationwide effects. By letting these unprecedented forces loose the telegraph actually 
contributed to undermining the plausibility of thinking about a unified social being. Naturally, 
however, this did not prevent new political projects based on the very idea of unity to emerge, 
as the need to conceptualize social processes under a coherent framework only grew bigger.
Universal Language
Thinking about communication in the age of the telegraph has no doubt been preoccupied with 
the idea of unity. To be more precice, it is the idea of a conceptual whole that has constituted a 
way of thinking about communication, insofar as communication is manifested in and through 
the telegraph system. It has been conceived of as being a means for engendering a political 
whole, the functioning of which it would then constantly maintain. Yet on the other hand, the 
conceptual wholes in which this could take place emerged from telegraphy itself, as systems 
and discourses relating to telegraphy provided, with other fields of practices, forms for
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conceptualizing the social in a rapidly changing age. Moreover, this was not restricted only to 
the Union, for the lines along with the telegraph developed and the logic it followed seemed to 
point the way for conceiving international relationships as well.
As extension of telegraph systems continued unabated, it became natural to think that if the 
telegraph could unify the country, why would it not do the same to the rest of the world? The 
theme of unification linked to the spreading of the telegraph was thus taken to its logical 
conclusion: it was seen as being a potentially unifying force among different nations and 
cultures, a universal language, so to speak, thus evoking Enlightenment’s dream of a 
continuous extension of the ratio that would shed the light of reason on dark comers and 
recesses previously only indistinctly visible, and in this way render universal space transparent 
once and for all.
Thus, the telegraph’s spreading out toward foreign countries marked the beginning of 
universalization of hopes invested in its unifying potential. The Atlantic cable project was the 
foremost intercontinental enterprise at the time, development of which was closely followed and 
reported on on both shores of the ocean. After the line’s completion in 1866, which knocked 
out a project to construct an alternative overland telegraph line to Europe through Siberia, 
Seward saw it “tributary to an expansion of our national commerce, and ultimately of our 
political institutions.”64 Toward the end of the decade, commercial and political links to 
foreign countries became more important, which was reflected in the need to create 
corresponding telegraph connections. This physical outward expansion of the telegraph lines 
caused great enthusiasm and optimism among the contemporaries.
A contemporary commentator in London extolled the electric telegraph, in 1866, for “it has 
gathered the civilized world together into instant and direct intercourse; a network of 
sympathetic intelligence encircles the earth, and we feel as though it had always so existed 
Since the introduction o f printing, there has not arisen an agency so beneficial and 
ubiquitous”65 People in the nineteenth century, especially in pre-Civil War America, believed 
that telegraphy and the railways, as both were seen as pure scientific miracles of the time, 
would not only bring political unification to America, but in parallel with that, also improve 
“the political atmosphere of the nations thus brought into closer moral contact with each 
other,”66 in this way eventually ending all hostilities. Capturing the sentiment of the age, James 
Reid, a telegraph pioneer who had served as a superintendent of several telegraph companies, 
held that the telegraph “gave to races of men in various far-separated climes a sense of unity. 
In a very remarkable degree, not necessarily definable, the telegraph in this mission of union,
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confederated human sympathies and elevated the conception of human brotherhood. By it the 
peoples of the world were made to stand closer together.”67
Also Morse himself believed firmly in the emancipating capacity of the telegraph. “The effects 
of the Telegraph on the interests of the world,” he pronounced in 1855, “have, as yet, scarcely 
begun to be apprehended —. I trust that one of its effects will be to bind man to his fellowman 
in such bonds of amity as to put an end to war. I think I can predict this effect as in a not 
distant future.”68 This was because of the telegraph’s capability to make “ one neighborhood 
of the whole country.”69 In this way, the formulation originally used to describe the effects of 
the postal system was rephrased and recontextualized in relation to the telegraph, where it 
found a new home for a long time. At issue here, as well as in the postal system, was how as 
vast a nation as America could hold together and function efficiently, avoiding disintegration 
and chaos. This horizontal perspective framed speech about the telegraph and linked it with the 
question of maintaining democracy’s ability to function. Morse’s statement was clearly 
motivated by this issue of a working order of democracy in a continental-sized nation, but was 
used to nourish visions of international harmony too.
The optimism these enunciations reflected gave expression to general hopes and beliefs of 
contemporary commentators on the power of the new instrument in advancing peace among 
men. “The best interests of the world,” declared George Wilson, a professor of technology at 
the University of Edinburgh, “are bound up in [the telegraph’s] progress, and its mission is 
emphatically one of peace. It does not merely speak swiftly but softly, and it offers men a 
common speech in which all mankind can converse together.”70 The underlying idea of a 
universal language provided by the telegraph, which would serve as a basis on which different 
nations could establish a union of peace, was quite unlike that which its position as an essential 
mechanism of a rapidly bureaucratizing and technologizing world would warrant thinking only 
a few decades later. The question as to whether the telegraph indeed constituted a language that 
was universal was not seen as problematic at the time. This was because telecommunications 
did not appear so much a public utility as a political tool in rivalry between great powers until 
the end of the nineteenth century.71 The idea that the language of the telegraph was spoken in a 
particularly “soft” way became increasingly questionable as the telegraph’s position as a 
strategical instrument in political and military matters became clear.
Hopes that accompanied many of the declarations in which the electric telegraph was regarded 
as “facilitating Human Intercourse and producing Harmony among Men and Nations”72 
ignored the fact that the telegraph was a remarkable social force in its own right. It was not
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only a complicated technological device that enabled diverse tasks to be performed much faster 
and over a much longer distance than before: the telegraph also unleashed a movement that 
changed—with other social processes—the prevailing social dynamics in American society, 
like every form of subsequent new communications technology, it changed and restructured 
prevailing fields of societal relationships. It engendered a renewed form of interaction, a novel 
matrix for rearranged power relationships. Moreover, it created a new system of knowledge, a 
whole set of positions that enabled one to incorporate a new field of objects and processes to 
an existing body of common culture. Finally, it established a novel network for the distribution 
of information. The question that has to be raised now is how the electric telegraph came to be 
understood as a purely enabling system, with certain inborn emancipating tendencies, that 
appeared as an asset rather than a threat
The answer lies in a conception of the telegraph as fundamentally neutral in its innermost 
nature. It was seen as a simple adjunct to existing social practices by improving the way they 
were carried out, and this was true not only with regard to some individual tasks but also to the 
functioning of the whole social communication economy as well. This neutrality constituted a 
precondition for emancipating tendencies: it was the mental terrain that made possible evolution 
of hopes of a universal spirit of togetherness. When considering contemporary conceptions of 
the nature of this new form of telecommunication, one can discern at least two distinct yet 
related features characterizing it:
1. The telegraph constituted a thoroughly instrumental medium for communication, it was 
thought. Irrespective of its mysterious double nature, which combined the pure miracle of 
electricity with strange mechanical logic, it was eagerly adopted as a facilitating adjunct to 
social practices soon after its practicability had been demonstrated. It was an instrumental tool 
for performing more effectively certain functions that existed prior to its introduction, not a 
social force in its own right that would engender radically new practices or organizational 
structures, let alone new ways of being. Contemporaries distinguished between individuals and 
formal social institutions. In this respect, the telegraph was analogous to central government: it 
was seen as only an appendage to the actual functioning of society. It was a technology that 
people could use according to their individual purposes, whilst its productivity was not yet 
recognized. The telegraph constituted first and foremost a medium of communication, not a 
social institution.
Later it turned out that institutionalization of the telegraph resulted in unprecedented 
accumulation of business power. Growing financial concentration deviated from and
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simultaneously infringed upon what seemed to be the natural state of affairs, but before this 
became clear, the operational mechanism of the telegraph was not seen as a productive social 
force. This was because the telegraph, once combined with the natural dynamics of society, was 
seen only as improving the effectiveness of society’s inborn characteristics. Its exploitation did 
not aim to change but rather to support prevailing practices, it was thought, without adding any 
extra features or taking away existing ones. However, if nonetheless it altered something, that 
was only for society’s own good since eveiything it created was regarded as having already 
preexisted within it in an inchoate form. Thus, it brought out the inner potentialities of 
American society, eventually rendering its rhythm of life much quicker than it used to be while 
still maintaining its basic nature and order intact
The telegraph was conceived, in sum, as an immensely effective adjunct to governance and 
communication, not a social power of its own right that would bring about a redistribution of 
the prevailing power system. Although positioned within the normal and natural, it was not 
considered an inherent or genuine element of society. This is exactly why it was neither inside 
nor outside of the social order rather, the telegraph’s essence was neutral, which precluded its 
location in positive terms into either category. It was only through this state of affairs, by being 
a tool without any positive social nature of its own, that it enabled the enlightened dream of a 
universal and transparent space, potentially common to all people.
2. Every communication technology creates its own area of communicability in the sense that it 
sets up the particular conditions, definitions, and ways of communication within its domain, 
operating by coding and territorialization.73 In telegraphy an assemblage of these structural 
determinations, the Morse code being its coding system and the way of its territorialization 
being the institution of the telegraph office, was not seen as having any essential influence on 
the substance of the message itself. In this case, contemporaries distinguished between content 
and its form of expression, leaving to be discovered the insight that content, like expression, 
has a form of its own. This allowed them to see the telegraph as an effective way of 
transmitting preexisting messages without the messages being changed by their transmission. 
The telegraph was established as a medium for transmitting independent content: what the 
telegraph transmitted was seen as existing irrespective of its existence.
This was reflected in a tendency to conceive technical improvement in communications not in 
terms of a new enabling productive principle but instead of face-to-face communication, for it 
constituted a basic level of the contemporary social communication economy: “The railroad, 
the telegraph, and the press have virtually brought our citizens — face to face — .”74 The
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telegraph, as any other communications medium, was seen primarily as allowing 
communication to take place over distances chiefly in the same terms as those in which it 
occurred in local, everyday circumstances. Although messages that were sent over the telegraph 
could not be formulated in as verbose a manner as in interpersonal discussion, and although 
they had to be transmitted through unfamiliar officials working in the telegraph office, the 
directness of the messages sent was regarded as remaining unaffected. As the telegraph was 
almost exclusively a one-way medium, lacking the interactivity present in conversation, the idea 
that it brought citizens face to face with one another must not be inteipreted in terms of 
conversational criteria, but in some more general context. That context seemed to be the public. 
The telegraph possessed the capacity to bring individual opinions together in the sense that it 
enabled modem publicity. This publicity defined a space within which it was possible for 
conceptions to be viewed alongside one another, the press being the reflecting surface, and the 
telegraph and other means of communication the vehicle of the publicity thus defined.
What kind of system did the telegraph institutionalize in the communication economy of 
nineteenth century society? It created a system that differentiated flows of information 
according to their factual value, thereby dividing messages into different classes and types that 
had previously seemed to constitute a rather uniform group: “The first result of the discovery 
[of electricity] has been a vast diffusion of what is called ‘news,’ the recording of every event - 
- eveiywhere without perceptible interval of time.”75 Telegraphic communication was 
fundamentally about transmissing messages with a particular pecuniary or news value. 
Information in its sphere moved rapidly, whereas other contemporary literary or journalistic 
materials continued to circulate relatively unhurriedly. More importantly, now these rapidly 
transmitted telegrams became the norm: they defined the type of information that was 
considered to be of particular social importance. This was one unanticipated concomitant of the 
great communication projects aimed at bringing unity to the Union.
In conclusion, the universal hopes invested in the telegraph can be traced back to the project of 
national unification. As the postal system provided a model through which it could be seen as 
part of the contemporary communication infrastructure, the telegraph soon became a focal 
point for a broader and more utopian social order, because universalization of its potential as a 
link between individuals, regions, and nations made it a general political technique for 
community-building. Let us now, lastly, turn to the question of what was the cultural self­
conception of nineteenth century America like, a self-conception which allowed telegraph be 
seen not only as an instrumental and neutral communication technology, but above all, as a 
more or less coherent whole.
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Contractual Relations
After a period of suspicion about its supposed advantages, it gradually became clear that the 
telegraph would constitute a key asset in the modernization of society. The telegraph could 
transmit messages within a single day over a distance that by mail would have taken possibly 
weeks and thus became an unbeatable communications device whenever speed was required. 
As people became convinced of the practicability of the telegraph and as it started to spread 
across the country, usually following post roads and later railroads, isolated communities 
became knitted together in ever tighter bonds: now news of changes in amounts of cotton 
production in the South was transmitted almost instantly to every major financial center, from 
which the implications reverberated over the whole nation. It was these circumstances that 
politized the communicative sphere of the telegraph.
The nation confronted the question of the telegraph in an era when separation of the spheres of 
government and individuals, including their mutual associations, defined the political horizon. 
A strong distinction between state and society was made in the tradition of the classical 
liberalism of nineteenth century America. The scope of the state was kept limited by a doctrine 
of negative state, the central idea of which was that the state was not allowed to interfere with 
the private sphere. This, for its part, was composed of autonomous individuals who were seen 
as possessing inalienable and absolute natural rights that no government could change. It was 
held by Jefferson and other political leaders of that period that the purpose of government was 
precisely to protect these rights, and the theory of natural rights in this way became a 
foundation for the concept of limited government76 The idea of limited government became 
dominant in the era after the Civil War when the political economy was understood largely in 
terms of laissez-faire liberalism. The popularity of that concept among academic and popular 
theorists stemmed mainly from a belief that the social order was governed by an immutable and 
universal law of nature, that competition was a fundamental characteristic of that law, and, 
finally, that government was an inefficient agency compared to natural competition.77
Social progress, it was held, was dependent neither on political institutions or practices, nor on 
local, traditional customs or conceptions. All that was fundamental in society, all that 
characterized it as a republican community, was seen as based on the authority of free 
individuals: the political in classical liberalism was encapsulated in this principle of popular 
sovereignty. The interests of society in general were seen as being best advanced by the 
discretion of enlightened private individuals who, by pursuing civic virtue, operated 
simultaneously on behalf of the whole community. The political was no more than the sum of
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the individual interests involved. The whole, they believed, was given content and meaning only 
by its integral parts, and, therefore, it could never be greater than these parts. This was the case 
because what was “true of every member of the society individually,” according to Jefferson, 
was “true of them all collectively, since the rights of the whole can be no more than the sum of 
the rights of individuals.”78 The political, thus, was essentially a heterogeneous entity in the 
guise of a common and unambiguous one.
Free contracts were a central organizing principle of civil society. Liberalism interpreted 
relationships within the private sphere as contracts through which individuals sought to achieve 
personal security and economic gain. Therefore the conception of politics in negative terms, as 
bearing responsibility for securing civil society’s inviolability, must be translated as meaning 
above all protection of a realm of interindividual contracts. Within this tradition of thinking the 
contractual relationship was viewed as “rational,” as opposed to other, “emotional” 
relationships such as those relating to family or friendship. The view included a belief in 
historical progress from an “irrational” society based on custom and sentimental bonds to a 
rational one in which society would be organized in accordance with a model of formal, 
objective contracts.79 This conception is epitomized in William Graham Sumner’s writing 
dating back to 1883, according to which in the middle Ages “society was dependent — on 
status, and the tie, or bond, was sentimental. In our modem state -- the social structure is based 
on contract —. Contract, however, is rational ~  realistic, cold and matter-of-fact.”80 As civil 
society was seen as an original source of human progress, and as the contract mechanism 
provided a principle of mediation between autonomous individuals—a basic unit of civil 
society—contracts gained the status of a paradigmatic societal mechanism.
The doctrine of liberty of contract forged a link that connected the individual liberty of classical 
liberalism to the market, for it not only placed individuals with their private associations in the 
economic domain, but, most importantly, became the organizing principle of social 
relationships, if these were understood as market relationships, as liberalists generally 
understood them during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century. This link between a 
political concept of self-government and an economic model of contract was widely thought to 
have a scientific grounding as it seemed to demonstrate a natural affinity between legal and 
economic ideas of liberty.81 The market mechanism, in turn, was conceived of as forging a tie 
between private liberty and the general good, as the combined effect of free individual 
economic decisions was held to advance the common interest82 Thus, the liberty of contract 
constituted a system for mediating on relationships between the right to individual liberty, 
markets, and the idea of a common good, as all were understood within classical liberalism.
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The market economy in nineteenth century America was governed by an ethos of freedom of 
contract it was “the golden age of the law of contract.”83
Jefferson and his followers believed in an inherently self-regulating market, consisting of equal 
sized economic units none of which was bigger or more powerful than the other. Free 
competition between different interests standing on an equal footing would ensure the ultimate 
balance and fairness of the market in a predominantly agrarian society. In addition to group 
competition, wide diffusion of property and a vast open frontier were seen as factors that 
secured the harmonious working of the market, which is why administration should assume a 
highly restricted role in economic affairs and particularly should not advance the interests of 
any single social group in relation to others. Thus, the common-law regime of contract and 
property, under which social relationships were constructed, was seen as ensuring a fair, self­
regulating market environment as long as its “natural” order was not artificially interfered 
with.84
It must be borne in mind that the contract institution operated simultaneously on two different 
registers, for it constituted both a paradigmatic model for social relationships and a legislative 
regulation mechanism. Similarly and concurrently, also the telegraph system operated on two 
separate levels in that it not only provided a particular service to be exploited but also 
constituted a whole framework within which it was possible to view the complex system of 
communicative relationships as a consistent whole.
Within the liberalist tradition of thought the telegraph could be conceived as having an inherent 
relationship to the contract principle. The telegraph was conducive to expansion of the market, 
and thus to social application of the contract principle in both of its cultural and legal 
dimensions. It rapidly became the foremost medium for performing commercial transactions 
whenever speed was a premium value—thus establishing itself as a de facto standard in a realm 
based on the contract mechanism.85 It therefore became a conceptual model of an economic 
relationship based on modem market conditions in the minds of contemporary Americans. 
Seen in this light, the telegraph, being essentially a system for intercommunication over 
distances, was congruent with the prevailing political self-conception and the structure of 
society, which was composed of independent individuals. The telegraph provided an effective 
and still neutral, it was thought, inter-individual connection mechanism. While the principal 
social relationship was viewed within political liberalism as being an economic one, the liberty 
of contract institutionalized a constitutive political mechanism that arranged these relationships 
into a whole. The telegraph was adapted to this mechanism as it provided an effective means
58
for executing economic transactions rapidly and over ever longer distances in a domain 
controlled by free contracts, rapidly becoming the principal medium for fast communication 
needs in financial and commercial sectors. For the telegraph, the world appeared to be 
composed of distinct geographical locations, with the task of the telegraph being to forge the 
required links between them. So the telegraph’s mission was congruent with that of the 
contract principle: to forge detectable connections within society.
Moreover, the telegraph was conducive to transformation of contract law into an objective legal 
structure aimed at the regulation of vast, impersonal contractual relationships in a modem 
society. With the railroad, it enabled expansion of the market, thereby gradually leveling out 
fluctuations in supply and prices in different locations. As long-distance trade evolved, the 
amount of impersonal economic relationships formed within civil society increased rapidly: the 
emergence of a national market produced a growing number of transient and anonymous 
connections between strangers.86 Thus it became important to create a system to ensure their 
predictability and reliability, which led to a transformation of contract law from an ethical 
system to a formal, impersonal jurisprudence. Modem contract law was devised and adapted to 
the particular needs of an industrialized society oriented towards a national market87 It was 
thereby separated from its common-law origin and reconstructed as a modem rationalization of 
the political doctrine of contractual relationships for the practical needs of an emerging social 
order. This was linked to changes in cultural structures of meaning and the posing of new 
political questions, as the telegraph helped to centralize economic power in a way that finally 
made government interference necessary to the operational dynamics of the civil sphere.
Thirdly, the common-law origin of contract law provided a basic legal structure through which 
the telegraph system itself was regarded as part of the civil sphere, as were any private 
businesses, although it was practically left free from the common-law obligations applied to 
common carriers. In the legal framework that gradually evolved to regulate the telegraph 
industry, the telegraph finally became likened to common carriers and incurred the same 
responsibilities relating to economic damage caused to customers. Through introduction of a 
law specific to the telegraph, this technology was for the first time given a juridical identity of 
its own, and liability for the transmission of telegrams was thus tied to modem jurisprudence in 
accordance with a general attempt to create a predictable business environment
Unlike counterparts in Europe, the government of the United States distanced itself from the 
proprietary ties of this form of communications and let it find its place within the private sphere 
like any other business. The purpose of politics was not to govern private interests but those
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interests constituted the possibility of politics. The telegraph’s influence on changing the 
distribution of power in society was growing but that did not pose a political threat because the 
mechanism of free contract already existed to govern economic relationships between 
individual interests, while the principle of governmental noninterference was preserved. This 
was where the central significance of the telegraph for society lay: it was viewed above all as 
fostering competition by providing a means for increasing economic connections and 
facilitating market transactions. It is not far-fetched, from this perspective, to see the telegraph, 
with the contract, as a political system for organizing social relationships between independent 
individuals within a national framework. Because the telegraph would create a multitude of 
economic connections over a vast territory without any government intervention—an idea that 
fits inherently into the liberal political tradition.88
Yet it was recognized in social and political discourses that growing monopolies steadily 
undermined the assumed natural operation of the economy. Consolidation of business power 
in the form of trusts and monopolies was seen as diminishing individual freedom of contract 
and stifling natural competition. What propelled this process of consolidation was that 
underlying structural conditions for competition had changed with the growing national market 
so that competition favored bigger corporations that were able to exploit a scale effect Or, to 
put it in another way, a company’s growth tendency was a reflection of changes that had 
occurred in the market mechanism. Although it could be seen as having advanced the common 
good in pre-war society, competition after the war had plunged industry into serious disorder, 
which it then had to attempt to manage within itself by seeking more cooperative strategies and 
mutual interests. This led finally to industrial consolidation.
As belief in a harmonious market was gradually undermined by the accumulation of capital, it 
became necessary to rethink the structure of the political economy. As emphasis on 
coordination replaced competition, as was the case in the telegraph industry in the 1860s, and 
as the complexity and power of industrial systems grew, so the public began actively to 
demand more control over these powers. The society previously understood as being 
composed of equal sized economic units on an equal bargaining level had clearly been replaced 
by an aggregation of extremely disproportionate economic relationships between different 
business organizations, as well as between employers and employees. Another phenomenon 
that encouraged regulation was the fact that alongside urbanization slum areas within cities that 
were densely packed and vulnerable to epidemics began to evolve. Growing pauperism in 
urban centers on the European model posed an unprecedented problem for American society, 
one that required a rethinking of the relevance of the concept of minimal government and the
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policy of nonintervention.89 Moreover, accentuation of class divisions, growing quantities of 
immigrants, and the fact that free land available for citizens had run out created more pressure 
for government intervention. Thus it became obvious that social reform involving expansion of 
the administrative functions of the state was getting unavoidable. Adequate regulation of the 
telegraph industry was not established on a national basis until 1910, when Congress amended 
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and declared telegraph companies to be common carriers.
Thus, at the time, many social issues came to be articulated within a dichotomous model in 
which economic laissez-faire, the tradition of individual freedom and self-determination, and 
local autonomy were juxtaposed with a need to establish a decent national regulative policy and 
with pressures to support a more active state in relation not only to the economy but to the 
whole of society. A growing tension emerged between fear of accumulating corporate power 
and fear of government power strong enough to cope with the new economy.90 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, the concept of the positive state had replaced the minimal, 
noninterventionist understanding of the functions of the state. It also constituted a new view of 
society. Whereas previously the political amounted only to the sum of individual interests 
expressed in society, now it achieved a positive content of its own. Society was seen as 
consisting not of individuals, but of groups. It was not an aggregation of autonomous 
individuals, but a positive whole that had an inner dynamic and inherent laws of its own. This 
was a moment when society achieved a distinct natural history of its own separated from the 
supposed laws of nature. Society not only assumed a more evident character as a political unit; 
it also became a subject for intensive investigation by the growing social sciences.
3.2. The Nervous System
The telegraph sustained the political self-conception of post-Civil War America which was 
mainly conceived through laissez-faire liberalism. This is because it created and strengthened 
private connections within society without governmental interference, thus sharing the same 
goal as the contract principle—the organizing principle of an economic system based on 
private transactions. What is more, the telegraph assumed a prominent role in cultural 
imagination and served as a model for thinking about contemporary social processes. Its 
logical structure had already been fully articulated by William F. Channing, a remarkable 
American inventor in telegraphy, in the middle of the nineteenth century. His description of the 
nature of the telegraph, using a rhetoric of organic analogies, was linked with the Spencerian
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theory of social evolution analysis which came to be regarded as a cogent interpretation of 
communication in the age of the telegraph. Being in line with Channing’s style of formulation, 
Spencer’s vocabulary seemed to provide pertinent conceptual tools for the contemporary 
conception of telecommunication which was deemed to support splendidly his notion of a 
biological analogy between an animal and society.
Although a relationship to telegraphic communication in late nineteenth century America may 
have been formed on a practical level, the way it was seen was influenced largely by Spencerian 
analogies. Use of the telegraph in national administration and of society at large was not 
immune to contemporary intellectual discourse. On the contrary, the role and significance of 
telegraphic communication was mainly understood in terms of Channingian/Spencerian 
vocabulary. Discourses on telecommunication and the construction of telecommunication 
systems should thus not be seen as two separate activities but instead as mutually articulated 
ones. Spencerian vocabulary relating to the telegraph was corroborated by the central social 
role that technology achieved in coordination functions, whilst its practical use was influenced 
by a climate permeated by the vocabulary. Let me first elucidate some central points in 
emerging social scientific theories relevant to understanding contemporary experience of the 
telegraph.
Social Organism
Life in early nineteenth century America, based on isolated localities with customary rules, 
could still have been characterized in terms of autonomy, self-rule, and independence. However, 
development of a national market, and fast acceleration of processes usually characterized in 
terms of “urbanization,” “industrialization,” and “modernization,” transformed conditions 
of traditional comprehension of social reality so that the consequences of human action became 
intricate, unpredictable, and untraceable to any single source. The causes and impacts of 
individual actions formed links and chains with distant social processes, became anonymous, 
and could no longer be handled through traditional conceptual means within a single locality. 
During this process, social conditions became impossible to describe through the traditional 
liberal principles emphasizing individual and local autonomy. What was needed instead was a 
new conception of society that would take into account the increasing interdependency of 
American society. This changed state of affairs can also be said to have been the reason for the 
birth of professional social sciences, and along with them, the whole concept of the social.91
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Clearly, the rise of professional social sciences was possible because of a displacement in 
traditional cultural structures of meaning—a process dependent on the ever-thickening 
networks of connections across the country. Social sciences in America began their 
institutionalization at the same time as the influence of the Darwinian theory of evolution 
reached them in the 1870s. Herbert Spencer was the most important figure in acceptance of 
social Darwinism in the New World, where he became very popular after the Civil War. 
Spencer’s works supported a strict interpretation of the politics of laissez-faire. While cautious 
about analogies between a“body politic” and a “living body,” he likened society to an 
individual organism from a functional point of view because “structures and functions in the 
human body furnish familiar illustrations of structures and functions in general.”92 As social 
processes were thus incorporated within an unchanging structure, it became pointless to 
attempt to modify them in any substantial way. This idea proved useful not only for social 
scientists but also for conservative politicians, who believed the organic structure could restore 
social order from the disorganization brought about by the liberal political tradition. Within 
social sciences, historical development became increasingly viewed as following a distinct inner 
logic that had a precharted course, isolated from historical change.93 Societal development was 
conceived in this theory as a progression through a number of stages within a stationary, 
ahistorical frame of reference, thus becoming at root a timeless event
Spencer expressed his conviction that history was a process in which government control 
would gradually decline. The distinction he made in his later works between military and 
industrial types of society was in accordance with this theme. Whereas military society was 
characterized by status and self-preservation, industrial society’s primary quality was contract. 
An individual’s life, liberty, and property were no longer subordinated to the state but instead 
defended by it. As there was no interference by the state in a regime governed by free 
contractual relationships, survival of the fittest was seen to be ensured.94 Spencer’s huge 
influence in America helped to establish laissez-faire liberalism as a central view in the political 
economy after the Civil War. Needless to say, in this historical period there were also 
challenging interpretations and countercurrents, but it would still be fair to characterize the 
laissez-faire inteipretation of the liberal political tradition as the major component in the 
conceptual construction of social reality in late nineteenth century America.
William Graham Sumner, reputed to be the first American sociologist, mediated Spencerian 
thinking to a broader intellectual audience and expressed the laissez-faire idea in its most 
cogent form. He viewed the law of survival of the fittest as constituting a determining context 
for the development of human societies. It became possible to see the existence of a given
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social institution or practice as an indication of a successful adaptation to underlying laws of 
nature, for otherwise it would not have survived. Social Darwinism was in this sense essentially 
a doctrine that made the prevailing order, viewed as based on an unchangeable course of the 
universe, legitimate. One could not change these superior, inherent, and inevitable laws of 
nature which constituted a predetermined structure for human life.95 Rights therefore had no 
natural status as nature did not recognize any privileges: “there can be no rights against 
Nature.” Rights were seen by Sumner only as an outcome of evolving, unplanned “folkways” 
that gradually achieved a normative authority embodied in social tradition.
Sumner made a clear distinction between social and political phenomena. Whereas the social 
was determined by natural, unchanging laws, the political was seen as being only an artificial 
product of human action which should not be allowed to intrude on the former. He resisted all 
interference with social development, because redistribution of wealth or regulation of private 
businesses would only have harmful and unanticipated consequences. The process of evolution 
was not only natural but, above all, an ineluctable one. The progress of human society 
depended on a selection process based on unrestricted competition. Moreover, because social 
phenomena were so complex and human’s comprehension of them so limited, formulation of 
unambiguous rules for social reform was ruled out as a matter of principle. It was not possible 
to change an intricate industrial organization to suit needs evolving at any given time; the best 
rationale was instead to engineer a more effective adjustment to existing conditions. However, 
Sumner did not abandon the possibility of sociology, “the science of life in society.”96 
Sociology could disclose objective laws underlying the surface events of history; the essence 
of these, however, could not be changed by human policy.
One of the overriding Spencerian themes that reverberated widely in the writings of 
contemporary social theorists was a conception of society as an organism. Spencer formulated 
the idea of society as a constantly developing and growing, living organism, uncontrollable by 
human-made laws. The best analogy for understanding the nature of this being was an animal: 
“A society as a whole -- represents phenomena of growth, structure and function, analogous to 
those of growth, structure and function in an animal; and these last are needful keys to the 
first.”97 By this straightforward biological analogy, Spencer forged a strong correspondence 
between the structure and function of an animal body and those of a society. Whereas social 
structure thus became conceived in terms of animal anatomy, social action was understood in 
terms of animal physiology. This is why it was only natural for Spencer to compare railway 
and highway systems with an animal’s vascular systems, or the telegraph lines with its nerve 
fibers.98 In so doing, he was utilizing the age-old reservoir of biological metaphors that
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Descartes too had found useful when comparing nerves with water-pipes, muscles with 
hydraulic engines, and the respiratory system with a clock." It was the same reservoir that 
Albert Schaffle, for instance, had worked on in many of his books in the late nineteenth 
century. Especially in Schaffle’s Bau und Leben des socialen korpers, newspapers and other 
media that transmitted symbolic meanings were depicted as composing a continually growing 
and diversifying nervous system which would ultimately link every individual.100 An underlying 
motive for the use of these analogies by Spencer was to exemplify a conception of society’s 
functional integration, a seamless cooperation by differentiated institutions and operations in 
highly evolved modem societies, or “superorganisms,” as he put i t
The conception of a society as an organism laid the foundations for theoretical understanding 
of the human condition. It enabled one to see the whole society with its functionally specialized 
institutions and practices, which superficially seemed to be a disordered complex of 
incompatible and disjointed parts, as an operationally integrated and coherent entity. From 
underneath the diverse parts and units of society emerged a clear order that rendered the 
complex and scattered structure an organic being. However the structure itself still lacked spirit 
and liveliness and had to have life breathed into it. Transportation networks made the 
functioning of a societal organism possible, for traffic over rails and roads performed the same 
kind of task as circulation of blood in an animal body. On the other hand, telegraph lines 
enabled a conscious coordination of society in a similar way that the nervous system 
transmitted the impulses of the higher nerve centers of an animal to its organs. In this way, the 
telegraph provided a supposed central agency with a means to direct the functioning of society, 
and, at the same time, made visible a principle of conscious command.
Biological analogies were frequently used by well-known public figures to describe the postal 
system for several decades prior to commercialization of the electric telegraph. In a major 
speech, for example, South Carolina statesman John C. Calhoun termed the postal system the 
nervous system of the “body politic” in 1817. When an organic analogy was used by Samuel 
Morse in 1838, as he sought Congressional funding for the experimental Washington- 
Baltimore line,101 he was drawing on these postal analogies.102 It was William F. Channing, 
however, who used this analogy in a more systematic way with respect to the telegraph, stating 
that the electric telegraph “is to constitute the nervous system of organized societies.”103 
According to The Telegrapher's account, the mechanism of the human system suggested to 
Channing the separate “signal” and “alarm” circuits that characterized his plan. This made 
“the analogy with the functions of the motor and sensitive nerves of the animal organization — 
complete. The central office is the brain, the wires the nervous system.”104 This comparison
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was elaborated in a more explicit form in a paper he delivered in the Smithsonian Institution in 
1855. “The electric telegraph,” Channing remarked, ”is ~  the nervous system of this nation 
and of modem society by no figure of speech, by no distant analogy. Its wires spread like 
nerves over the surface of the land, interlinking distant parts, and making possible a perpetually 
higher co-operation among men, a higher social form than have hitherto existed. By means of 
its life-like functions the social body becomes a living whole, and each of its new applications 
marks a step in the organization of human life.”105 Here the pre-Spencerian biological analogy 
did not serve as a retrospective rationalization of the telegraph system but instead as a 
conceptual prototype for its technical structure. It did not explain, but actually directed thinking 
about and the construction of the electro-magnetic telegraph and of the sphere of 
communication it enabled.
The anatomical comparison largely laid a foundation for contemporary interpretations of 
human-made technical systems, as it seemed to provide a good way to conceptualize their 
social role. This is also why it made sense to attempt to extract the inner laws of nature and 
translate them into some practical, applicable rules, for this was seen as the only way any 
human innovation would work. An invention that conflicted with these laws would have no 
chance to survive. This is exactly where the ingenuity of Channing’s recipe lay: in order to be 
able to simulate nature’s logic of operation, one has first to systematize its central principles. 
This is also the reason he thought himself entitled to deny that his interpretation was a pure 
analogy. Instead, through it, so he seemed to think, nature revealed its innermost essence.
Although it appeared the right tool to decipher nature and the mechanisms of some major 
technological systems, the analogy remained somewhat isolated until it was subsequently 
incorporated into a more general theory in Spencer’s interpretation. The way Channing used it 
in relation to his telegraph was broadened and connected to a coherent theory of social 
development. With the spread and popularization of the Spencerian theory in the United States, 
the biological analogy was entrenched as a general truism in public awareness.
The conception of technological networks—meandering railroad tracks or stretching telegraph 
lines—as the vascular or nervous systems of modem American society presented a startling 
vision to contemporaries. The analogy was in wide use among contemporary popularizers of 
science and other semi-academics, in addition to scholars within the institutionalizing social 
sciences, who were interested in current technological developments. So it was not meant as an 
overstatement when C.R. Henderson, an associate Professor of sociology at the University of 
Chicago, claimed in accordance with contemporary understanding in 1897 that “telegraphs and
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telephones — are — the nerve system of the social body, the material means of welding this 
nation and all nations into one spiritual community.”106 The telegraph helped society as a 
whole to better fulfill its true nature by equipping it with an effective control mechanism. It let 
society, it seemed, control its own being.
The transformation of American society from a “segmented” society with isolated and self- 
sufficient communities to an “organic” society, in which the regions and localities were tied 
together by a process of growing interdependence, constituted a precondition for a change in 
the conception of telecommunication from a purely neutral form of technology to the nervous 
system of society.107 This marked a new stage of cultural sentiment through which 
communication in the age of the telegraph assumed a clear, distinctive, and positive character. 
This is not to say, however, that a total break in conception of communication occurred either. 
As the effects of social transformation became visible, the telegraph inevitably got a more 
positive identity, but at the same time it largely retained its instrumental nature in the sense that 
it was held to be directable by the decisions of men: although becoming more clearly a social 
power in its own right, telecommunication was seen as remaining under the control of the 
people whose practical affairs it helped. The changes the telegraph contributed should still not 
be underestimated. It had entwined with the historical fate of the nation by being conducive to 
processes which changed conditions for thinking about not only different technological 
systems, such as itself, but also the whole cultural construction. In so doing it transformed the 
same historical self-conception within with it had been developed and considered.
In new social circumstances in which anonymous chains of actions penetrated distant regions, 
the telegraph came to be regarded, alongside the railroads, as the most visible representative of 
this novel logic of operation. The telegraph’s interlinking power formed a sensible model for 
thinking about increasing interdependence and interpenetration of distant regions and actions. 
Not only was it conducive to facilitation of nationwide circulation of actions and implications, 
but it came to constitute a conceptual frame of reference on the basis of which this 
phenomenon could be conceived. Thus, the telegraph had two simultaneous effects; it was at 
the same time a historical force for societal transformation and a model or metaphor for 
conceptualizing the new societal logic. The nervous system as an analogy for the telegraph 
provided an excellent rationalization for the latter purpose. In particular, it seemed suited to 
describing firstly the telegraph’s use and position in tasks of the national and municipal 
administration, and secondly the thickening networks of urban communication, which 
represented points of concentration of social power.
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The analogy of a nervous system was not only an attempt to describe the prevailing 
organization and function of the social in terms of communication, but also, and above all, an 
attempt to think about the conditions of communication, and thus, also the “ whole” of 
communication as it corresponded to contemporary experience. By means of the analogy, it 
came possible to conceive of the “essence” of communication, which presupposed thinking 
about the conditions for its possibility. Through the idea of a nervous system, experience of the 
social appeared historical insofar as the nervous systems is always situated in a particular 
organism which is only in a historical time. Whether this aspect was explicitly discussed or 
not—and, generally speaking, it was not—it still retained in itself the possibility of perceiving 
the community as a fundamentally historical experience. In sum, then, the biological analogy 
constituted a relationship through and in which thinking about communication was given a 
definite shape and form. These sorts of forms, after their formative period, directed and 
structured thinking by providing unifying frames of reference. With respect to thinking about 
communication, the idea of nervous system proved a lasting conceptual whole that not only 
constituted a structure for communication, but more importantly, also formed the framework 
within which communication could be viewed as an object for thought in itself.
The Telegraphization of Society
Although it was potentially a general communication system, the telegraph, largely due to its 
expensive use, was largely related to governance and coordination. The logic or nature of the 
diverse functions it added to different operational domains varied remarkably. Despite these 
disparities, an underlying conceptual image of the telegraph as the nervous system of the 
society constituted a unifying conception for telegraphic communication. National and city 
governments together with the metropolitan press and news agencies can be regarded as 
realizations of the idea of the nervous systems of a nation, in that they were the primary 
intersection points of inflows and outflows of telegraphically transmitted information. As 
municipal telegraph systems had established a practical basis for the concept of a center, this 
idea (a dominating center and local offices arranged in a hierarchical manner with constant 
information traffic between these locations) provided the framework for both thinking about 
and the practical organization of communication on an increasingly regular basis. This is why 
we have to study local systems more closely, because they, especially the police and fire 
emergency systems, came to be referenced in thinking about more general societal processes 
too.
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The telegraph issue needed to be addressed not just as a general concern as to its position in 
the liberal political discourse. More practical and specific questions also arose as to its role in 
administration within an organizational framework. The question of possible uses of the 
telegraph for government purposes, however, was not a particularly urgent one. Although 
administration was weak and lacked appropriate means for enforcing legislation, the telegraph 
did not immediately appear as a mechanism to meet these needs. This was partly because of a 
common fear of strong central government and partly because the telegraph was first seen 
rather as a kind of scientific tool with no inherent practicability for serious applications. Efforts 
to connect this system to government objectives increased steadily, as its role in a national 
communication infrastructure gradually became clear. Eventually, the diverse administrative 
tasks of the government came to be closely connected to the telegraph.
The telegraph was connected mainly to functions that served a number of communicational and 
scientific purposes within administrative institutions. It was placed in the service of politicians 
for example for keeping in touch with their constituents; of diplomats for correcting 
misapprehensions; of scientific and technical government agencies, such as the United States 
Coast Survey “in charting weather reports and spreading warnings of approaching storms, 
calculating longitude, establishing correct time at various points throughout the country, and in 
registering astronomical observations.”108 In this way, scientific practices, as well as political 
ones, helped to reduce uncertainties and increase predictability.109 The telegraph became an 
important part of gradual standardization of different spheres of life, coalescing with other 
technical developments to make the social more predictable, stable, and governable.
The telegraph became a common instrument in administrative departments in federal and state 
governments, being used for ordinary departmental business that required dispatch. By 1860, 
the General Land Office was sending telegrams routinely to correspondents five days late in 
responding.110 After the telegraph had been established in government use for good, 
arrangements for a comprehensive telegraph system for government service in Washington 
were being advanced,111 making its position as a political nervous center of the national body 
even more visible and unambiguous. One of the central advantages of the telegraph in 
governance was in enhancing the ability to coordinate diverse operations and geographically 
scattered units under centralized management and in controlling the whole intricate system 
more effectively. It accelerated communications between central government and its 
representatives across the country, and between headquarters and smaller units within a region, 
thus strengthening the importance of a central executive agency. As Leonard White pointed 
out, relationships between headquarters and the field no longer depended wholly upon a
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lengthy correspondence consuming weeks or months, since now field information, thanks to 
the telegraph, could be transmitted straight away to Washington and responses dispatched on 
the same day.112 So close did the connection between the telegraph and central administration 
become that, according to the Circuit Court in the Pensacola case in 1875, “the functions of the 
Government either in war or in peace could not now be carried on without [the telegraph’s] 
use.” 113
The new dimension of rapidity that the telegraph introduced not only strengthened but also 
reorganized administrative machinery. Institutionalization of the telegraph in governmental 
organizations was part of a professionalization of administration which involved the concept of 
administration as properly businesslike rather than political in nature.114 This was connected to 
a historical accumulation of public power in governmental bureaucracies which were separated 
from party politics and the market economy. Now government was equipped with better means 
for monitoring the varying dynamics of the social, although control on the whole, as well as 
improvement of the government’s administrative effectiveness, remained minimal by modem 
standards. This was because the political climate did not allow government to take full 
advantage of available technology and strengthen its control capabilities. Any attempt to 
increase the power of central government was confronted by a resistance stemming from the 
political tradition that relied on the principle of self-governance.
Municipal authorities became central stages for realization of comprehensive telegraphic 
systems. This, in fact, was the field of administration in which the concept of the nervous 
system proved most apt, providing a model to be seriously considered also in national 
administration: management of space and movement in a city came to be taken as a model for 
governance of the country in political discourses. One question that required urgent attention 
was control of space in rapidly growing urban areas, as many American cities were beset by 
problems caused by a fast increasing and densely packed population. Such cities became 
explosion points for urban riots, fires and epidemics around the middle of the nineteenth 
century. Implementation of municipal telegraph systems, introduced as technical adjuncts to 
city governments in a battle against urban disorder, was part of a professionalization of fire 
departments and police organizations. Partly thanks to the telegraph, both groups were 
reorganized into more unified and efficient bureaucratic organizations. The telegraph made 
coordination of units more effective and faster, permitting continuous control of city space to 
become gradually institutionalized in administrative machinery. In this way, the telegraph 
equipped government with a means that enabled development of an organized practice to 
penetrate society on a more detailed level than had been possible before.
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William Channing seems to have been the first to systematize a model of an efficient municipal 
telegraph system. He did that in 1845 in an article in the Boston Daily Advertiser in which he 
described the general principles of his system for applying the electro-magnetic telegraph to 
fire alerts, a system which subsequently became the basis for the American fire alarm and 
police telegraph systems.115 In 1851, he submitted a detailed plan with Moses G. Farmer for a 
Telegraphic Fire-Alarm to the city government of Boston; the plan was adopted and put into 
operation in 1852.116 Under the scheme, Boston was first subdivided into fire districts, and 
then a central station at city hall was connected to nineteen belfries and thirty-nine alarm boxes 
throughout the city. Turning a crank inside the box transmitted a signal to the central station 
identifying the box and the fire district in question. On this basis, the central office operator 
could signal identification of the district to the bells as well as that of the originating box to all 
alarm boxes so that by listening the nearest box the firemen could locate the fire.117 New York 
got its fire-alarm telegraph system in the same year, and Philadelphia and other large cities 
followed suit soon after.
For Channing, the conception of telegraphic communication had to be rethought since existing 
systems could not serve as models for a city telegraph. Tasks and aims related to the former 
could not possibly form any substantive part of the latter, which had a distinct logic of its own. 
Hence, he planned his telegraph system with a concentration of points close to each other 
rather than a dispersed distribution of distant points, thus replacing a network based on a 
number of centers by one that had only one. Instead of the “linear” connections in a long­
distance telegraph, municipal systems would operate in loops, circles, and intersections: unlike 
long-distance links, municipal links did not embody a single direction or* relationship. Whereas 
long-distance telegraphy was based on straight lines generating reciprocal relationships across 
wide areas, an intraurban system operated on the basis of contacts between different 
hierarchical strata within a multiplicity of possible points of interaction. The space for 
intraurban systems no longer consisted of a heterogeneous diversity, but rather of a 
hierarchical density. Contrary to Channing’s conception, however, the difference between the 
structure of the two systems was perhaps not so absolute after all. This is because the city 
telegraph only concentrated all the connections and relationships of a long-distance system into 
a single, geographically and politically limited unit With the help of a system of preselected 
codes, urban telegraph could squeeze all transmissions into a multilevel complex. Thus, what 
was initially formed through straight lines was now organized in folds and circles; namely, on a 
principle of concentricity.
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The more the circles and loops were concentrated on and limited to a single system, the more 
the idea of a strong center became reinforced. Whereas “the common telegraph connects two 
independent centres of life and activity,” Channing stated, “the municipal telegraph connects a 
multitude of subordinate points with one centre, and makes the position of those points 
dependent upon the centre and the needs of the system.”118 Diverging from the contemporary 
cultural climate and political tradition, he thus articulated a powerful center-based view. The 
multiple points of connection served as information sources through which information from 
any part of a city could be sent to a center in which it was analyzed and from which an alarm 
would then go out. A center had to be presupposed, since the area to be governed constituted a 
system, and every social system required a central organ. Moreover, as the telegraph system 
corresponded naturally to the nervous system, it had to constitute a control mechanism for the 
social body. The underlying biological analogy directed thinking about the system, for just as 
coordination of a living body depended on the activity of the brain, coordination of a city 
system was thought to require a commanding center. Through this center, the whole could not 
only function consistently but also become aware of itself.
“[The municipal telegraph’s] function is not to connect distant towns or independent 
centres of life and activity with each other, but it is to organize a single city or town so as 
to bring every subordinate part into relation with its centre of government and direction. Its 
purpose is to multiply points of communication, to cover the surface of the municipal body 
as thickly, if you please, with telegraphic signalizing points as the surface of the human 
body is covered with nervous extremities or papillae, the whole being intelligently 
connected into a system by which the municipal body shall understand itself in every part, 
and shall have a common life and vital functions for its own essential purposes.”119
In this quotation, the idea of a self-conscious system was given an explicit articulation. The 
whole is first divided up by the telegraph into different segments, after which every single part 
of the system is locatable. When all the distinct sections have possibly been subdivided further 
into different districts, all connected to local centers, the segments can finally be linked to the 
main center of the system. In this scheme, the center would be capable of coveming every part 
of the whole, according to hierarchically arranged relationships. Moreover, these governed 
parts, being simultaneously in touch with the center, enabled the whole to be aware of its own 
being. In this way, the idea of a self-governing whole was expressed in terms of 
communication. The center can be aware of events going on in different parts of the system, 
whilst individual points of contact distributed throughout the whole provide the means for the 
whole to attain a certain level of formal self-reflexivity. This is why Richard Vaux, a Mayor of
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Philadelphia, could say that “the telegraph is not only the voice, but the eyes of the executive 
department.”120 All component parts could thus be geared to the interests of a commanding 
center, which, for its part, could be aware of the whole because of the density of connections 
between it and the various parts of the social body.
Police telegraph systems constituted the second application of municipal telegraphy in which 
the telegraph was used in controlling social disorders such as urban riots and crime. It 
provided better coordination within the police force by linking police stations to central 
headquarters. The New York City police department installed a telegraph system between 
headquarters and ward offices in 1853.121 In Boston, a police telegraph system was designed 
using Channing’s fire-alarm system as a model. The police telegraph soon became an 
indispensable instrument in police organization. By creating direct connections between police 
districts and headquarters, it lessened a need for frequent meetings between captains of districts 
and the police commissioner. It enabled coordination of action between separate stations and 
was adopted subsequently for connecting patrolling policemen to their stations by using call 
boxes that were connected either to the precinct house or to headquarters. By 1864, New Yoik 
City was divided up into 58 signal stations: “From the central office — wires are extended to 
every part of the city, connecting with the signal boxes and alarm bells, and returning again to 
the central office. — Each signal box is furnished with a telegraph key for police purposes, and, 
by a simple set of signals, any policeman can communicate with the central office from any 
part of the city.”122 Channing’s idea of organizing the system according to “signal” and 
“alarm” circuits was the underlying model here too, although in contrast to the original fire- 
alarm system the signal boxes contained a dial enabling policemen to pass a specific request to 
headquarters.
The police telegraph allowed centralized control of city space and of police forces, constituting 
thus, with fire-alarm systems, a central organ of the social body in the minds of the 
contemporaries. The Scientific American resorted again to the old analogy when describing the 
combined telegraph and telephone system in 1881: “When the entire area of the city shall have 
been covered by the system the analogy between the civic organization and the nervous 
organization of an individual animal will be curiously complete. The civic organization will 
become sensitive, so to speak, at every point, and the transmission of intelligence therefrom to 
the brain and subordinate nervous ganglia—that is, the central and district police stations—will 
be practically instantaneous.”123 Principles of transparency from the center and of hierarchical 
relationships in relation to information transmission came to be understood not only as
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characterizing technical features of new systems but, above all, the structure of the police 
organization itself.
According to The Telegrapher, “through [the police telegraph] the Superintendent transmits 
all his orders to subordinates, and he can, if he chooses, sit quietly in his arm-chair in the 
Mulberry street police palace and direct the whole immense machinery under his charge.” The 
Superintendent, however, was not the only user of the system: “The Police Commissioners 
and their chief clerks also use the police telegraph in the transmission of orders, and the 
transaction of nearly all other official business.”124 With this system, the police could improve 
control of city space qualitatively, as telegraph wires twisted a network around a city, allowing 
subtler and more exhaustive control over its interstices. Like the fire-alarm system, the police 
telegraph divided a city up into sections, created relationships between stationary points of 
contact and station within a section, and finally connected all sections into a unified structure. 
“Now, the entire police force has but one soul,” declared Judge Conrad, Ex-Mayor of 
Philadelphia, in 1856, “and that soul is the Telegraph.”125
The New York police telegraph system was used for sending “all notifications to the 
coroners” and those “in regard to offal, dead animals, nuisances, etc.”, for “restoring lost 
children, recovering lost or strayed horses, arresting deserters from vessels, protecting 
shopkeepers and others against newly-issued counterfeits and other descriptions of bad 
money,” and for “the suppression of riots, the dispersion of mobs and the allaying of popular 
disturbances of all kinds.”126 Thus, the Superintendent of the police telegraph could announce 
in 1869 that with the aid of the telegraph, “ 128 lost children have been restored to their 
parents; 170 lost, strayed, or stolen animals have been returned to their owners; 58 vehicles 
have been similarly disposed of; 542 dead animals have been reported to the sanitary police, 
and 15 alarms of fire have been sent over the wires.”127 This communication system was an 
essential component of a technical basis for coordination not only of the police force but of 
governmental institutions responsible for the internal safety of society, of control over and on 
behalf of the subject population. Police telegraph systems were adopted at a somewhat slower 
pace than the fire-alarm telegraph, and the number of systems started to accelerate only after 
1882.128 Although the telephone rapidly replaced the telegraph as a central police 
communication medium, the police telegraph constituted an effective aid to the police, being, 
according to a contemporary commentator, “equal to a model guard of two hundred and fifty 
men.”129
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As mentioned, creation of an improved technical basis for coordination and control was part of 
professionalization of the police and other administrative institutions, which, in turn, was linked 
to a process in which local governance practices came to be supplanted by national bureaucratic 
control of formal state organizations. The construction of a new police organization was a 
reflection of this. Intermittent and reactive control, concentrated mainly on individual incidents 
or areas, was replaced gradually by preventive, detailed, and regular supervision of society. This 
was connected to the application of scientific techniques to the practice of governance, to 
establishment of separate functionally specialized public institutions and to general 
improvement in government data-gathering, storage, and retrieval. The Bureau of Statistics, for 
instance, was organized as a branch of the Treasury Department in 1866.130 Government 
started systematically to gather information on its subject population and of societal processes 
after the Civil War.
These practices developed hand in hand with the increasing use of statistics among social 
scientists. The conception of statistical work changed in the Gilded Age from a descriptive 
statistics of social groups and a rudimentaiy science of natural laws to a scientific method 
proper for analyzing diverse social phenomena following the German model. In this way, the 
notion of social processes following unchangeable laws of nature was gradually replaced by an 
idea that those processes had an inherent dynamic of their own, brought about by collective 
human activity. A positivist conception of natural law was still widely maintained in social 
sciences, though.131 However, it now became possible to articulate societal development in its 
own terms—separated from any metaphysical laws of nature—composed of complex set of 
human actions. Thus, society achieved a history of its own, gradually undermining the 
traditional ahistorical framework through which its development has previously been 
conceptualized.
Changing Lines of Communication
Whereas introduction of the telegraph can be said to have had profound effects on national and 
municipal administration, the effects on communicativity in the national communication 
economy were absolutely sweeping. As in the former case, the biological analogy provided a 
cogent framework for thinking about power centers in the changed communicative 
constellation—the metropolitan press accompanied by an emerging nationwide system of news 
wire services. In fact, this analogy was embodied in the very model articulated by Channing,
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generalized from local into national systems while retaining the same form of a nervous 
system.
The telegraph created a basis for the great metropolises to consolidate their roles as major 
communication centers on national level and thus to undermine the decentralized information 
distribution that government had supported. This process formed a setting within which an 
emerging centralized news transmission system was established as the nerve center for social 
circulation of information. Conditions that paved the way for generalization of Charming’s 
scheme can be divided into at least two dimensions related to the development of metropolises 
as concentration points for flows of communication. First, the forming of big corporations with 
their headquarters, responsible for nationwide operations, positioned in major urban centers; 
and secondly, the development of numerous intraurban telegraph-based communication and 
information services to help commercial, financial, and domestic sectors.
First, the telegraph can be said to have promoted large organizations while at the same time 
perfecting the functioning of markets, as these two developments were mutually 
complementary processes. As the telegraph favored users who needed rapid long-distance 
communication, companies were prompted to exploit it to its full advantage by expanding their 
scope of activity and operating on a national basis. During the late nineteenth century, large 
business organizations came to dominate the economy as a result of the establishment of 
telegraph systems.132 Eventually the telegraph came to support a concentration of economic 
power, contrasting with its previous role as an agent in helping the progress of an ideal fostered 
by the Jacksonians, in which small enterprises competed against each other within formally 
equal conditions.
The second dimension in a process that made metropolises the undisputed hubs of 
communication networks implied the rise of intraurban telegraph systems, which became a 
principal area for the development of telegraphy after the Civil War. After a variety of systems 
based on pre-assigned functions and automatic signaling mechanisms had been developed, 
specialized uses of the telegraph multiplied and became broader in scope. Urban metropolises 
became concentration points for a number of different telegraph-based information services 
that enhanced and speeded their internal communication. They constituted rapidly growing 
arenas on the basis of which ever-denser communication networks were interrelated with 
evolving social power formations which extended their influence all over the country. The 
remarks made about these two dimensions are naturally not intended to propose that 
construction of a prominent news system was a consequence of the abovementioned
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developments or that it somehow applied only to the urban sphere in which communication 
flows were increasingly organized. All we are claiming is that these processes helped to 
transform the communicative constellation by strengthening metropolises as the 
communication hubs of the nation.
Now, the metropolitan press and news agencies grew, alongside national governmental 
bureaucracies, as principal information intersections, the true nerve centers of the transforming 
societal constellation. They laid a foundation on which a new national communication economy 
would have to be arranged. A strong linkage between the newspaper press and development of 
the telegraph increasingly rearranged the whole existing system for collecting, processing, and 
distributing news, which was based on editorial exchange of news. Now the telegraph became a 
necessity for individual newspapers, with an increasing volume of information that had, prior to 
the telegraph, been available only intermittently, now being systematically transmitted to 
newspapers.133
The telegraph system, providing rapid one-way communication over distance, favored 
centralized news gathering agencies. The New York Associated Press was exactly this kind of 
center it received pieces of news from all over the countiy, which, after a process of selection 
and editing, were sent back in standard form to local newspapers. Thus, it was based on a 
similar scheme to that originally formulated by William Channing for a fire-alarm telegraph, in 
which information came in from numerous points in a system and was gathered in its center, 
where it was analyzed and finally sent back to the public in a prearranged fashion. In the 
Associated Press system the content of information transmitted, namely diverse instructions 
and reports, was only replaced by individual pieces of news reports. Furthermore, whereas in 
the fire-alarm telegraph a single, hierarchically organized system was the basis for operations, 
the newsbrokerage system extended its lines across the nation and incorporated a large number 
of local centers and regions. In this way, the principle that Channing had successfully applied 
to cities by translating and folding the linear lines of long-distance systems into circular and 
hierarchical ones was reversed and stretched again to cover the entire area of the social body.
Thus, the newsbrokerage system was structured according to a more complex constellation. It 
was based on interlinking a number of distinct, interactive points or poles, thereby creating a 
network for constant circulation of information. It operated on Channing’s principle, but 
expanded it again to a multipole organization. Although the poles in the system were genuinely 
interactive, only one center dominated the configuration and determined the principles on which 
it worked. This centralized system of newsbrokerage displayed a twofold structure. The first
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part was based on an arrangement in which a large number of individual sources fed 
information into a single center. The second one turned this structure around as it embodied 
the unprecedented principle of the mass media: the narrowing of the range of news sources, 
and the corresponding widening of the range of passive reception.134 So while the first, 
inflowing movement provided new, heterogeneous, and potentially incommensurable 
information for the system, the second, outflowing movement provided edited, congruent, and 
essentially identical information. This duality indicated also that the numerous points of contact 
which were essential to the system’s functioning assumed different roles in each case. In the 
first place, the points served as sources of new information to be edited at the center. In order 
for the center, and the whole mechanism, to be capable of constant service, it needed active 
contribution from its local agents in the form of continuous information feed. In the second 
place, the peripheral circumference of distant points were terminuses for final news sent from 
the center. In this case, the localities were transformed from active sources to mere passive 
recipients of information. Whereas at first the working of the whole depended on multiple 
information sources, emphasis then moved on to the center, while feedback did not gain any 
substantial significance in the process.
As in fire-alarm systems which concentrated control of an urban area at a single point, the 
Associated Press system centralized newsgathering and delivery into a single structure. As 
speed improved and technology developed, however, it became possible to let a particular piece 
of news be posted directly to the whole network from a remote location, thus increasing the 
system’s flexibility with important messages. Hence, the headquarters’ role changed from that 
of a collection and deliveiy center to that of a supervisor or regulator of the system, retaining 
control over policy but dispensing with the practice of centrally editing the incoming flow of 
raw news.135 The newsbroker service nevertheless remained a centrally organized and 
professionally controlled business which reached an ever-increasing reading audience over ever 
lengthening distances. As, in any case major metropolises dominated the news scene as both 
the main sources and increasingly the recipients of wired information, the center assumed an 
unquestionable position of command with respect to the rest of the system.
Alongside the Associated Press communication system which was founded on centralized 
news collection and delivery, a different pattern of information circulation evolved. What was at 
issue here was a constant increase in the horizontal flow of communication. It did not 
necessarily result from a center-based system of organized relationships, but rather had to do 
with the emergence of a multitude of sprawling, discontinuous, and competitive sets of literary 
presentations. This heterogeneous movement traversed the social landscape, carried by
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different interests and groups that overlapped or even opposed one another. Unlike the 
newsbrokerage system, this movement did not deliver the same but instead disparate. The basis 
for its operation was not found any longer in hierarchical relationships between a processing 
core and a number of different points of contact in the periphery, but from a free, unorganized 
distribution of certain groupings of information, propelled by commercial or factional interests, 
along a horizontal plane. It enabled dispersed localities to receive various kinds of relevant 
information not only from the commercial centers of the east but also from other smaller 
regions with information considered valuable. At the same time, information tended to be 
grouped into topical classes, around which like-minded persons and interest groups could 
gather.136 Thus, whereas previously public information had been scarce and limited mainly to 
learned and wealthy circles, now it was abundant, and its circulation became based on popular 
demand and taste. Moreover, information that used to be governed by communal order and 
local tradition came to be provided on a competitive basis.
The systems of news wire services and segmented information generation and delivery 
practices established a grid across America. Their underlying principle consisted of two things. 
On the one hand, local centers were increasingly incorporated into the system as interactive 
points of contact, as both senders and receivers of information. On the other, horizontal 
information flows which connected diverse centers were speed up, covering vast areas that had 
previously been dependent on a main metropolis for their news supply. Whereas a news 
service system unified a given area by transmitting the same kind of information, in horizontal 
flows information content was divided and grouped according to special interests. To multiply 
active points and to intensify circulation between these and the center constituted a general 
formula. A joint effect was a sense of a common event taking place, a shared national 
experience based on uniform news reports.
Given this, what can be said about a change which occurred in the communicative 
constellation? The constellation between regional powers lost its stability as communication 
and transportation systems coupled those powers with a close interrelationship. Hence, the 
meaning structure that was based on a predictable network of forces had to be recast for a new 
environment in which previous relationships had lost their validity. What was at play here was 
not only an expansion of private economic power but also a transformation of the underlying 
conditions of social life. As has been shown, in the course of this process the idea of a 
centralized hierarchy was strengthened. Having unleashed (together with improvements in 
transportation) accumulation processes for capital and power, and enabled construction of 
centralized systems of coordination and communication, the telegraph system formed an
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illustrative conceptual model for thinking about contemporary events that characterized the 
rapid transformation of society. Thus introduction of the concept of a center in American 
political culture was linked with this twofold operation of the telegraph as a technology and a 
conceptual model. Of course, however, the rise of the telegraph institution represented only one 
albeit significant historical process related to the idea of a center becoming formulated. Like 
any tool, the telegraph was a metaphor of itself, symbolizing the activities it enabled.137 
However, its character as a model was not limited to the way it was used but was instead more 
profoundly entwined with cultural self-conception articulated in an explicit form in the 
Spencerian theory of society. While supporting free individual activity and minimal 
government, it also came to conceptualize the role of a central organ of the social body. It was 
introduction of the telegraph as the nervous system of a modem society that embodied and 
made visible this principle of center; and this, for its part, paved the way for more centric 
arrangements and expressions in political thought. In this way, although not the only cultural 
model for it, the telegraph enabled conceptualization of a more justified view of a center and 
thus of a hierarchical, centralized system.
Certainly, this ran counter to the tradition of American political thought. Yet it instilled a vision 
of the functional advantages of a hierarchically organized whole in thinking about the social as 
such. It provided a model to cope with interlinking clusters of problems like those that ensued 
from growing immigration and the worsening condition of cities. This was because of a 
conception that what a municipal telegraph system did to a city, a social system organized on 
similar principles could do to the whole country; namely, divide it up into distinct units and 
classes, set up boundaries between different areas and districts, form horizontal and vertical 
relationships between them and the center, and finally render this hierarchical network 
governable, at least in its essential aspects, from a single location. On the other hand, like the 
news wire service, it could organize channels, hubs and intersections for communication flows, 
establish institutions for systematic gathering, restoring and retrieving differentiated types 
information, and finally connect all the flows into a dominating center. In this way the telegraph 
would provide a model for the whole to become truly aware of its own being.
This way of thinking characterized more the aims enacted in Europe, especially those of 
Prussia and France, than those of America. For the latter, acentric systems rather than 
centralized ones constituted a foundation for social structure. One should not, however, 
presuppose too sharp a conceptual distinction between these organizations, as Tonnies did in 
his division between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, for they had an inherent relationship to 
each other. Acentric systems were not independent on centralized ones, which, as for them,
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could not contain the movements of disintegration within them. Thus, for example, the news 
wire service enabled and was conducive to the processes that produced a number of 
heterogeneous information systems. For their part, these systems inevitably influenced the way 
the news wire service worked by, at the very least, constituting a thick texture of institutions and 
practices that served not only as a background, but often also as a source of counter-truths for 
national news.
If society did not, after all, turn into an immense telegraph system, the idea of this system 
doubtless forged a new relationship to thinking about the political. Combined together in a 
symbiotic relationship, models provided by some networked systems, worsening social 
problems, and theoretical discourses of the Spencerian variety seemed to justify demand for a 
stronger centralized political government Ever more complex chains of problems and the 
accelerated pace caused by technological development lead contemporary political thought to 
consider similar kinds of arrangements to those that had successfully been applied in private 
businesses to maximize the scale effect in nationwide operations; namely, management of a 
variety of processes within a single coordinative center. This fact related not only to 
organizatorial design but also to methods of effective treatment of problems, prepared a terrain 
for technocratic thinking to take root later in the following centuiy. It articulated a model on the 
basis of which political questions could be handled successfully, it seemed, as technical 
problems. The apparent efficiency of organizatorial arrangements prepared the ground for an 
emerging approach that sought to formulate a technical model for management of political 
processes. It received its first theoretical embodiments in Taylorism and the technocracy 
movement, the influences of which, notwithstanding their limited periods of active practice, 
were not transient but left a lasting trace in common ways of conceptualizing political questions 
as well as in the administrative history of and by communication. It is here that the role played 
by the telegraph is absolutely unparalleled, as the model it lent to the service of powers 
championing a centralized decision-making structure was also conducive to technocratic 
phrasing of non-technical problems together with results produced by institutional 
reorganizations.
Of highest interest for us are not the possible effects of the telegraph on specific schemes for 
thinking about the political, although this is certainly not unimportant. Rather, our interest lies 
in communication’s position as a precondition of the political and in the telegraph’s central 
role in the new communicative sphere. No doubt without the telegraph, communication would 
neither have become politized nor conceptualized to the extent it was at the time. It was the 
telegraph that produced an unprecedented positivity in communication; and an awareness of the
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historical and positive role of communication was only intensified during the era of the 
telephone. At this time, people started to pay attention to a reciprocal relationship between 
cultural circumstances and communication practices that had an effect on each other, and thus 
to the productive influence of communication systems to society.
What is significant in the history of communication from our perspective is that 
“communication,” in the age of the telegraph, depended on a conceptual whole. Thinking 
about communication was inherently connected to the idea of a prior whole that enabled 
communication as a social experience. This was realized in two related aspects. As a result of 
the telegraph and a subsequent new identity for communication, attention was focused on 
mechanisms, movements and flows of communication. As thinking about communication was 
motivated more by practical than theoretical interest, not least because of the uninstitutionalized 
state of telecommunication discourses proper, instances that produced and directed these flows 
became the framework for “communication.” On the other hand, the idea of unity that marked 
political discourse provided an environment in which communication was not only politicized 
but also conceptualized in terms of its own positivity, that is, as communication. As in the case 
of communication systems and institutions, the theme of national unification served as a 
conceptual whole within which all the disparate communicative events and processes could be 
conceived of as being subservient to a single objective or purpose, a principle that would give 
communication a consistent structure.
This whole that seemed to both enable and set the limits for thinking about communication had 
a name. It was the nervous system, which constituted largely the conceptual framework for 
“communication.” Thus, insofar as communication was viewed as a socially effective object in 
itself, it is possible to argue that this took place in terms of the biological analogy, which 
conceptualized communication as a social mechanism. The analogy of the nervous system, 
together with telegraph systems and discourses, laid a foundation for the idea that 
communication could be subordinated to a single law or principle. In the course of this idea’s 
development, communication became regarded through the themes of ordering and planning as 
an object to be organized according to consistent functional principles.
This analogy politicized a common characteristic of all communication systems, that 
communication was something that could be sold: communication, and especially a 
communicative event, was made a saleable commodity. All systems of communication yield 
and organize communication, but not until the commercial telegraph became common it was 
included in capitalist production. Before this, communication had mainly been a resource
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outside market relationships, but the telegraph made it an article of trade on which the telegraph 
based its industrial organization. For the first time communication as an event became 
something saleable: it was incorporated into the market economy and became an industiy of its 
own. The biological analogy turned this fact into the basis for political system, and provided a 
model and legitimation for political attempts to seize “communication.” Under the sphere of 
influence of this powerful image of communication as the vital system of modem society, 
communication was not only rendered a “whole,” it was also made a rational whole since the 
lines and routes of communication were seen as constituting ultimately an orderly system 
serving specific social functions. The biological analogy sought to rationalize networks of 
exchange and organize the tracks and connections of information flows under the same 
conceptual whole. This is a theme, however, that found its greatest expression during the 
telephone’s heyday.
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4. Systemic Orders
The communicative assemblage underwent a change at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
This was mainly because of the coincidence and interweaving of two distinct fields of power. 
The emergence of a new constellation was occasioned, first, by rational planning becoming 
established, which, in turn, was an outcome of efficiency doctrines and scientific method 
coming together, and secondly, through the organizational technique of carrying out the diverse 
functions by means of a hierarchical system. The new technology of telephonic communication 
constituted the chief framework for these processes.
The position of the telephone is central in the modem history of communication. Being the 
first real interpersonal communication system, it assumed at the beginning similar functions to 
the telegraph, but soon turned, after the creation of telephone networks predicated on the 
exchange principle, into a general conversational medium.138 As it did not require expertise to 
operate, as was the case with the telegraph, the telephone made possible instant interpersonal 
communication, and not, as the telegraph did, only interregional communication. This personal 
accessibility brought about the immense constitutive effect the telephone had on the 
functioning of the social, and provided the prerequisites for it to be considered not only as an 
instrument enabling new forms of organization to be founded, but as a central institution by 
way of which the social organism could organize its inherent being according to a conscious 
rationale. This is why the telephone system, “a great communication machine,”139 was not just 
an institution among others. Its significance resided in the fact that it allowed social institutions 
to adapt themselves to the changed circumstances of modem society in a desired way: by 
rationalizing operations and increasing their efficiency. On the other hand, it was to a great 
extent the veiy improvement in communication that set in motion the dissolution of the 
previous social order, a process we understand as modernization. Thus the telephone system 
cannot be considered as only having made a “contribution -  [to] the functioning of [social] 
institutions,”140 as many commentators tend to think in line with functional theories, because 
this system was a precondition for existence of these institutions in their modem state. But 
even this is not all. The telephone system can be said not only to have constituted a 
precondition for collective institutions and their possible interrelationships that together made
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the society what it is, but more accurately, to be the expression and mark of the temporal 
unfolding of the social insofar as the latter is based on communicative relations. This is why 
communication systems do not contribute to, reflect, or follow the social as if being “external” 
to it; rather, they “are” the very loci of the social, and thus expressions of the unfolding of 
what the social “is” — an unfolding that consists precisely of this process of expression.
The telephone, after its use was socially established, created conditions for interpersonal 
communication that transgressed and restructured communicative practices being formed in 
large organizations. Unlike the telegraph, in which the ticker, on the one hand, and the news 
service, on the other, had created a medium to be used for broadcast purposes too, the 
telephone was mainly an interpersonal medium. While allowing people to communicate with 
each other without going “through channels,”141 the social impact of the telephone system has 
at the same time been conducive to the formation of extensive hierarchical systems. Although 
there is much truth in the argument that the telephone was not important to establishment of 
internal lines of communication as a managerial tool, being mainly a mechanism to extend 
informal communication,142 it formed at any rate a conceptual model for this purpose. The 
telephone constituted largely the horizon within which thinking about communication was tied 
to the idea of a system in the early twentieth century, especially in organizational contexts. 
Although (horizontal) communication never ceased to unfold, systemic, hierarchical 
communication rose from the sea of horizontal communication and was regarded as paving the 
way for the future of communication. It created not only areas of organization, but also an 
image of the community itself by providing an idea of how it functioned as a whole.
Thus, though it had a remarkable role as a precondition of horizontal communication, the 
telephone played perhaps an even more important role as a foundation of hierarchical power 
structures. As the telephone’s position as a condition of centrally planned systems became 
clearer, so the promotion of horizontal relations and the distribution of information, as outlined 
by progressives, were replaced by the demand to found a law. This law, to determine and 
regulate relations and practices within the purview of a given system, was already a prominent 
part of the formation of the new socio-economic order in terms of systematically applied 
methods, hierarchically arranged organizations and routinized practices. However, it was not 
until the the telephone was established as the main form of electric communication that the law 
turned into being an undeniable basis of the social order. Thus, law, as opposed to education 
and the distribution of information, became irrevocably the basis for politics and social 
practices.143 Moreover, it was during this process that communication posed law as the method 
of politics. While law is understood here as a set of predetermined rules and methods,
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communication as a precondition of centrally planned bureaucracies can be similarly conceived 
of as a relation in which function and parties are predetermined with respect to the system 
through which the relation is realized. Communication here is above all internal to the system 
that establishes it as communication. In other words, it receives its meaning from the functions 
of the system, and whose status and purpose have thus been formally pregiven, which is not the 
case with horizontal relations.
In what follows, I will analyze the dimension wherein communication was connected to law, 
understood as above as a formal mechanism to control interrelations within a given system, 
instead of to free horizontal relations in two interlinked senses. First, communication was the 
precondition of law: it made possible the formulation and enforcement of a rule. Hence, it was 
an integral part of the formation of social power systems. But the development processes of 
these systems are not something that can be disentangled from the historical unfolding of 
communication itself, as if external to i t  On the contrary, communication is nothing other than 
the historical process through which a community constantly reorganizes itself as a 
community. Therefore it is to be understood not only as providing the possibility for social 
relations, but also as the daily occurrence of these relations insofar as its historical role is 
determined in and through these very relations. This is because the conditions of the social are 
not formed in any domain or dimension independent from the daily course of the social, but 
expressly through the occurrence of restless, undetermined, and undecidable processes which 
constitute the social.
Thus, secondly, communication can be seen as having been articulated through law during the 
period in question by taking the form of law—universal and indisputable logical structure. 
Though in this respect it was analogous to natural law rather than to the legal norm, 
communication nevertheless lent itself as a seemingly neutral, accurately definable mechanism 
to the service of powers seeking rational governance and determined social relations. Here the 
application of scientific research to social questions cannot be separated from rational reform 
and subsequent projects, from the New Deal to Johnson’s Great Society and beyond, for 
social rationalization. Communication took a form in which it corresponded to its own age and 
in which it became both an object of scientific concern and a useful tool in the prevailing 
institutional practices grouped on and around the foundation of the aim of rational order. Of 
course, communication as a law and a precondition of law is only possible in the same social 
practices and the field formed by these practices wherein the social, too, becomes thought of 
especially as social. Thus, the role of communication in the modem world144—in its position 
as both law and a condition of law—is indistinguishable from the history of modernity. This
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does not mean, however, that its constitutive dimension as the condition “before” any 
particular communicative relation could not be considered separately from its historical 
manifestations, although in a given historical situation these are always, as has been proposed, 
one and the same thing.
In this chapter we will deal with the industrialization of communication in relation to both the 
systems of and discourses on the telephone. Along with the development of telephony, the 
central theoretical cornerstones of this process included the rise of “scientific method,” the 
Progressive movement, the work of Lester Ward, efficiency engineering, Taylor’s scientific 
management which systematized efficiency doctrines, and the technocracy movement Let us 
now turn to the theoretical tradition that formed the conceptual terrain for thinking about 
communication, after which we will discuss, in the next section, the forms and modes of 
communication as realized in certain individual systems.
4.1. Communicative Machinery
Insofar as the telephone as the main form of electric communication created a model for 
systematic application of scientific research to the production of consumer goods at the end of 
19th century—alongside the electrical and chemical industries—it is possible to see “the 
speaking machine,” as it was often called in the contemporary press,145 as having formed a 
speaking machine of the whole society. This is because it set the pattern not only for 
communication, but also for industrial system as a whole.146 The telephone largely constituted 
the intersection of powers in and through which both modem communication and industrial 
order—which are not to be treated as separate from each other—assumed their shapes. The 
social history of the telephone, and of telecommunication in general, can naturally be construed 
from diverse starting points, not necessarily compatible with each other. It is my intention here 
to bring out the path of development through which modem metaphysical (in the sense given to 
the term by Nietzsche and Heidegger) ways of thinking have been inculcated into the manner 
communication has been taken as both an object and a means of administration during the 
telephone's heyday. In the course of this development the uncommunicative conditions of 
communication, that is, the ontological dimension which makes possible communication as 
communication, has been understood in terms of a whole characterized by growing 
systemicity. In this heterogeneous but unidirectional project, wherein communication was given 
ever more precisely formulated meanings, the connection through which thinking about 
communication does not deal with its determinable characteristics but rather with what in
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communication “precedes” all particular communicative meanings and its articulable 
properties begin to be perceived within an ever more technical context. This is why the line of 
development, brought up here, from Lester Ward through Frederick Taylor to the technocracy 
movement and further to cybernetics, is important For it was the working of these discursive 
frameworks which paved the way for considering communication primarily as a question of 
technique. It is in and through these forms that the fundamental historicity and finiteness of 
communication found its modem industrial appearance.
Communication as a general social dimension, during this period, was reduced by way of these 
instrumental settings mainly into two distinct, although related, categories. First, at its most 
visible and impressive in the form of and as the effects of great industrial systems, 
communication was conceived of first and foremost as part of the growing national economy. 
Thus, it was considered an industry, that is, it was of interest only insofar as it was seen in the 
light of the functioning of an industrial unit. It was in this period when communication, 
representing the modem technological society, was linked irrevocably with the organizational 
form and functioning of an industrial field—a link that is still highly effective. Secondly, given 
the efficiency of communication as an industiy, there emerged an interest in systematizing the 
whole communication process and unveiling its mechanism, its very “logic” within this 
industrial context The systematization of communication emanated, of course, from the same 
movement in which industrial processes became rationalized according to a general scheme for 
making them function more efficiently, and was thus intertwined with the institutionalization of 
scientific research. While actual telecommunication technologies and the systems they enabled 
did largely constitute the environment wherein communication originally was brought out as a 
social question, thinking about communication was articulated more in technical terms, the 
more these technologies were incorporated into a sphere of institutionalized scientific research. 
The concept of communication, although the motivation for its systematic explanation stemmed 
from a particular historical stage wherein its instrumental positivity was brought out by and 
through the effects of industrial consolidation, was materialized within frameworks that 
presented themselves as objective, and dispensed with all its “subjective” and thus irrational 
empirical connections in order to capture its innermost “essence.” It is in this context that the 
“scientific” conception of communication was first worked out, preparing the ground for 
subsequent generalized models of communication systems deeply rooted in academic treatises. 
Therefore it is this latter lineage that we must follow in order to trace the formations laid down 
for and in the course of communication, and to investigate the role communication has been 
given in modem American society, that is, in what during the nineteenth century was separated 
from the preceding social order.
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Communication and the Challenges of Industrialization
By the time the telephone system was established culturally it had become clear that the 
influence of the new communications and transportation technology, coupled with machine 
industry, on the transformation of the social conditions of American society was fundamental. 
Communication in its modem forms was not only conducive to the dissolution of the shared 
structure of meaning and the undermining of the normative order of agricultural America: it 
was one of the most important causes of this process.147 The rearticulation of social conditions 
to this extent clearly would not have been possible without the improvement of communication 
systems and the establishment of their social status. Charles Horton Cooley, for example, 
writing in the early nineteenth century, depicted the social transformation brought about by the 
railways, the telegraph, newspapers, and the telephone as revolutionary in every aspect of 
life.148 Therefore the configuration of means of communication cannot be thought of as 
separable, nor even as distinguishable, from society. Communication as the basis of society 
naturally always builds this connection, but especially in developed industrial societies social 
events are organized expressly as communicative events, as events in a communication 
environment in and through which social relations are established as social and the common 
experience of what is going on comes in the sphere of shared meanings. Modem 
communication systems were not only vehicles of change, because by constituting the field 
wherein this change could be taken as an object of speech they formed the preconditions of the 
thinking of the social reorganization itself. This idea was articulated in contemporary writing 
mostly as a notion of communication as the factual site of the political. It was also the 
conclusion to which the progressive historians Charles and William Beard, for instance, came 
in 1930, for according to them the improved means and forms of communication had created 
an “intellectual climate in which governments make and execute policies.”149 Though 
communication technology was still seen strictly as a means to distribute information, the new 
systems nevertheless were conceived as having become established not only as the essential 
environment for political action, but also as its necessary precondition.
The telephone system, regarded as an organism, constituted a whole new mode of publicity. 
Arnold Bennett, writing in Harper*s Monthly, understood that the telephone network, in 
connecting innumerable private households and businesses together, engendered a new field of 
communicability. “Just as I think of the big cities as agglomerations pierced everywhere by 
elevator-shafts full of movement,” he said, “so I think of them as being threaded under 
pavements and over roofs and between floors and ceilings and between walls, by millions upon 
millions of live filaments that unite all the privacies of the organism—and destroy them in
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ordeir to make one immense publicity.”150 As it was hoped the telegraph would bring 
communicating parties together, so the telephone seemed to be capable of bringing this process 
to ai conclusion and establishing a unifying publicity by means of speech. Thus, a 
contemporary commentator characterized the telephone as a social force as follows:
“‘Behold a highly developed and well organized system of communication touching 
human activity at every point—an essential factor in the social and industrial life of the 
nation—cities, towns, villages and hamlets, though widely separated, farms, factories and 
firesides everywhere intimately bound together by countless avenues of speech. -- The 
incessant exchange of information and ideas which this system makes possible, puts 
individuals and localities on common ground—sweeps away sectional 
prejudices—advances civilization. — While the telephone, together with other methods of 
communication—the railway, the mail and the telegraph—have been the means by which 
the occupation and civilization of this great country have been accomplished, the telephone 
has provided a facility peculiar to itself, in that, over areas of great and small, it has made it 
possible, by spoken word, to bring together—mind to mind—the vast majority of the 
American people.”151
The belief in a coherent political unit, to be fullfilled with the aid of growing communication, 
struck the social imagination. If the telegraph did not actually succeed in establishing a 
harmonious community, the far more efficient telephone, which inherited the hopes invested in 
the earlier communication system, seemed to be able to fulfill expectations. The telephone was 
no doubt regarded as an important means of engendering and organizing the social into a 
unified system. This view was reflected, for instance, in the address by N.C. Kingsbury before 
the Central States Conference on Rail and Water Transportation. “In the history of the 
telephone,” he stated, “there have — been no greater achievements than the development of 
transcontinental telephony and of wireless telephony. — This is a final blow to sectionalism. 
The East is no longer separated from the West, nor the North from the South. -- Co-operation 
is rendered easy, natural, necessary, permanent.”152 It seemed apparent that communication 
resided in the core of the modernization process that permeated the whole society, and, in the 
final analysis, it was nothing other than the expression of the unfolding of society itself. Of 
course, it must be noticed that communication was not—with some notable 
exceptions153—articulated as an ontological question but was stuck in the instrumental register 
communication was something by which one could create “intellectual climates” rather than 
being related to the emergent way of being that made this creation possible in the first place.
90
The revival of communication in a new technical mode appeared as a two-pronged question. 
On the one hand proliferation of connections speeded up the general economy and increased 
the complexity and fluidity of social and industrial processes, thus multiplying the “burdens of 
government”154 and enhancing the need for organization and planning. The telegraph alone 
had grown and accelerated collective forging of social relations to the extent that it, in the main, 
disintegrated the very order on the basis of which it had developed, and the telephone increased 
many times the level of the complexity and the rate of social processes.155 On the other hand, 
communication, especially in the form of developed communication technologies, could be 
seen at the same time to be the central tool for resolution of this problem,156 for communication 
systems such as the telephone enabled better control by increasing the efficiency of 
coordination. Furthermore, telephone systems constituted in themselves a giant industry the 
network structure of which provided a recognizable visual representation for grasping the new 
conditions of societal activity in which distant actions seemed to have immediate and 
perceptible effects. Therefore they could be viewed as models for making the governance of 
society more effective and business-like, which was what the contemporary critique desired in 
opposition to the “corruption” of the government
After the telephone and the immediate interpersonal communication it set up was socially 
established, it emerged as an indispensable resource with respect to the governance of 
numerous activities, becoming an “absolute business and social necessity.”157 This was 
manifested in both the increase in telephones and telephone lines, and the growing use of them 
on a routine basis. So, the telephone was no longer just an auxiliary device in social practices 
but was instead taken for granted as the precondition of these practices. “ Organized society,” 
stated a contemporary, “cannot exist without inter-communication, and the quicker and more 
certain it is, the greater is the uplift of humanity in the intimate relations of social units.”158 
The telephone was a definite foundation not only of the corporate domain but also increasingly 
of the functioning of the society itself.
The instrumental and conceptual means provided by communication systems were given the 
necessary buoyancy required for the significant collective project of structuring social practices 
more in accordance with a general plan by and in connection with “scientific method,” as 
successfully pursued in the natural sciences, in the light of which the full potential of 
communication was to be realized within a rational guidance system. The nature of this method 
consisted in a number of things. First, it separated the incidental and insignificant from what 
was essential and necessaiy, and in doing so forged a relationship to truth. Secondly, it 
replaced contingent, subjective opinion by a rational and objective procedure that did not leave
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room for individual interests or preferences, being thus beyond value laden disputes. Thirdly, 
this procedure had a coherent, endlessly repeatable nature, which did not change with time and 
context, whereas its objects, in turn, appeared independent from the method, which only 
revealed them without having any influence on their existence as such. Lastly, the method was 
insensitive to its objects: it could be applied in principle to any object regardless of their 
particular type or distribution. This method constituted the foundation on which the social in its 
variability could be thought as an object of scientific control, but also laid the basis for 
communication becoming a focus of systematic production of knowledge. From the technical 
point of view, the latter virtually formed a precondition of the former, as communication in the 
form of telecommunication required dependable and effective transmission systems which both 
necessitated scientific research and were an outcome of it. Furthermore, and more essentially, 
scientific practices depend naturally on communication in a more original sense by being 
necessarily communicative practices. They are therefore intelligible only in the realm of 
communicative relations, which were also a precondition of these relations themselves 
becoming objects of scientific investigation. In the course of its becoming measurable and 
determinable—and its nature thus being revealed, as it seemed—communication 
(telecommunication) increasingly created opportunities for the determination of social relations 
too, at least insofar as it is conceived as constituting both a means and object of scientific 
practices.
Scientific interest in communication strenghtened concurrently with the improvement of 
technologies of communication. It was connected to the growing sentiment that communication 
as a social process, after having been analyzed and formalized, could be used to engender and 
maintain the social system.159 Thus clarification of the communication process was not merely 
an academic, but also a thoroughly political question. Despite the fact that the scientific control 
of society was presented as a collective mission, the actual determination of social relations, as 
it were, did not depend primarily on conscious decisions. Modem communication, relating to 
the institutionalizing of scientific research, set a matrix in which many relations, especially in 
the economic realm, were capable of being performed by telecommunicational means. 
Telecommunication determined social relations by engendering and differentiating positions, 
practices, and connections prior to and alongside discourses on rationalization and social 
planning. It routinized forms of interaction and specified operational chains of action, allowing 
the reformulation of tasks and necessitating rearrangement of organizational structures. 
Through creating classes of action and types of organization, it was also involved with the 
realization of conscious schemes and systems. But most importantly it fulfilled an underlying 
precondition, inherently exposed to the scientific estate, that allowed for the determination of
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communicative relations within the social. This is because of the abovementioned double role 
o f communication as both means and object of science: if science is only possible as 
communicative practice, it is the nature of this very communication that is at stake in modem 
scientific institutions from anthropology and economics to engineering and information 
systems. Whether it manifests itself in the form of rituals or lines of impact, or in mediation of 
interests or transmission of signals, what these approaches have in common is precisely a need 
to explain “communication” relevant to a given discipline. Though the significance of 
language and communication from the administrative point of view was evident by the turn of 
the century, it was especially cybernetics that made it a science in the middle of the twentieth 
century. For the cyberneticians it was clear that “language is a necessary subject to study for 
any scientist.”160 It is in this connection, that is, in the conjunction of communication and 
science, where free, irreducible communicative relations are inscribed into the body of the 
scientific edifice and translated into their special vocabularies. In this respect, the determination 
of social relations is indissociable from the linguistication of communication.
Thanks to the historical linkage between communication and a general method or law, 
communication was considered as capable of being brought within the sphere of conscious 
command, which reflected the ambition and hope of society taking control of its own destiny. 
While communication, in the form of social relations and processes, was wanted under rational 
control, it was however this same communication which would perform the control required. 
Seen from this perspective, concern about communication not only reflected the need to direct 
the course of society and thus to take the responsibility for its own being, for it was 
communication which established the space and defined the ways within and by which this 
concern could be expressed: if communication was a means, it was a means for society to exist 
and maintain itself as a society, because it is this very communication which makes sense of the 
community.
The concept of society based on the idea of a founding law as a mode of social governance was 
gradually given explicit formulation through the view of society as an integration of different 
social groups which replaced the old idea of it as an aggregate of atomistic individuals. This, in 
turn, was a fundamental part of the process that prepared the ground for a more positive view 
of the state and for national planning evolving as a major issue of American public policy.161 
Progressive thinkers like Charles Cooley, Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and John Dewey, 
attempting to formulate the outlines of a new, industrial liberalism, agreed that the supposed 
natural harmony of economic competition was not capable any longer of maintaining social 
stability, which depended instead on the idea of cooperation. In this context, the exposition in
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the second half of the nineteenth century of communication in terms of competition was 
rejected It is easy to read from the contemporary discourses that during the time of the 
telegraph it was communication which was the integrating social power: it united the 
community as a community, while the prevailing political economy, in turn, defined 
communication as a universal competition between atomistic individuals pursuing their own 
egoistic self-interest. Now, however, communication assumed a novel character because the 
idea of competition did not correspond any longer to experience of the present situation or the 
requirements it placed on social action. The great industrial systems that were seen as 
epitomizing the intrinsic nature of modem technical society established the conceptual frame of 
reference within which communication came to be considered. As the central processes of 
society were depicted as systemic, and as it was understood that what characterized the society 
as such was no longer competition but cooperation and the aspiration for smooth and efficient 
action, the concept of a system became the reference point through which the progressive idea 
of the use of scientific methods in administration was entwined with the aim of efficiency.162 In 
contrast to the European tradition, social governance was not naturally organized as a 
comprehensive program in American political thinking, but insofar as the political tradition 
marked by localism and fragmentation became increasingly restructured on the basis of law 
and a general method,163 it was impossible to disentangle communication as a systemic 
instance from the realization of this law.
Lester Frank Ward was the first person in American social science to articulate the notion that 
history was subject to scientific control and direction, and would have had sociology mobilized 
into systematic disclosure the rules according to which social laws could be controlled.164 For 
Ward, distancing himself from the static social Darwinism of William Graham Sumner, 
movements within society appeared not as preordained for, although still following natural 
laws, they were now seen as governable in just the same way as natural forces have proved 
rationally governable thanks to the natural sciences. Here, the model of natural sciences 
provided a way for Ward to rethink the status of social laws, because if the same laws governed 
both physical world and human society, discovery of these laws would allow rational control. 
This let him conceive politics as the governance of these laws “just as water, wind, and 
electricity are controlled.”165 In this way, politics as the sphere in which social relations were 
articulated was to be supplanted by the “scientific” control of social laws. Thus, 
communication, the voice and mark of the social, became something that could be subjected to 
communal regulation, because the laws which directed its course could be formulated not only 
for analysis but also for manipulation.
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In this respect Ward paved the way for technocratic thinking by articulating a program to 
capture the inherent “essence” of society in the form of social laws and to control these laws 
in a systematic, methodical manner. Politics, in this program, came to be replaced by a set of 
supposedly uncontroversial and objective rules, based on “scientific” analysis. Insofar as for 
Ward the possibility of directing the development of history and our own fate was important, it 
was this very aspect that was remowed discourses of social engineering proper. In those, the 
instrumental dimension of effective social control excluded questions concerning common 
objectives and the direction of history, in other words the whole possibility of politics. 
Nevertheless, Ward demonstrated how easily the concept of controllability of the social was 
translated into a question of technology. This was not, however, just accidental, for the 
increasing awareness of the general significance of instrumental efficiency constituted to a 
great extent the social context within which the early twentieth century American society and its 
future were posed as objects of thought.
This notion, which substituted Sumner’s ineluctable natural development by scientifically 
generated progress, and competition, as manifested in the survival of the fittest by natural 
selection, by mutual cooperation and rational negotiation, opened up a new relation to thinking 
about communication as well. For insofar as they appeared to enable the general economy of 
social interaction, the conditions of communication were translated from natural laws external 
to human authority to principles pertaining to the inherent nature of human society itself. 
Although still remaining within the sphere of natural law, these principles were now included as 
workable elements of the human realm. In this way the practical, instrumental viewpoint lent 
itself naturally to dealing with social questions. So, communication, a sign and signal of the 
social, became subordinated to social direction and regulation by virtue of the fact that the 
underlying laws that determined its course could be used for manipulation by sociological 
investigation. The forms of multifarious communicative relations appeared in the perspective of 
this applied, “dynamic sociology” no longer as reflecting an unchangeable blueprint, but were 
seen instead as following an intelligible and, eventually, controllable law.
What appeared as the most crucial question, as opened up and addressed by the reform 
Darwinism which Ward systematically articulated, was not so much concerned with historicity, 
but controllability of the social: instead of considering the social as being realized in the course 
of its becoming articulated, it drew attention mainly to methods for the proper organization of 
social life. The gesture by which politics was replaced by technique was legitimized by so 
called scientific method, which established the domain within which controllability could be 
carried out. This method, being essentially “analytical and rational,” was viewed as opposed to
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the “instinctive, emotional, rule-of-thumb operations of historic politics.”166 In addition, it lead 
unavoidably to the right decisions relative to the situation: “it calls for the collection of 
pertinent facts, the formulation of conclusions on the basis of facts, and the execution of 
policies in accordance with the requirements of the fact situation.”167 So, through the 
coalescence of Darwin’s conception of evolution with scientific method, a possibility arose for 
a new relationship to the social. The far-reaching significance of this should not be 
underestimated, for this is why a whole sphere of practices became firmly entrenched on a 
foundation of law—in the sense of predetermined relationships and unchanging, systematically 
applicable procedures. This was related to the fact that the possibility of control was only 
conceivable by virtue of the scientific edifice which was itself grounded in the same principle of 
controllability.
As the changed circumstances demanded a rational recasting of society, a mechanism for 
reform was thus discovered, not in evolutionary theoretical interpretations by social Darwinists, 
but rather in the repeatable method of science that posed the conditions of communication as a 
factual structure. In this way a still extant project was initiated, in the course of which these 
conditions showed up as able to be understood in consistent and quantifiable categories. At the 
same time they were irrevocably enshrined in the system of metaphysical science as something 
conceptually uniform and numerically definite. It is this project—although heterogeneous as 
well as discontinuous, and so losing any sense of predetermined historical or thematic 
consistency168—wherein communication assumed a growing “beingness” in terms of the 
forms in which it was introduced as an object of scientific analysis. However, the question is 
not of a juxtaposition of eventfulness and beingness (an event can be as being-like as a being 
eventful), but rather of the types of form through which communication was expressed within a 
sphere of systematic thinking. Of course, there is nothing accidental in this, for scientific 
method isolates its objects and thus causes, to a large degree, being-like existence to be tested, 
measured, and assessed. Therefore it is not surprising that communication adopted an inherent 
structure and mechanism of its own out of the indeterminate oscillation wherein it both 
conditions and is being incessantly conditioned. Hence, what has defied a comprehensive 
definition, namely the always elusive “nature” of communication, started to get considered as 
a positive term.169 Yet the positivity introduced here is always its own positivity, not an external 
quality attributed to it. What the emerging figure of communication was suggestive of, in a 
way, was society’s own image in that the scientific practices that evoked it became an ever more 
integral part of a society that was constituted, in the final analysis, from communication.
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American System of Communication
Alongside the utilization of technical models for rationalizing the practices of various systems, 
Frederick Winslow Taylor formulated a sophisticated concept of control wherein the 
requirements for efficiency and methodical clarity were combined into the form of a 
regimented, scientifically managed organization.170 This was encapsulated in what became 
known as scientific management, and after World War I, industrial management. It concretized 
the major focus of social reform at the local level by creating a realistic program of 
rationalization to be implemented in industrial organizations.171 The concept of the stability and 
controllability of communication found a first promising model from engineering method 
because it seemed to be capable of fulfilling the vision of a scientifically governed society by 
serving as a means of replacing social contention with indisputable answers.172 Scientific 
management synthetized engineering method, the “ scientific” approach, and the previous 
doctrines of efficiency experts and job designers into a consistent system of theory and 
practice. It established a perspective that gathered together the theoretical formulations of 
organization, the idea of standardization, the physical movements of workers, and material 
conditions for the workplace, allowing them to be analyzed within the same conceptual 
framework. It is of utmost importance from the point of view of the history of administration 
of and by communication to take cognizance of this development, as it was in factories and 
workshops that communication was not only formulated as a distinct object of thought but also 
in which the formalization of communication took its first steps. This is related to the fact that 
at the beginning of the twentieth century it had become apparent that the possibility for 
scientific planning of social development was based on the factual structure of communication, 
not on its assumed immutable principles.173 The Taylor System provided the context wherein 
this structure could be translated into specific laws in order to rationally direct not only 
industry, but the whole nation, as the method of governance was seen to be basically identical 
in both cases.174 The charm of Taylorism from the administrative point of view was naturally 
that it suggested the possibility of specifying the “one best way” for any social activity, and 
this was the reason it soon assumed the form of a general socio-political program.
It can be proposed that the experience of a limit to social development was linked with “the 
passing of the frontier,” or “the Turner thesis,” in that experience was now accumulated 
through markets, through the fact that profit had to be made more and more through 
competition rather than by extending markets infinitely. Experience of limits was thus tied 
more and more to experience of the finiteness of market relations, and it is at this point that 
Taylor entered the picture by presenting a “scientific” approach to the problem of the increase
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in production required. Scientific management was a method for meeting the need, expressed 
from the last decades of the nineteenth century on, for finding a way to coordinate operations 
and control workers in order to increase the level of production. Against this background, 
Taylor can be regarded as having forged a new relationship to the experience of limit, because 
it is in the context of the new awareness of the limits of the market that his system has left a 
lasting mark.
Yet Taylorism is to be understood not only as a theory of management but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, as a way of thinking about communication within the circumstances of 
modem industrial society. Seen from this angle, it can first be said to have established 
communication as one of the means by which the manager could control work done on the 
shopfloor, thus expressing the relationship between manager and worker in terms of 
communication. Although it was not the only relevant perspective within which work was 
conceptualized, communication was viewed here as an integral part of the production process. 
Thus the success of scientific management, according to Taylor, relied on, for one thing, “the 
intimate cooperation of the management with the workmen, so that they together do the work in 
accordance with the scientific laws which have been developed, instead of leaving the solution 
of each problem in the hands of the individual workman,” as he pointed out in his classic book 
The Principles o f Scientific Management, which was first published in 1911.175 The theme of 
an underlying law brings us to the second point Taylorism articulated a perspective which 
enabled work as communication process to be thought of as a regular activity controlled by a 
general law which could be fully revealed in each particular case by the methods of scientific 
management. Taylor was firmly convinced that “laws of this kind, which apply to a large 
majority of men, unquestionably exist, and when clearly defined are of great value as a guide in 
dealing with men.”176 These laws were not, however, imposed on action from above, as a 
principle foreign to it, but stemmed from the specific procedures and motions needed in a given 
task. So the law, gathering communicative relations and events under one conceptual whole, 
was fundamentally a law derived from the activity in question.
It was by and through the scheme introduced by Taylor that a line between a system and its 
“outside” was drawn. The system represented what was rational, ordered, and efficient, 
whereas its outside, the “other” of the system, comprised all that was not in line with these 
characteristics, things and processes external to the system which endangered the order 
laboriously created and maintained. What exactly was this externality, this other, then, with 
respect to Taylorism? By the systematic organization of work and communication Taylor 
sought to efface 1) practices based on habits, 2) subjective, incongruent activities, and 3)
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differences in views and inner inconsistencies. This can be perceived as a crucial move in the 
politics of communicative administration and the administration of communication, being 
incessantly reiterated, applied, and elaborated later, through which the mechanism of a system 
was synthetized and formalized out of its previously heterogeneous parts and described in 
terms of its intrinsic nature, seen as a logical whole. For the first time in a “scientific” sense, 
communication assumed a thoroughly rational structure, taking the place of what used to be an 
incoherent set of distinct, often incongruent or overlapping practices.
An impersonal, uniform structure was to displace time-consuming and incoherent traditional 
practices that, from the point of view of a rational system, usually only led to confusion, 
disagreement, and endless negotiations. “Scientific management will mean,” argued Taylor, 
“the elimination of almost all causes for dispute and disagreement between men.”177 These 
differences of opinion and disordered practices constituted, according to Taylor, the ultimate 
enemy of a perfect system. And it was communication, first and foremost, which provided the 
means of overcoming the state of disorder, for “more than all other causes, the close, intimate 
cooperation, the constant personal contact between the two sides [a manager and a workman], 
will tend to diminish friction and discontent.”178 Yet the infinite exchange of views to be 
eliminated, in this connection, is precisely what could be called politics. From the point of view 
of Taylorism, politics made the functioning of a system inefficient, expensive, or dishonest.179 
Seeing it as a hindrance to working order, Taylor attempted to overcome politics not by another 
set of politics as other reformers did, but by truth. That is, he aimed at identifying the most 
effective method for any task by discovering the inherent laws that controlled i t
This necessity to eliminate negotiations by establishing a law forged a new relationship 
between a system and a non-system. Even though a law-based order took the place of disorder, 
the latter could not be completely eliminated for it was essential to the existence of the former. 
Upon further scrutiny, the outside of a system is defined as outside concurrently with the 
implication of the method, that is, when the constituent parts and processes are reconstructed 
on the basis of their necessary logical structure. Consequently, what happened here, in fact, was 
that the outside remained part of inside, part of the system, in the sense that the latter could not 
be considered as completely bereft of human imperfection. Rather, through methodological 
principles it was possible for the system to regulate inconsistencies in a rational manner. So, 
what is at stake here is the administration of internal uncertainties by exploiting and refining 
relevant objects with respect to two things, namely, the fixed goal of a system and what was 
external to it. In a word, it was a question of constructing a norm in terms of efficiency.
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This said, it is clear, though, that what fuelled the appeal and spread of this approach was 
precisely the vision of the possibility of reconstructing the whole system as a machine. It was 
Taylor who gave work and communication, understood in terms of a system, a mechanistic 
foundation. It tied the manager, workers, factory, machines, and the actions and routines needed 
for the work to one and the same mechanistic whole. It also forged a new relationship to time 
available. The most economical rhythm of motion became the standard for expenditure of time 
and removed any discretionary power to take turns working. As a consequence, man and his 
work, as well as the means and methods of production were all conceived as part of a 
consistent mechanistic system through physical and functional separation of tasks, 
standardization of production, and through bringing time in as an essential factor in 
production. In this way, if technology was previously viewed, to some extent, as a resource 
external to work, now Taylor built it into the organization of work itself.
The mechanistic approach inherent in Taylorism, and, in the main, also in its successors, 
constructed a consistent, recursive chain of action that, in the specific circumstances of any 
given case, would establish the one best, unchanging way to get a task done. Once the chain 
was established, there would be no need to change i t  Only persistent monitoring would be 
needed to check that the planned line of action was maintained and no deviations or 
interruptions occurred. It was this rigid methodical approach, remaining the same in every 
instance, that if followed strictly, would demonstrate the immanent order of communication, 
and its connection to the production process. Communication, hence, was articulated in 
between the mechanisms of science and those of the market. Moreover, it was in this 
“between” where communication received its innermost rational structure.
In this sense Taylor can be considered to have built on the legacy of Ward, for he formulated a 
method for the systematization of functional action, thereby trying to define the very logic, the 
hidden mechanism of communication at the core of this action. In a Platonic vein, Taylor 
sought to identify a simple, rational, and true foundation underlying the heterogeneous and 
variable world of appearance and to subordinate this apparent multiplicity to a founding law. 
By deriving this law through a controlled variation of isolated elements, he applied scientific 
method to the field of functional communication in order to make it more effective. The 
uncovering of the elementary elements of a given activity and their rearrangement in accordance 
with the requirements of the tasks in question was seen as a prerequisite for the efficient 
organization of communication. By undertaking the task of specifying the scientific laws of 
communication, Taylor can be said to have laid the foundation for thinking about 
communication as a factual and fully determinable entity at the service of administrative
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functions. In this respect, he became the central metaphysician of communication of the 
industrial age America.
What was central to his concept of an efficient organization was the idea of repetition: 
communication consisted here of regular and controlled reiteration of similar kinds of routines. 
In this context, every routine performed a certain function within a given productive whole, and 
communicative operations were then standardized and made interchangeable like machine parts, 
according to the “American System” in the second half of the nineteenth century. An essential 
feature of this procedure was that a recurrent, predetermined series of action and 
communication routines constituted the foundation for efficient production, in which more 
important than the content of communication was its performance, its occurrence, and its 
formal renewal. Because the contents of these acts were already preestablished in relation to the 
desired outcome, the more vital was their task-related repetition and repeatability. 
Communication assumed here for the first time the character of a scientifically produced and 
controlled function, being subordinate to the needs of the industrial organization it belonged to.
It is possible to perceive this idea of repetition, as put forward by Taylor, as epitomizing the 
industrial interpretation of communication by reducing the number of its diverse realizations to 
its lowest common denominator, that is, by reducing a multiplicity to a standard. This concept 
became expressible only in an industrial age, from the needs of which it received its conditions 
of meaningfulness: what Taylor did to work and communication paved the way for what Henry 
Ford did later to automobiles and transportation in general. By reflecting the realm of 
mechanical technology, the concept of repetition formulated a crucial principle of the modem 
industrial society. Its effectiveness lay in the fact that it was not restricted to any particular 
application but in theory enabled optimal performance to be determined for any industrial 
purpose. Hence it became a generalized tool that not only advanced industrial production but 
was also itself a product of industrial functions, for it was expressed through them at least in 
two senses. Firstly, it did not bring into them anything that they did not already contain, but 
only reorganized their internal sequences of action according to the law immanent to them. 
Secondly, and more essentially, it formulated operational laws of movement from the 
perspective of industrial institutions, and in so doing remained inside the industrial order. What 
was fundamental, of course, was that this idea of producing and modeling serial processes 
became possible on the basis that this modem industrial order had laid down in the late 
nineteenth century. This is how communication pushed ahead along the road of 
“standardization and efficiency,” in the words of telephone historian Herbert Casson in the 
early twentieth century.180
101
It is important to note that the efforts to systematice work and communication were not 
restricted solely to the discursive domain. Scientific management was consequential in its 
effects on organization and governance in American society. For public administration, it was 
an “inspiration, model, and source,” according to Dwight Waldo.181 The wave of 
rationalization permeated gradually a whole range of governmental practices with the 
introduction of management techniques related to reorganization of offices and rationalization 
of work flow.182 Moreover, communication was interpreted along the lines articulated by 
Taylor in industry and in the systems that made a business of it: the ideas of scientific 
management were not only external to the industrial production of communication but were an 
essential way of comprehending the nature of this business in some of its most prominent 
institutions. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), being both the main 
industrial player in the field and also one of the largest corporations in the United States and 
the world, took the theories of scientific management in earnest and actively implemented them, 
consequently turning the process of producing and wholesaling communication into a question 
of establishing the right method.183 It seemed that if social development was capable of being 
planned centrally by using “scientific” methods, so the telephone system, insofar as it were to 
keep pace with development, must be similarly centrally directed as a single entity.184 As Roger 
Burlingame, a historian of technology, put it in the 1940s, AT&T became “a symbol of the 
collective phase,”185 for it crystallized the impetus toward scientific administration in a way 
that created a model not only for other corporations but also for social governance in general.
The idea of the telephone company as the model for governance had been presented already by 
Charles P. Steinmetz, the most famous engineer after Taylor, according to whom the 
government should take as its model the corporation, and thus introduce supposedly 
disinterested and unambiguous methods for decision making.186 AT&T (or in general “the 
Bell System”) was proposed as an explicit model for the successful management of an 
immense organization especially in the Technocracy Study Course, a book that encapsulated 
the central ideas of the technocracy movement in the 1930s. According to the Course, the Bell 
System “ maintains in continuous operation what is probably the most complex, interconnected 
array of physical apparatus in existence,” by “continually changing the apparatus with which 
it has to deal, and remoulding the organization accordingly.”187 The Bell System established a 
pattern by way of which rational coordination was practiced successfully against a background 
of continuous and uninterrupted transformation of the whole system. This was not, however, a 
novel perception as Casson, for instance, had emphasized the dynamic structure of the system 
in question as early as 1910,188 and the exemplary model of this giant monopoly as regards 
style of management and satisfying customers’ needs did not escape other contemporary
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commentators* notice either.189 The question of social change was an immediate political 
problem of the time, which is why it was vital, as Wallace Donham said in 1932, “to introduce 
into our American industrialized social organism methods of dealing with change without loss 
of fundamental economic and consequently social stability.”190 Here, it should be noticed that 
the question presented itself naturally in terms of lack of a method, which when found, would 
give organization of the social a solid foundation. For the technocratic branch of progressivist 
thinkers, in any case, the Bell System came to serve as a model for a dynamic organization 
which mastered its own development through formalization of action, and in so doing 
exemplified the basic design, as anticipated and planned by the technocrats, for the larger social 
realm to come.
Thus the technocracy movement focused on the methods formulated by the Taylor 
System—standardization, the interchangeability of elements, and the maximum economy of a 
set of actions—which had been introduced into some, although nowhere near all the key 
institutions of modem American society, from the beginning as applicable to society as a 
whole. Even though Taylor had also thought of his system in relation to society and not only to 
the industrial establishment, the technocrats’ project was explicitly to carry out rational 
planning directed at society as a whole. For the technocrats, however, there was only one 
question of importance regarding communication, namely, “of two equally effective modes of 
communication which has the least energy cost per unit?” The unit was defined as “a given 
number of words transmitted a given distance.”191 Here, the idea of communication as purely 
the transmission of pre-existent, independent contents, was given its strongest and most 
resolute expression within the heritage that can be traced back to Ward. Communication 
became exclusively a matter of organizational efficacy, for it was of interest to the technocrats 
only in terms of its effects on the replacement of manpower by advancing the automatization 
and mechanization of society as a whole. Clearly, in the hands of these thinkers it was rendered 
a completely self-enclosed instrumental system: it was not only viewed as being subordinated 
to the industrial aims it seemed to serve and express but also as receiving its positivity, value, 
and social meaningfulness through the predetermined and unquestioned objectives of the 
system itself. So, its seemingly infinitely variable forms could in principle be identified and 
determined according to their social function and the level of energy consumption, and thus 
produce the best communication model for each purpose required.
The technocrats, who largely received their original inspiration from Thorstein Veblen’s book 
The Engineers and the Price System, published in 1919, held that because contemporary social 
problems, as they saw them, were predominantly technological in nature, it was the engineer
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and not the politician who must take over the management of the country.192 This opinion 
reflected the general sentiment among progressives that the growing complexity of the 
industrial society made the expert a prominent figure, although only the technocratically 
oriented branch was willing to grant the expert authoritative powers. By articulating the 
engineer’s point of view, the technocrats capitalized on the prevailing impulse to use clear, 
objective methods to reach unambiguous solutions, avoiding a political dispute. Whereas 
politics was subordinated to free market in the classical liberalism, in the context of a new, 
industrial liberalism it had a tenacious disposition to become subjected to technique. It is clear 
that community for these thinkers was not a political community, for it did not allow 
disagreement or debate, that is, questioning of the conditions of commonality. They held that 
[any competent functional organization] “ has no political precedents. It is neither democratic, 
autocratic, nor dictatorial. It is determined by the requirements of the job that has to be done - 
- .” 193 What the technocrats wanted to do was to erect a machinery that would recognize only 
one norm—that of smooth operation of the industrial system. As the disinterested and 
impersonal methodological approach appeared the only valid basis for this, the 
uncontroversiality of the method brought about the apoliticality of governance. Because social 
matters largely became questions related to the choice of appropriate rules of conduct, politics 
became an interlinked set of practices and precepts, a body of instructions rather than an 
argumentation. Here, instructions are to be understood not only as a set of precepts concerning 
the functioning of the social apparatus but also as the product of the “machine-likeness” of 
the society itself, as a response to questions which became expressible only within this 
conceptual context.
What seemed to be the logical result of the development of science and technology was an 
efficient yet nondemocratic government The efficiency schools rejected “both politics and the 
political,” according to Karl, and centered on the rational and economic system.194 It is not that 
politics would be completely removed or eliminated, though. It is rather that rational technology 
would engender a regime of truth wherein politics would be exhausted through unambiquous 
methods and procedures. Politics, insofar as it existed, would definitely not be defined in terms 
of contention or dispute, but rather in those of efficiency and stability.
Mechanical Systems
The rational reform movement initiated the project that placed communication, and thus the 
social order, on a scientific footing, wherein applied sciences were combined with the
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engineering model. This movement was concerned with institutionalizing communication in a 
way that would correlate with industrial organization, and in this sense also with modification 
of the conditions of communication in line with this objective. These conditions were conceived 
of in this project in an instrumental way, as an enabling structure for a certain communicative 
action to take place. They thus appeared no longer as a set of unchanging natural laws but 
instead for the first time as a modifiable order, subordinate to rational design. But as 
communication had assumed an unprecedented positivity and social effectiveness resulting in 
the systematic study of its mechanisms and channels, so the conditions of communication were 
seen in this instrumental light, which placed its ontological dimension in a technological 
context. In this way, as the progressives articulated society as an administrable whole, the need 
to take the reins pushed the dimension of communication as an instrumental means to the 
foreground. It began to be thought of within a technicized framework that was based on the 
dichotomy of means and ends, the former taking priority and causing the latter to recede in 
importance. This field of growing technicization, of course, laid the very foundation for the 
general possibility of the idea of being able to control the direction of society.
Communication research took shape in and through this perspective of administration and 
control; in fact, it was, in the final instance, this very perspective that made it possible as an 
institutionalized practice. As Herbert Croly expressed the view that the extreme concentration 
of industrial and financial power had resulted in the disintegration of political order and that 
what should be done was to restore social stability and a sense of national unity,195 
communication as a social process was immediately politized and embodied in one whole and 
political purpose. So, communication research was given a social function within the political 
movement that was only strengthened during the wan to provide knowledge about 
communicative means, practices, and effects in order to maintain the stability of the political 
system.196 Here, there was a notable break with communication as understood within the 
framework of the natural-rights doctrine of liberty of contract, which positioned it as an 
interindividual mechanism. Although also aiming at engendering a sense of unity, this 
mechanism proved unfeasible as it apparently led to the dissolution of political order. It 
conflicted precisely with what the progressives were struggling to achieve: it was what they 
wanted to abolish so to give way to a concept that was predicated on collective, not inter­
individual processes.
On the other hand, the demands of industry resulted in the development of methods and 
techniques that would aid in rationalizing production systems. Communication, particularly 
new communication technologies, if they seemed support this objective, were integrated sooner
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or later into this scheme. This is also why the Taylor System must be seen as applying directly 
to communicative practices, too. It is also important to notice that it was not limited to purely 
industrial activities, but spread throughout society and grew as a common conceptual horizon 
within which the question of rationalization was expressed and executed. Given this, it created 
an environment also for prosecuting broader political interests along the lines of progressive 
thinking. As Bowman has pointed out, underlying the practical application of the idea of social 
balance was the norm of efficiency. This was the source of the attractiveness and viability of 
Taylorism and other efficiency schools: they supported the political cause by providing 
mechanisms to restore social balance, for free contractual relations proved unable to maintain 
i t 197 Efficiency could be sustained only by efficiency itself; in other words, where previously 
there was a loose set of connections between rationalized industrial plants and practices, one 
should create a comprehensive and consistent social machinery. This is how social stability 
was combined with a hierarchical principle of organization,198 and with this conceptual bond 
communication as a social process was connected to a hierarchical system as well. Although 
this kind of total system was not, of course, brought into being, Taylorism provided a model 
that framed the political discussion on how to retain the beneficial consequencies of efficiency 
without its detrimental effects.
Thus, in his book Progressive Democracy, Croly argued for the creation of “industrial 
democracy” within a system of “scientific management.”199 These two terms were not 
independent of each other but, on the contrary, seemed to be inherently linked by their common 
goals of efficiency and stability.200 If scientific management was first and foremost a political 
technique, then its practical application was not restricted to management of business but was 
felt essential for industrial democracy in general. There was also a second reason why 
scientific management seemed to be suitable for Croly as a political technique for maintaining 
and engendering democracy. This is that scientific management—not unlike Croly’s 
progressivism—rested on the idea of a single whole. For Croly, harmonious social structure 
implied a concept of society as an interrelated and efficient totality,201 and scientific 
management seemed to provide a theory not only for setting it up, but also for continuously 
thinking about the various social processes within one conceptual framework.
Now, along with the move from an individual to a group, as well as from competition to 
cooperation, the telephone—together with other communication systems—appeared as a 
communal technique which would not only tie separate individuals to each other but would 
engender communality. If communication constructed the community, as was acknowledged, 
then by controlling the means and structure of communication one could keep the social as one
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governable whole. This idea, although not often explicitly articulated, was reflected in various 
forms in contemporary developments. One of these was clearly the drafting of the Sherman 
Act in 1890, through which freedom of contract was subordinated to national regulation, as it 
seemed out of touch with reality in the eyes of the progressives. The same idea—of 
maintaining social stability through a regulative system—was proposed also in connection with 
social conversations over telephone lines.
It found expression in early discourses on the telephone, especially those produced by 
telephone companies and which first attacked social chat over telephone lines. Chat, so 
telephone companies and probably most of the people at that time believed, only kept lines 
busy and conflicted with the idea of their economical use. Therefore, in order to maintain the 
“efficiency” of the communication system, chat had to be eliminated. Thus, the editorial of the 
Telephone Engineer in April of 1920 (XXIII:4), for instance, regarded proposals to “eliminate 
such abuse of the telephone privilege”as a “brilliant reform [idea],” though judged it as 
probably “unworkable.” Although it is obvious that it was motivated partly because of the 
tendency to continue to think of the telephone in terms of its telegraphic heritage as strictly a 
tool of business,202 there is also an other reason for this. It is possible to regard this episode as 
a way in which arguments about a communication system attempted to direct and maintain the 
govemability of the social—at least by establishing limits—following the ideals of 
rationalization. The rise of efficiency discourses during the time resulted in chat appearing as 
the enemy of well-ordered communication facilities: like politics, it represented the same 
endless exchange of opinions that only seemed to undermine the most economical use of the 
system. The influence of Taylorism is thus clearly visible. In a sense, this demonstrated the 
idea that one could, within certain limits, engender and strengthen efficient social structure by 
controlling communication. Here, though, the idea was presented in a negative form, as the 
telephone companies’ objective was to limit or pre-emt unwanted ways of using and organizing 
the communication network.
Administration of communication was important, but not less imporatant than administration 
through communication. Communication took center stage in the organization of community, 
and the technical means of doing this were naturally in the spotlight This is why the primary 
responsibility for constructing the communicative domain was given to communications 
companies, unlike in Europe where telecommunications was a governmental service, which thus 
formed the vanguard in seeking to tie the community with communicative bounds into a single 
consistent administrative whole. This, then, implies without doubt the centrality and, at the same 
time, delicacy of communication. Of course, engendering forms of the social must not be
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understood narrowly, here, as in the United States this meant largely strengthening and 
unifying the national basis of communication and, as is the case here, supervising and 
preventing unwanted practices from taking place. As this activity, however, took rather 
prolonged forms which did not change until after World War I when the use of the telephone 
for social purposes began to be actively encouraged, systematic monitoring of the use of 
communicative means must be viewed in its politicality: it expressed a concern of the social 
viewed as a whole. Yet communication did not appear as a major political issue as such, 
particularly due to the inclination to see it through intrinsically rational, rather than political 
systems.
The rise of communication as a theoretical and administrative concern must thus be seen 
against this background. During this period communication became conceived of as a distinct 
and determinable object of systematic, institutionalized discourse. At the national level, the 
advent of communication as a separate administrative category was consolidated when 
interstate telephone and telegraph were included under the regulation of Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1910. This marked the moment when telecommunications came under national 
control and became an established category of national policy. At the theoretical level, one of 
the first definitions that ascribed a discrete conceptual identity to communication, formulated in 
1928 by I.A. Richards, an English literary critic and author, stated that “communication takes 
place when one mind so acts upon its environment that another mind is influenced, and in that 
other mind an experience occurs which is like the experience in the first mind, and is caused in 
part by that experience.”203 Clearly aiming at universality, the definition rested on an 
instrumental view of communication, seeing it as an effective social relationship. Here, the 
concept that extracted a core, an essential substance of communication from all the processes in 
and within which it occurred, started to get articulated in positive terms. This largely reflected 
the general professionalization of social scientific disciplines in terms of the natural sciences 
model, narrowly understood. If communication proved an attractive object to these institutional 
practices, it was the development of new communication technologies and systems, coupled 
with advances in scientific research, that was the context for this rising interest.
What gathered these scientific interests and technical means of communication into one distinct 
issue, was the perspective of control, which was only emphasized during the World War I. In 
fact, the birth of communication research as an academic discipline has been attributed to the 
study named Propaganda Technique in the World War, written by Harold D. Lasswell in 
1927. In this work, the author construed propaganda as one of the most influential forces of 
modem world: one which welds separate individuals together into an integrated mass.204 It has
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been noted in various contexts that the beginning of mass communication research in the 
1930s—for which the Propaganda book prepared the way—and the break it caused with 
previous thinking on communication with its emphasis on empirical research, was occasioned 
by the administrative need for concrete social information.
In this period, the political technologies of communication established, for the first time, the 
theoretical basis of communication viewed as a structured system. “Communication” 
constituted an object of ever increasing theoretical interest and became part of the 
administrative structure both in business and politics. Along with the strengthening of the 
federal government, Taylorism paved the way for the generalization of the idea of planning at 
national level, with Herbert Hoover becoming the first president to develop consistent national 
engineering within a scientific framework.205 Here, communication served as a resource in the 
general process of rationalization. While almost invariably attention was directed at the 
effective relationships of communication, interest was focused on formal organization of 
communication. This is not, however, to imply that communication systems coming to the fore 
implied a shortcoming, pure and simple, in thinking on the ontology of communication. Here, 
we do not hold that an original Beginning would have been concealed by this tradition, or that 
the tradition would have to be destroyed in order to inaugurate a return to this Origin. Instead, 
every contribution in the tradition forges a relationship to the ontology of communication, 
albeit from different angles and because of distinct aims. They are inevitably ontological 
contributions as well, as they conceptualize the question of the limits of communication.
How, then, was the question of the limits of communication addressed in Taylor? Now, it it 
important to keep in mind that scientific management did not remain a contribution to 
efficiency discourse but developed into a general conceptual framework, becoming, according 
to Stephen Waring, the political philosophy of bureaucratic government.206 As a conceptual 
horizon embraced within the majority of subsequent theories and practices of administrative 
communication and the administration of communication, it also set limits for thinking about 
communication within this tradition. It was in and through this perspective that communication 
began to receive a distinct positive identity which inevitably was related to its converse, namely 
to what it was not but to which it retained an inherent relationship.
Taylorism distinguished between what was common, that is, objective and defined, as opposed 
to what was not, that is, to its “other.” A mechanical system was not only a mechanism for 
producing standardized artifacts, it also introduced identity and consistency into the action in 
question. In the norm in practice, a whole range of activities was excluded, and could be
109
approached in negative terms only. Typically, hierarchical systems depend on mechanisms of 
exclusion. They establish an interior which abolishes and subverts something that can be 
interpreted as politics, aiming at substituting law for discussion. Yet, at the same time, the 
other—what is left out, what is abolished and displaced—always remains inside the system that 
establishes the norm—as a trace that cannot be totally eliminated because it is essential to the 
functioning of the mechanism of exclusion. Thus subjective opinions and habits, the real 
enemy of an efficient system, constitute, as the human element, the veiy precondition of a 
system. Seen from this perspective, the concept of communication implied here is formed in 
between the conceptual “whole” of a regimented system, on the one hand, and the actual 
forms of its realization, on the other, which together determine the field in which it can appear 
as an object and a means of action.
Without doubt, Taylorism set the framework for “scientific” thinking on management and 
communication, and certainly on communication as management as well as management of and 
through communication for years to come. For communication, at least within the tradition 
outlined here, this implied that it became difficult to separate it from managerial problems: the 
modem fate of communication was interweaved with the politics of governance. What is more, 
problems relating to management and control were precisely what allowed communication to 
appear as a distinct concept and a category of action; it was through discursive chains of 
management and control that communication was conceptualized—first as a tie between 
individuals, then as a mechanism of the social itself. In both cases, though, communication 
served as a method of engendering and organizing the social as a whole and, at the same time, 
assumed a status of its own in the course of this very process.
After Taylor, thinking on communication was closely connected to the way contemporary 
capitalism operated. Communication, it is true, would not have been possible in its modem 
forms without capitalist markets which, generally speaking, defined the domain within which 
communication became an object and means of systematic thinking. By starting from corporate 
practices and needs and not from communication as such, Taylor gave this relationship a 
theoretical basis that permanently intertwined the history of communication with that of 
capitalism. Although impossible to disentangle from communication, the domain of corporate 
capitalism, here, determined the terms in which communication was conceptualized.
The Taylor System was not a philosophy of capitalism but rather one that operated within i t  
While questioning the conditions of productive action it remained firmly inside the horizon of 
capitalism. What this implied, among other things, was that communication was to be thought
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of as fundamentally apolitical and, at the same time, as a mechanism to ensure and maintain this 
apoliticality. It was based on the aim of doing away with disputes over values, relying on 
centralization and specialization. Yet it also created problems without being able to solve them. 
Much of the later development of administrative communication and the administration of 
communication can be seen as a series of attempts to overcome these problems, linked with the 
tendency in Taylorism to create conflicts and operations that could not be controlled through 
the means provided by it. While one school responded to the problems by developing 
participative methods of management in the Progressive spirit, another school formulated 
mathematical and mechanical techniques in order to make bureaucratic management more 
efficient207 In the succeeding chapters, we will follow largely the latter line, as the former 
school, in general, accepted centralized power and specialized tasks too, the two main tools of 
bureaucratic technique that unified the subsequent history of communication until the 1970s.
Taylor formulated a way of talking about communication under growing corporate power and 
the increasing influence of formal techniques. Communication was something to be regulated 
by rational means, constituting at the same time the mechanism for this regulation. It is 
important to notice this “at the same time,” because the mechanisms introduced emerged, 
ultimately, out of communication itself. Thus there was no conflict between the objects and 
means of control, no violence done to the intrinsic nature of communication, as it were, as the 
way it was organized depended on the elementary constitution of communication, on the 
inevitable parts and processes of i t  Contemporary capitalism was, for Taylor, the context that 
brought out this communicative structure that varied according to the task in question. It 
constituted the horizon which not only laid bare but, in fact, produced the practices and series 
of action Taylor sought to systematize.
It is perhaps possible to consider the cybernetics of Norbert Wiener a kind of culmination of 
this development, as it is here that communication as a law or a method was given probably its 
most resolute expression and in which it at the same time is linked with a new, computer- 
controlled horizon. Let me first, however, elaborate in the next chapter on the component 
position of the telephone system with respect to the growth of centrally directed organizations. 
For they were the reference point on which the studies of Taylor and the technocrats—as part 
of the general thinking which took as its subject the changing conditions of social 
operations—were focused and which thus constituted the terrain within which communication 
became to be thought about. At the same time they provided the context in and with regard to 
which it was only natural for Wiener to formulate his theoretical views, which can be seen as a
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modernization of the model built on and around the idea of a center to correspond to the 
circumstances and conceptual possibilities of a period of automated technology.
4.2. Industrial Communication
It is possible to conceive of the discontinuity caused by and in telephonic communicability 
from two distinct perspectives. On the one hand, the telephone can be seen as a means for 
horizontal distribution of information. It was customary, especially in the Progressive tradition, 
to view horizontal communication as a force for unifying the nation. Within this tradition, 
scientific methods and knowledge attempted to overcome social factionalism as well as 
conflicts and disputes, and it was the task of communication and education to accomplish this 
general social harmonization. Yet on the other hand, the telephone—if not the technology, at 
least the model of the system it provided—can be regarded as closely connected to centrally 
directed hierarchies. In this view, communication imposed law, as opposed to education, as the 
method of politics. As part of the same process, the nervous system and the concept of center it 
included were consolidated in a system that encompassed the whole of society. If society did 
not, however, become a huge nervous system with its diverse functions and processes linked 
together and controlled from a single executive center, the idea of this kind of system certainly 
evoked enthusiasm, mobilizing plenty of energy, and resulted in some very concrete 
arrangements, practices, and effects. Not only had the idea of a mechanically controlled whole 
real consequences for various schemes and procedures, but it also, and more importantly, 
provided, to a great extent a conceptual perspective in which these schemes could be articulated 
in the first place, and in this way forged the limits within which the social was understood.
Even though both perspectives on the telephone appeareded here as distinct from each other, 
they should not be thought of as logically or temporally separate but rather as views that are 
aggregated and arranged, according to their own laws, around an event that is being investigated 
at any given time. We can define the first case, in which the telephone is seen as a means of 
horizontal communication, in terms of a relationship, the function and parties of which are not 
given and the formal occurrence of which is not determined. Instead, in the second case, in 
which the telephone was viewed as an integral part of centrally directed hierarchies, its function 
and parties are determined by the system. A communicative relationship here is a relationship 
internal to the system, and its functional nature is thus prestructured as regards its formal 
characteristics.
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In both cases communication was conceived of as a more or less coherent and closed process. 
It was thought of in and as a conceptual whole. There was a change, though, in the way the 
whole was viewed as we move from the telegraph to the telephone and related discursive forms. 
Whereas atomistic individuals defined the earlier viewpoint, and communication was seen as an 
addition between already established identities, now the viewpoint moved from individuals to 
the broader social group they belonged to, and communication was more and more regarded as 
a factor that maintains the integrity of the group or system. It was the social system, that now 
constituted the basis of thinking about communication, and although communication was a 
precondition of this system, it became systematically regarded as only a means to sustain the 
unity of the system.
This is why the hierarchical aspect is the one that has been emphasized here. Since the 
beginning of the century, and alongside scientific projects of rationalization and optimization, 
new forms and systems of communication, with the telephone being without doubt the most 
important one, have been thought about within the bounds of a rational system. But it is 
significant that the telephone, as a system, played an integral part in bringing about the 
conceptual form of this system. Therefore the history of the telephone is inherently tied to the 
devebpment of hierarchically organized and rationally controlled systems, although its history 
cannot certainly be reduced to just this development
Machines of Speech
Scientific management standardized basic units and courses of work and reorganized a given 
functional whole according to the most economic sequence of actions. In doing this, it 
anticipated and recorded all possible variations and compressed them into a set of necessary 
rules.This led to a hierarchical system wherein communicative action was to be controlled by a 
predetermined method. It was here that a “rational” center, replacing the “subjective” 
manager in a conventional organization, emerged as a founding modus operandi. In Taylor’s 
theor, all managerial power was concentrated on this single locus, the superintendent’s office, 
from which executive work was planned, put into effect, and supervised. In a manner similar to 
the wiy the brain directs the movements of the hand, the thinking organ of the organization, it 
was assumed, told the workers the exact way to do their job. “All possible brain work,” Taylor 
wrote “should be removed from the shop and concentrated in the planning or laying out 
depatment.”208 The cornerstone of this scheme was a rational, repeatable program which
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identified what was essential from the apparent diversity and multiplicity and defined a system 
of communication for the instructions to be transmitted.
As systemwide actions were controlled from the center, it was telecommunication, here that 
made, to an extent, control possible, as Taylor describes in his book The Principles o f Scientific 
Management:
“In this office [of the superintendent] every laborer’s work was planned out well in 
advance, and the workmen were all moved from place to place by the clerks with elaborate 
diagrams or maps of the yard before them, very much as chessmen are moved on a chess­
board, a telephone and messenger system having been installed for this purpose.”209
If scientific management was in the final analysis a matter of communication, at least in that it 
was meaningful only in a communicative context, the telephone system, for one thing, was the 
means by which it was carried out. Insofar as the functional whole appeared to be a 
communication machine, the telephone was an integral part of the control system that this 
whole depended on. It was this formal structure, itself an outcome of the organizing role of 
communication, which systematized the functional performance of a given system. This is, at 
the same time, why the necessary communication systems cannot be conceived only as 
auxiliary instruments external to work practices but instead as what made the system possible 
as a organized whole in the first place.
From the background to the history of the idea of a hierarchical system, a whole series of 
diverse, irreducible, and discontinuous historical constructions can be found, especially as 
implemented in different military and political systems since the time of Frederick the Great of 
Prussia. Yet, it was the invention and proliferation of machines, coupled with the scientific 
method, that laid the ground for a hierarchy as a powerful mechanism for distinguishing 
between “objective” and “customary” ways of organizational performance in its modem 
sense. The hierarchy manifested the scientific method’s principle, which Taylor, for his part, 
exploited and applied, of substituting subjective decisions by an objective rule. Hierarchical 
architecture put formal criteria in the place of changeable practices based on custom and 
experience, and in this respect can be considered as a kind of counterpart, application, or 
embodiment of the scientific method in the social domain. Yet, it can be argued, the hierarchy 
appropriated this method not for truth but rather for efficiency: whereas scientific method 
separated what was incidental and random from the essential and unvarying, and thus forged a 
relationship to the truth, as it were, the hierarchy created a realm of efficiency in the midst of
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diverse and incompatible social practices. Insofar as efficiency sought to shed light on the 
underlying “law s” of the given process, however, it cannot be separated from ontological 
questions in any straightforward manner. In both, the necessary and general was derived from 
what was contingent and arbitrary by the constraints imposed by a rational method. If scientific 
management apparently dealt only with efficiency, then it did so with a view to truth.
On the other hand, and on a different register, insofar as the hierarchy proved to be an 
influential social ordering principle as well as a useful conceptual tool in thought about modem 
societies in general, as Max Weber demonstrated in his contribution on the proliferation of 
bureaucratic forms of organization, it was to a great extent the network structure of the railways 
and the telegraph systems that prepared the ground for the hierarchy. This is because the 
chaining together of series of actions with enabling physical structures into a consistent 
operational whole made it possible to organize interrelationships between events in an 
integrated way. The idea of a planning and directing center took shape notably in early 
telecommunication systems, as in the municipal telegraph systems, the network nature of which 
enabled uniform, systemwide operational control with separate hierarchical levels of regulation. 
This is undoubtable the context, too, that must be seen as the point of departure for Taylor as 
he generalized from prevailing institutional practices and arrangements using scientific method 
as his guiding canon, the idea of the center with multiple levels of control into a general 
managerial principle. Therefore it is possible to see Taylorism as a powerful combination of 
scientific method and a centrally directed hierarchy. Through the influence of his theory, 
coupled with the growing dominance of big corporations, the internal functioning of which the 
former aimed to enhance, Taylor contributed to telecommunication’s entrenchment as the 
organizing mechanism of the industrial order predicated on the concept of vertical lines of 
communication in hierarchical organizations. Because improved communication 
systems—especially the telephone system which allowed instant, two-way 
communication—figured as the key factors in the transformation of the whole communication 
economy in the period in question, they must also be viewed as the forces through which 
hierarchy as a social category should be analysed.
The telephone created a basis for more and more accurately determined needs of governance in 
modem society by permeating the communal sphere and becoming a mechanism—as part of 
the increasing professionalization of social organizations—by means of which this sphere 
could be controlled. Namely, it enabled systematic and institutionalized gathering and 
distribution of information and quick reaction to phenomena taking place within the range of 
its operations. Thus it became increasingly a part of daily operations in the private sector as
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well as in many fields of public administration. The Weather Bureau introduced it swiftly into 
its operations as well as many other public bureaucracies like the coast guard, fire department, 
and the police.210 In this way, the telephone divided society into distinct, although interlinked 
and partly overlapping sectors, each of which administered its own areas of responsibility on 
the basis of the same principle of instant two-way exchange of information—the gathering of 
information from the field and the transmission of instructions from the center within the 
framework of a functional, hierarchically arranged whole.
In police communication systems in 1910, this two-way communication meant that “the 
patrolman reports to the desk sergeant from the telephone box on his beat, and then receives 
any special directions which the chief wishes to give.”211 This principle, with the operational 
advantages of efficiency and coordination it enabled, also provided a setting for the 
construction of huge national systems in an age of big conglomerates. Though centric systems 
were introduced on a large scale in the era of the telegraph, it was not until the advent of the 
telephone with its superior properties that the foundation for truly professionally organized, 
nationwide systems was laid. The telephone systems of the government and the War 
Department were among the largest private exchanges in the world,212 and it was easy to 
perceive them—being contemporaries of the consolidation movement that created monopolies 
and trusts—as having mainly a centralizing effect on governance and communication.213 
However, as with commercial organizations, they supported simultaneously both centralizing 
and decentralizing processes in the functioning of these public institutions: if the telephone 
system made it possible to centralize power at single point, it also allowed decentralization and 
differentiation of operations to become possible and, from the point of view of a centrally 
organized system, often rewarding as well. Thus big communication systems becoming 
established as founding institutions of social activity does not lead directly to centralization of 
social power, because the center always decentralizes action as well. The center can therefore 
never monopolize the sphere of action of which it is a part. But this is not all, for the center also 
cannot cease to differentiate, which is exactly what positions the center as a center. In other 
words, the differentiation which is possible because of the center, and the results of which it 
counts within its sphere, is not external to its inherent “nature,” as it is this veiy differentiation 
and separation which is its basis and defines what it is: if the center engenders differentiation, 
the possibility of becoming independent of this action creates a prerequisite for the existence of 
the center. This is why the interlinked movements of centralization and decentralization always 
need and feed off each other, whilst still in conflict with each other.
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Yet, by enabling even more effective control of very complex processes and series of action 
from a single point, compared to the telegraph, the telephone necessitated a center for both 
institutional and operational reasons and from this angle was connected more closely to 
hierarchical power structures than to decentralization. It was conceived, like the telegraph had 
been, still largely through the analogy of the nervous system: the telephone took the shape of 
the nervous system of a modem industrial society,214 its metallic nerve cells organizing the 
social body into a united organism capable of controlling itself. Thus Frank Jewett, AT&T’s 
Vice President and the President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, was able to express the idea 
in 1936 that when there are no longer economic barriers to full usage of telephone lines, 
“society for the first time — will — have a complete nervous system.”215 Against this 
background, it is possible to see the telephone as the nervous system of the social organism in 
having highlighted the concept of the center at least in three different respects:
1) It created centers in local and regional purpose-built systems following the example of 
municipal telegraph implemented in major metropolitan areas. Thus, the police communication 
system based on the telephone that provided immediate connection between police 
headquarters and the patrolman on the beat as well as between different departments and units, 
served as “the central nervous system of a highly integrated organism for the suppression and 
prevention of crime.”216 Similarly, the teletypewriter system, originated somewhere in between 
telegraph and telephone technology, which enabled almost instantaneous transmission of 
messages to numerous different places simultaneously, was introduced widely in business for 
it helped to rapidly coordinate the activities of factories, warehouses, and sales offices in 
different cities. But it also constituted the foundation for the extensive eight-state alarm system 
that provided the means for the police to coordinate their widely scattered State Police posts, 
municipal police departments and state Motor Vehicle and Criminal Identification bureaus.217
2) It strengthened the notion of the center as an operational necessity for the system as whole, 
because in contrast to the telegraph, the telephone system required central offices and switches 
in order to interconnect large numbers of telephone devices.218 Thus, even the architectural 
structure of the telephone system necessitated a more conspicuous center than the telegraph 
had. Whereas the telegraph interconnected locations, it was the mission of the telephone from 
the beginning to link people together, a capability made feasible by the central exchange, “the 
solar plexus of the telephone body,”219 as Alexander Graham Bell had envisioned already in a 
letter discussing the “grand system” written in 1878:
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“In a similar manner [as in the network of gas-pipes and water-pipes], it is conceivable 
that cables of telephone wires could be laid underground, or suspended overhead, 
communicating by branch wires with private dwellings, country houses, shops, 
manufactories, &c., &c., uniting them through the main cable with a central office where 
the wire could be connected as desired, establishing direct communication between any 
two places in the city. - - 1 believe in the future wires will unite the head offices of the 
Telephone Company in different cities, and a man in one part of the country may 
communicate by word of mouth with another in a different place.”220
The telephone network was created in the division between the “route lines” (later termed 
“trunk lines”), on the one hand, and the “distribution lines,” on the other. Trunk lines 
interconnected major centers, whereas distribution lines branched out from each center over a 
given area. In practice, these centers appeared to users chiefly as the voice of telephone 
operators, as they—primarily young women—manually connected incoming calls to the 
numbers desired. This was why “the Central” became almost synonymous with the telephone 
for callers in the early twentieth century America. It gave a conceptual form to the coherent 
nature of the telephone system in a way that was in harmony with both the contemporary 
sentiment searching for the possibility of scientific direction of society and the still effective 
organismic thinking. Thus the telephone system makes up a ’’single unit from end to end,” 
being “a single entity, almost a living organism which, if disturbed at one point, reacts 
throughout.”221
3) The telephone enabled an accelerating concentration of private power and an unparalleled 
accumulation of financial capital which created new conditions for social life. For this reason 
this period was also called “the Age of the Telephone.”222 It was not an invention like other, 
only superficially similar objects of use, because, in the words of Casson, “it is nothing less 
than the high-speed tool of civilization, gearing up the whole mechanism to more effective 
social service. It is the symbol o f national efficiency and cooperation.”22* It was established as 
a condition of modem social order alongside and related to new ideas in science and 
commerce,224 and these conditions seemed to assume the form of a strongly centralizing 
movement It was Taylor’s idea to combine this presence of a center with scientific method as a 
way of rationalizing the functioning of industrial organization in order to make production 
more efficient and to recast the institutional structure of society to meet the new de facto 
standards of performance introduced by technological development
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The significance of the early local systems cannot be underestimated, for it was essentially in 
relation to these diverse systems that the model of organized communication was formulated 
and subsequently used more generally. In the United States Army, for example, three general 
classes of telephone system were operational in 1911. First, there was a system enabling 
instantaneous communication between all parts of an army post, analogous to a good regional 
telephone service. A second class of military communication system was designed to carry all 
communications relating to sea-coast defense, and the third was a system enabling 
communication between troops in the field and the command post or base of supplies.225 The 
functional structure of the military communication systems naturally followed the same order 
of predetermined hierarchical relationships that was the basis of the military institution. As 
some of the first and foremost examples to exploit the centered communicational arrangement, 
they were to prepare the way for a general model for organized communication in large 
establishments outside the military. Yet, they were not the only source and setting for a 
rationally ordered communication system.
Thus, the New York Police Bureau, for instance, used at least three different telephone 
communications systems as early as 1909, the aggregate effect of which was so considerable 
that it constituted a model to be followed. First, there were seven switchboards in New York 
“tied to and centralized upon the switchboard at the Manhattan headquarters Each 
switchboard is localized in its own borough, radiating to the courts, morgues, hospitals, humane 
and animal societies, police precincts, etc. The connections of each switchboard are brought 
direct to the central switchboard at police headquarters, Manhattan.”226 Thus, “while the 
central headquarters in Manhattan can connect with any precinct in any borough, — no local 
switchboard can communicate with a precinct outside of its own borough without going 
through the Manhattan switchboard.”227 This is how the communication structure of the 
Police Bureau was centralized on one location which organized the flows of interaction 
between the different parts and units of the system. Secondly, in addition to and independently 
from this arrangement, there was a signal box system, consisting of 900 lines and 38 
switchboards. It ran from precinct posts to local precinct houses only, and was used by 
patrolling policemen, in addition to emergency situations, to make their calls required, “once an 
hour,” to their local stations. The increase in this kind of controlled repetitive routine was part 
of the professionalization of public bureaucracies in this period. Finally, there was a system of 
43 leased lines running to the homes of administration and executive staffs so that should an 
emergency arise, “the executive staff would be hauled out of bed the first thing and told what 
to do and where to do it, while dressing.”228
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A combined police telephone and signal system enabled the chief of police “to get in touch 
with patrolmen in any section of the city in an emergency, and, further, makes it possible for 
the patrolmen to send special information to headquarters and to record it there — .”229 These 
communication systems, complementing each other, indicated the growing importance of 
creating and organizing communication practices according to an institutionally executed, 
general scheme, and provided a feasible model for doing this for a number of social 
assemblages outside the field of policing. This model came down essentially to a 
predetermined communications relationship between the center and the terminals radiating 
from it, in which the latter reported locally gathered information to the center, which, after 
having processed the incoming information, sent instructions back to the terminal branches. 
One scheme of this kind was the Associated Press news service that was organized by 
telephone. Here information, gathered first all over the country by local reporters and news 
offices, was sent to the Associated Press head office in New York from which, after filtering 
and editing, it was sent to subscribing members nationwide by telephone in one call.230 Here, 
the Taylorian division between “thinking” and “doing” found its expression again, as the 
center had no first hand experience of what was going on, and the communication line 
terminals had no final discretion concerning decisions to be made.
Thus it is clear that increasing use of the new systems of communication was inherently linked 
to prevailing social practices and discourses that, taken together, constituted, generally 
speaking, a framework for their reception and utilization. But the effective relationships ran 
also in the other direction, as we have seen, with technical structures being conducive to the 
formation of conceptual approaches. Local and regional communication systems, then, must be 
seen as having been created in the midst of diverse forces, and as always retaining an inherent 
relationship to current discursive practices regarding the technicization of communication. 
Therefore, although these communication systems reflected the influence of Taylorism to 
varying degrees, at the same time they set in motion practices that reinterpreted classic scientific 
management in the light of local demands. Nevertheless, Taylorism undeniably formed the 
perspective for the telephone seen as a political technology.
With the rise of Taylorism, the telephone was quickly harnessed to the service of 
rationalization, although, as mentioned above, it has been pointed out that the telephone did not 
play a significant role in the emerging formal communication system.231 Yet its role should not 
be ignored either, as it clearly contributed to techniques exploited in scientific management and 
efficiency engineering. This was perhaps most instantly recognizable in train dispatching. The 
telegraph had already established a practice of using telecommunications to coordinate the
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movements of the trains. Now, the telephone achieved the same ends more efficiently: “the use 
of the telephone is so quick in every way and so much more flexible that the dispatcher gets far 
more detailed information of what each train is doing than was possible by the use of the 
telegraph.” It allowed more personal conversations, it was quick to use, and the weather did not 
make any difference to its operational dependability. But more importantiy, it enabled detailed 
control not only over the movements of trains, but also over what engine drivers were actually 
doing at any given moment: “with the telephone it is possible to arrange apparatus so that the 
superintendent can at any time supervise the actual work of train handling.”232 This was a 
decisive improvement in the overall coordination of such vast and complex organizational 
structures as the train companies were. Of course, the use of the telephone in personnel 
management did not remain confined to the train companies. Thus, “the telephone makes [a 
telephone] official efficient, reliable, painstaking and ever prompt in the transaction of the 
business brought before him.”233 It provided a means to bind the workforce into part of a 
great industrial machinery.
The telephone played a part in industrial intercommunication systems too. This kind of system 
commonly consisted of “a series of jacks, which are numbered to correspond with the 
different departments of the plant. A plug, hung on a conducting cord, is inserted into the 
desired jack and the pressing of a button immediately rings the signal bell in the corresponding 
department. -- Every department in the plant may be reached by simply transferring the plug, 
without removing the receiver from the ear.”234 With the automation of telephony, its industrial 
role increased both in terms of technical solutions and the conceptual visions it supported. The 
automatic switchboard, it has been noted, was in a sense the prototype or conceptual model for 
the automatic factory that came to represent the whole industrial order in many cultural 
products of the 1930s, but which did not get a serious chance to be realized until 1950 
alongside the rise of the so called system sciences.235
Just as the brain was conceived to interpret signals sent to it by the central nervous system, it 
was the telephone exchange in which the “brain” of the telephone network was embodied.236 
Rudimentary exchanges were already in use in 1878, but they were not properly established 
until the technology developed in the next decade, when the first automatic switchboard was 
patented.237 This made it possible to dispense with manual exchanges, for now callers could 
contact numbers desired without the help of “Central.” The automated telephone system 
encouraged more spontaneous and frequent use, which eventually established the telephone as 
a standard mode of communication in the industrial era. It is not incorrect to propose that in 
most of the organizations of the period, it was management which became a switchboard. This
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is partly because management was commonly seen as representing the thinking agency in an 
organization, as opposed to the doing agency, not unlike the brain in the nervous system. In 
addition to this, however, management became a switchboard because it was the point in and 
through which key connections were made and which established the internal pattern for the 
communication structure. Thus, it engendered the directions and routes of formal 
communication relationships between central and middle management and executive 
departments as well as the detailed ranks and orders of interpersonal lines of communication. 
What management did was to organize communication within a hierarchical structure, yet it 
was already, of course, itself organized by and through the communication that continuously 
rearranged the social order, and with it, the corporate institution.
The Taylor System can be seen as the conceptual culmination of the development in which 
social relations and processes were enshrined in a general law or method which was a 
precondition for the intelligent control of society. Unlike in previous cases, this law was 
dynamic and more sensitive to relationships between its elements and to changes to them and 
was not meant to fix them definitely in an immutable structure. The concept of a system 
coupled with the requirement for a central planning agency encapsulated expectations and 
requirements relating to adequate governance of how an assemblage consisting of diverse and 
constandy changing elements functioned. It opened up a field wherein it became possible to 
oudine the essence of modem society in a situation where old concepts did not seem to work 
any longer and the new ones were not yet established.
This conceptual alliance between the system and the center lent itself to thinking of automation 
as the general, uniting force, thus addressing this relationship in terms drawn from the 
technological register. Automation supported the idea of the system having an intrinsic nature, 
on the one hand, but acknowledged also the need for regulating principle, on the other, and 
incorporated both into a consistent whole. Yet, before automation was introduced on a larger 
scale, and before cybernetics capitalized on the conceptual content of it, the idea had already 
been articulated in connection with the regulation of social processes. Hence Wallace Donham, 
for instance, expressed in 1932 the idea that social control operations should be based on 
automated routines. He suggested creation of a mechanism “which will absorb the shocks [in 
society’s adaptation to the environment] automatically — .”238 This is where, perhaps for the 
first time in this connection, the idea occurs of bringing the center and the system together 
through controlled and repeated routines, as exemplified in an automatic mechanism. This 
brought out the routine-based nature of automation, and in so doing illustrated at the same time
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the potential he potential benefits of large-scale routinization of social processes within a controlled 
framework, framework.
The notion oThe notion of the center got firmly entrenched in social life after the mobilization experiences 
during the wluring the world wars and the related special arrangement Despite the fact that temporary 
administrativadministrative arrangements, set up for the needs of the wars, which strengthened the position 
of a central pof a central power, were not sustained after the wars, the concept of center got strengthened as a 
cultural fact cultural fact and increasingly formed a point of departure for the structural organization of 
many associaiany associations functioning in different social fields: the coordinating center and the 
sectional unifcectional units grouped under it began to constitute the model on which especially commercial 
and political and political organizations depended.
The center ifhe center is not to be understood, however, only in its structural sense as part of an 
organizationaorganizational model, since it was associated with a whole set of practices that permeated the 
social order, social order. This was related to a process in which bureaucratic control, having taken shape in 
the late 19thbe late 19th centuiy, brought the traditionally decentralized and predominantly locally 
administered idministered American society into its sphere. During the course of this, social relations 
became ratiooecame rationalized through professional national bureaucracies (the army, the tax authorities, 
the police ache police and fire departments, for example), although the role of public bureaucracies 
remained linremained limited in comparison to that in many European nation states. In any case, the 
concept of a concept of a rational and efficient whole, which took a distinct shape from the operational 
models provinodels provided by communication systems, largely provided the basis for discourses and 
conceptual fconceptual forms applied to thought on society and a starting point for the gradual but resolute 
process of qmrocess of quantification of communication.
This viewpoifhis viewpoint allows us to go one step further and delineate schematically the relationship 
between cenbetween centralized power and the formalization of communication: the former can be 
conceived of :onceived of as seeking the optimal elimination of noise (multiplicity) by rationalization of 
innate systennnate system functionality, as it were. This aim, reflecting and using scientific method, 
constituted th:onstituted the conceptual and institutional terrain in which communication, both as signs and 
signals, begasignals, began to be formalized. Though communication is not, of course, reducible to the 
former alone,'ormer alone, for it has its own local histories, thought about it was anyway moving into 
contexts in wontexts in which scientific method figured as a predominating measure of the truth of i t  
CommunicatCommunication was exposed to the objective norm in order to eliminate anything merely 
incidental to ncidental to it and to reveal its essential core: what was of interest was only its hidden, 
necessary logiecessary logic as knowledge of this was assumed to give access to the desired organizational
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rearrangements, thus improving general system functionality. But the center was one of the 
most outstanding outcomes of organizational rearrangement during the period in question. 
Therefore it is in no way independent of the methodological explanation of communication. On 
the contrary, whereas professionalization of scientific practices determined the true nature of 
communication by separating noise from it, it was precisely the center which carried out this 
separation in terms of the social, that is, in terms of improved efficiency. Another way to 
describe this relationship is to say that as institutional requirements necessitated a center, it was 
the systematic examination and regulation of communication—the task imposed by the method 
as encapsulated by the center—that called for the institutional reform. Thus, while scientific 
method forged a relationship with the truth of communication, the center built one with the 
efficiency of communication, because for the latter the separation of what was random from 
what was necessary was always more a question of control rather of knowledge, although these 
aspects, it is true, cannot be disentangled in a clear-cut way from each other.
Telephonic Constellation
We have attempted to show how a new relationship was gradually forged between 
“communication” (as both a concept and a process) and “telecommunication” (as the set of 
interrelationships between distinct technologies, institutions, and discourses) during the period 
from about the turn of the century until World War II. It can be seen that two developments 
especially came to the fore and opened up a new relationship to communicability. First, 
scientific management became the political technology of bureaucracy, and secondly, the 
telephone was established as a precondition of modem community, being the very embodiment 
of advanced communication. Together they laid the foundation for a change or displacement 
that occurred in the communicative constellation. Let us now take a closer look at how this 
constellation, as an alliance between technologies, discourses, and practices, unified diverse 
communicative events under the same whole: a whole that was serial or mechanical in nature, 
on the one hand, without being, however, independent of or preceeding these events, on the 
other.
Chester I. Barnard, in his seminal book The Functions o f the Executive published in 1938, 
developed the idea that all successful organizations depended on cooperation, and that it was 
the task of managers to create it through communication. He subordinated communication to a 
social whole whose function it became,239 hence operating within the tradition in which 
communication had been conceived as both an object and a tool of administration. Yet he
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systematically promoted the constitutive characteristic of intercommunication as part of a 
theory of formal organization. Barnard explicitly described the system of communication as an 
essential part of any organization: “communication technique,” according to him, “shapes the 
form of and the internal economy of organization.”240 Moreover, the system of 
communication “is a primary or essential continuing problem of a formal organization. Every 
other practical question of effectiveness or efficiency—that is, of the factors of 
survival—depends upon it.”241 He made communication an explicit object of analysis during a 
time when its quintessential role in organizations was realized but not yet generally studied, 
contributing thus not only to the theoretical understanding of communication but also to the 
institutionalization of the theory of organization. “In an exhaustive theory of organization,” he 
stated, “communication would occupy a central place, because the structure, extensiveness, and 
scope of organization are almost entirely determined by communication techniques.”242 
Barnard thus made communication the focal point of theories aimed at understanding the 
functioning and dynamics of modem organizations.
As communication became conceptualized, the formal, hierarchical structure of communication 
was particularly emphasized, as a large part of communication in organizations was 
informal.243 Accordingly, it was the task of the manager to establish an objective hierarchy of 
lines of communication out of a sea of informal, spontaneous, and habitual communicative 
relationships. This required channels of communication to be defined, formal channels between 
the manager and every member of the organization to be determined, and conflicting 
communication be avoided by establishing procedures concerning the use of the channels 
defined. This idea of a formal or objective ordering of communication would not, of course, 
have been possible without the contribution of Taylorism, from which it received its theoretical 
grounds. As important as the goal, however, was the idea of the whole within which this 
ordering took place, and this whole resembled closely the nervous system, with the manager 
being the center through which all relevant information flowed. As in the nervous system, it 
was the function of this center of communication “to translate incoming communications — 
into outgoing communications - - .”244 Thus: “the functions with which we are concerned are 
like those of the nervous system, including the brain, in relation to the rest of the body. It exists 
to maintain the bodily system by directing those actions which are necessary more effectively 
to adjust to the environment, but it can hardly be said to manage the body, a large part of whose 
functions are independent of it and upon which it in turn depends.”245 The primary executive 
function, according to Barnard, remained “the establishment and maintenance of the system of 
communication.”246 Through Barnard, the common view that the structure of communication 
of a given system could be used as a means for advancing its efficiency was given theoretical
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legitimacy. Moreover, the fact that certain communication systems had been taken as 
conceptual models on the basis of which complex social and industrial systems could be both 
understood and directed appeared to gain more theoretical justification.
Now, it would surely be an overstatement to attribute some kind of privileged status to these 
communication systems with respect to a rationalization process that was not limited to the 
business realm. Yet there has always been a connection between these kinds of systems and the 
existence of and as a community. Comments such as “the civilization of a country seems to 
advance in proportion to the development and extension of its communication systems,” as a 
commentator remarked in 1929,247 were indicative of this strongly felt relationship. Therefore it 
is not far-fetched to assume that communication systems were a formative part of the great 
rationalization movement, especially as it was at the local level where the main focus of the 
reform lay.248 Thus they can be said to have prepared the ground, for their part, for 
generalization of the substitution of a technique for endless negotiation through the gradual 
institutionalization, growing, and merging of diverse local systems into a more or less unified 
view of an organized whole. These systems, combined with the rational planning discourse and 
available communications technology, formed an essential part of the history of the 
formalization of communication and its generalizion within a common horizon—a line of 
development the organizing of which was associated rightly with the seminal contribution of 
Taylor. The New Deal period embodied this generalization of the belief in rational planning on 
a national scale with its emphasis on the politically neutral science of the administrative 
process.249 In line with experience of the New Deal, the 1934 Communications Act shaped the 
institutional framework for national telecommunication regulation in the form of Federal 
Communications Commission. Now all communications problems could be referred to a 
single office which divided them into three separate categories; broadcasting, telegraph, and 
telephone. Moreover, telecommunications policy became an institutionalized concern of 
American politics.
It is true, of course, that the tendency toward increasing rationalization by way of centralized 
decision making cannot be reduced to a few managerial tenets, for these ideas were rather 
representations of a larger conceptual state of ferment wherein social order was articulated as a 
result of administrative reorganization. It was during this process also that conceptualizations 
concerning society itself became reformulated. Whereas in the late nineteenth century it was 
common to understand society in terms of a biological organism, it soon became evident that, 
with the drastic changes in conditions of living, theories concerning the underlying nature of 
society needed to be reshaped. Though the analogy of a nervous system remained in use, it was
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now conceived of in an altered, more technological context. The network of communicative 
contacts in which the causes and consequences of human action formed complex institutional 
structures and unexpected and impersonal chains of effect undermined the idea of a natural, 
harmonious social order. Instead it suggested a vision of an intricate system, the mutually 
interacting parts of which formed an efficiently functioning machine. It was communication 
between the component parts that formed a system out of an apparently heterogeneous whole, 
or, as the political scientist and philosopher Arthur Bentley put it in 1908, “in living beings 
there is no function that is not systematized.”250 It was in this system, or rather machine, that 
the social organism assumed its new, industrial identity.
As it became evident that the parts and processes of society were linked together like the 
components of a machine, biological analogies were gradually replaced by mechanical ones, or 
at least were interpreted in the light of them. The image of society as an enormous, “highly 
integrated machine” or “mechanism”251 made possible a new understanding of 
communication as a hierarchically organized system rather than as an apparently chaotic 
multiplicity of “organically” developing relationships. In this way, distinct communicative 
phenomena, even though superficially independent of each other, could be understood as 
ultimately forming a dynamic whole. Hence, for instance, according to the abovementioned 
Technocracy Study Course, “the general function of communications (--)—mail, telegraph, 
telephone, and radio—automatically constitutes a functional unit.”252 Thought on social order 
became established in a framework in which this order’s previous unstructuration was replaced 
by a highly organized whole. In it, each event and instance had its own place and function: the 
concept of the system became the absolute measure of the organization in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century American society.253 The ultimate structuring principle of the world was 
now recognized as hierarchical through the intervention of technical systems; and no pains 
were spared to determine the composition of this hierarchy, to standardize the elements 
belonging to it, and to designate the inherent place of each element and establish their 
interrelationships. Social relations were thus systematized in a functional system of 
hierarchically organized components.
Systemicity was not only a neutral, intrinsic principle of the structure of society, but also 
something desirable in itself. Mechanisms that increased systemicity by multiplying 
interconnections between components of the system was seen as contributing to the 
functionality of the whole. Improvement of communications was naturally the key goal, the 
significance of which had became evident by the 1920s. Rexford Tugwell, for instance, a social 
planner who acquired fame particularly during the New Deal, regarded communication, against
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this background, along with transportation and exchange markets, as the nerve and 
coordinating center of the economic organism. As it develops, “the organism functions in a 
more complete fashion, more intelligibly, more as a whole. — When, then, we link a continent 
with telegraphy and especially telephony — we quicken the nervous system.”254 Insofar as 
division of labor, specialization of function, standardization of technique, and rationalization of 
operations became the basis for industrial production 255 communication became a system that 
was definable in mechanistic rather than biological terms and prepared the ground for models 
inspired by the mechanical automaton.
If the functioning of society as a complex whole was not satisfactorily describable as a natural 
evolutionary process, then the biological analogy turned out to be at least equally problematic. 
The crux of this changed conception resided in the insight that society had an intrinsic 
functionality at a systemic level. It was believed that there was more than one social 
coordination point and that the harmonious functioning of society was based on some kind of 
logic of cooperation at a systemic level. This underlined the need for an overall centralized 
control over interlinked parts and processes, which society, as opposed to the biological body, 
did not posses. The biological analogy proved unsatisfactory because at the time there was no 
“brain for our social organism.”256 Machinery with adequate connections existed, but the 
social body seemed not to have a central organ corresponding to the physical facilities in order 
for it to be feasibly likened to a biological body. It was, however, exactly this kind of 
coordinating organ that was desired, for the social organism “must have a mind.”257 The idea 
of a center implied an unprecedented importance in the operational position of, in the words of 
the abovementioned Wallace Donham, a “central thinking agency” as it would “anticipate the 
slow trial and error of organic evolution.”258 In this line of thinking, the notion of a rational 
center was strengthened, but was now seen as an agency for maintaining the “intrinsic” 
functionality of the system. The center did not itself generate this system functionality but 
could only use precepts based on social laws which social research would discover over time. 
Hence, the analogy of a machine introduced the idea of system rationality into concepts of 
society in which the theme of a coordinating center figured ever more strongly.
The roots of this concept are not remote from the field studied by the quoted writers, for they 
can, in the main, be traced back to centralized systems and various related discursive practices 
based on telecommunications. The telephone as the main form of electric communication 
seemed to assume a special role in this connection, because it provided an operational model 
not only for modem communication but also for industrial institutions. These dimensions 
were, of course, inherently intertwined: industrial society requires and produces communicative
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practices corresponding its needs and communication in its modem forms provides the basis 
for the prevailing social order. What is especially noteworthy is that communication as the 
precondition of industrial production becomes at the same time a prerequisite for thinking 
about society, because when speaking about contemporary societies we have to presuppose the 
role of the highly developed communication systems that make these societies possible. 
Modem communication, in other words social life based more and more on technical 
communication systems and on relationships created by them, now constitutes a necessary 
precondition for thinking about community. And it is exactly from the sphere of 
communication that not only the technical means but also largely the still extant conceptual 
forms for thinking about this relationship have emerged.
Thus according to Frank Jewett, for example, the network of various communication channels 
constitutes, in practice, one machine. This was an idea that was generalized in cybernetic 
thought through an analogy combining the concept of the nervous system with the computing 
machine:
“The communication channels which interconnect the switchboards within a great 
metropolitan area, and the long distance lines which criss-cross the country and form the 
interconnecting network between cities, towns and hamlets, are in the last analysis merely 
the extended wires which link together parts of a single switching machine. — they are 
functionally no different in their purpose from many of the wires which connect together 
different parts of a switchboard within the same central office.”259
While the idea of communication as a machine created a platform for planning and 
formalization experiments and gradual consolidation of certain modes of creating organization 
out of disorganization, what constituted the whole within which this all took place was, as 
shown, none other than the nervous system. “[Thousands of central office switchboards] are 
merely parts of a single complex organism — ,”260 constituting the “nervous system of the 
whole social structure.”261 It gave a common name to the diverse systems and processes of 
organization, as well as the structure through which the organization could be realized. Hence, 
it was the form of the organization, that is, a conceptual means for conceiving the field of 
relationships as a whole, as well as what was organized in the course of this that was this whole 
itself. The nervous system, thus, served as both the means and the objective of these projects 
which gave rise to the organized system of communication.
129
Politics as a formalization of social functions emerged from the possibility of thinking about 
modem western community through the machine metaphor. In this metaphor thinking about 
commonality was expressed as a demand for adjustment and regulation rather than as a matter 
of negotiation around different interests. It is important to notice that the notion of 
communication as a set of rules concerning the functioning of a whole, as proposed by the 
technocrats and later elaborated on by the cyberneticians, was firmly entrenched in the thinking 
that characterizes the history of communication as the objective and means of administration. It 
suffices to quote a renowned telecommunication theorist in late fifties:
“Communication is a social function. -- the whole, the organization or organism, 
possesses a structure which is describable as a set of rules, and this structure, the rules, 
may remain unchanged as the individual members or elements are changed. By the 
possession of this structure the whole organization may be better adapted or better fitted 
for some goal-seeking activity.”262
The machine metaphor becoming established through efficiency rhetoric and especially 
through scientific management did not appear in contemporary discourses as a distinct 
conceptual construction but rather as a result of changes in the structure of production in an 
industrializing society and as a response to the problems of such a society. It formed, hence, 
the boundary within which issues pertaining to reorganization of the social were conceptualized 
and means of achieving it were addressed.
The machine-likeness of communication was reflected in the concept of a communicative 
whole that consisted of interconnected parts differing functionally from each other. This 
manifested itself after Taylor mainly in the separation of planning from doing, with both of 
these functions setting their own rules and practices for communication, the communicative 
relationship between them consisting largely of instructions from the former domain to the 
latter one. This arrangement established formal and unequivocal chains of command and by so 
doing set free the potential for more efficient functioning of the whole. It emphasized the 
functional separation of action as the basis of communication: a whole should be as adapted to 
its purpose and program as possible. Division of tasks was implemented through the way the 
mechanical assemblage standardized goals, specialized roles, routinized practices, and 
regularized communication.
New means of communication, coupled with the related discourses, changed the tasks and 
functions of communicative practices into part of a larger communicative whole, with social and
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institutional actors influencing the way this whole was continuously reconstructed. After 
Taylor had separated thinking from doing, it became clear during the development of modem 
management that their functional relationship was far more complicated than he had given 
occasion to think. This understanding of the complexity of an organization was interweaved 
with the vision provided by the analogy of the nervous system that now had been given a 
mechanical interpretation. The center of a hierarchy did not only assign functional departments 
according to some prethought plan, but in the same way that the functions of a body were 
largely independent with respect to the brain, so functional departments in modem business 
organizations assumed a fairly self-governing role. Of course, they remained accountable to 
management but their interrelationship could be characterized better as a complex structure, 
directed through intermediate levels of regulation, than as a straightforward relationship of 
command. What is more, the center presupposed this functional relationship as a condition of 
its existence.263 It was this terrain that cyberneticians came to work on, thus becoming involved 
in the history of communication.
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5. Self-Regulating Assemblages
After World War II a completely new form of communicability that emerged as a result of the 
interweaving of two fields or processes began to take shape. First, the systems scientific 
approach spread and became common, and secondly, systems based on information and 
communication technology developed and came to be seen as a necessity. These two processes 
were not separate but, on the contrary, fed each other in a symbiotic relationship. Systems 
sciences and especially cybernetics and information theory were established as the theoretical 
sources for systems of communication and computation,264 and computers enabled the 
realization of systems scientific applications. Together they engendered a fairly consistent 
system of communicability that did not start to weaken until the 1970s. The position and 
significance of emergent digital computing technology was absolutely crucial to the ontology 
of communication. This technology, coupled with fields of knowledge becoming 
institutionalized, made society a huge information structure. Accordingly, the totality within 
which communication was thought about changed from “communication machine” to 
“information system,” rendering it a far more exact quantity than previously.
Communication becoming something more and more precisely definable in numerical values 
was, of course, not just of interest in academic discourses; it did not arise solely out of them 
and was not an object for them only. It was, above all, the result of the rhythm of 
telecommunication itself, of the process of its realization (which was and is not an event 
distinguishable from the related discourses). Physical implementations of telecommunication 
posed questions about communication that were given appropriate formulations in their fields 
by telephone engineers and mathematicians. Behind it all was chiefly a need to make 
communication economically profitable by using as few lines as possible to transmit the 
greatest possible quantity of information.265 The quantification of communication is essential 
to the reliability of a telecommunication system, and becomes problematic, according to 
contemporary critique, only when increasing numbers of communication events, outside the 
engineering field, are considered in quantitative terms.
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It was precisely telecommunication systems which mainly constituted the environment in and 
through which communication assumed a distinct, theoretically determinable identity with a 
nature of its own—a nature that could be captured exactly in mathematical terms. Since the 
very beginning of electric communication, questions relating to the speed and capacity of 
transmission of “intelligence,” as it was commonly called—anticipating and paving way for 
the concept of “information” —and subsequently leading to communication theory, had 
constituted a mathematical basis for communication. This was possible through the concept of 
“the quantity of information” which was useful in analyses focusing on the problems of 
reliable and rapid transmission of signals, and was subsequently regarded mainly as a technical 
question of modulation.266 This is how communication was established as an object of 
systematic, institutionalized investigation by professional scientists and technicians, as 
something that could be described primarily in quantitative and temporal terms.
This quantification of technology became possible only in the social historical phase in which 
it had been given a market value, in other words, in the stage in which it was incorporated into 
the capitalist production process and made a commodity. Communication, however, has never 
been external to this process, like something which would have been sucked into the market 
mechanism only at a certain stage of development as a resource or reserve. On the contrary, 
and as noted above, communication, especially in the form of telecommunication, was the very 
force, linked to a number of social processes, which revolutionized the social conditions of 
economic activity and paved the way for a new, industrial social order.267 Thus, the 
commoditization and objectifying of communication cannot be disentangled from its own 
history and reality; similarly, its quantification is not external to communication in itself—in its 
modem mode—but is instead an inseparable part of its own historical existence. Yet it is 
possible to draw a distinction between communication and telecommunication and propose that 
the fate of the latter is not reducible to that of the former; but two noteworthy points relate to 
this gesture. Firstly, it can be noted that telecommunication largely establishes nowadays the 
social environment within which communication is thought about It forms the frame of 
reference in and through which a communicative relationship is accounted a social relationship; 
in other words, it organizes communication as something socially significant and collectively 
constitutive. Moreover, there is a danger here in postulating an original, privileged, and with 
respect to its particular historical realizations, independent realm of existence for 
communication; it is anyway impossible for communication is nothing other than the passage 
of history in which everyday social relations are expressed and thought about.
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Yet communication can be differentiated in principle from the changeable forms of its historical 
manifestation, as noted above, even though it does not differ from those in any way, due to the 
fact that social relationships and orders articulated through them constitute in any given 
situation what communication is. This differentiation is not a determination of any meaning 
external to communication, but is not based, either, on any existing difference: it is nothing 
substantial in itself. The point where the distinction between communication as such and its 
historical modes can be drawn is in the communicative existence itself. There is nothing being­
like or substantial in this communication, no ideal source of significance that would enable its 
expression in positive terms. Though the distinction is not, it is always made, and this making 
always gives rise to existence insofar as it is understood as communicative existence. However, 
what this also means is that differentiation is not dependent on individual choice but is instead 
something derived from existence itself, and in the final analysis is nothing but this 
existence.268 Thus we can conceive that the development of communication into something that 
can be dealt with by formal means and expressed in terms of numerical quantities is 
indistinguishable from the politics of communicative administration and the administration of 
communication in our times—and, hence, indistinguishable also from our own historical 
destiny.
Projects in and through which attempts were and still are being made to formalize 
communication are compelled to postulate some form of authenticity, typically in the form of a 
communication system understood as a totality. Thus the modem history of communication, 
intertwined with social communication projects, assumed forms in which a certain founding 
logic presented both the possibility and the limits of its realization. Here this logic is 
understood as a law: it is the comprehension and treatment of communicative relationships in 
the context of a more general order that determines in which forms they can occur. It goes 
without saying that because communication always connects with discontinuous processes and 
practices, it cannot be simplified into a certain form or disposition, not even into the most 
influential and unchallengeable one. However, what makes this special link between the ever 
more precise description of communicative events and things in different domains of the 
social—in other words, the link with the social understood as a law—of paramount importance, 
is that it reveals the style, manner, or structure of our coexistence insofar as our time can be 
seen to be characterized by scientific research and applied technology (as they are commonly 
referred to together, although it is clear by now that technology is not only applied science). 
But, as it was noted above, one has to keep in mind that communication itself was in the main 
both the starting point and the object of this need for objectification, which naturally was not 
restricted to the laboratories of telecommunications engineers but became an integral part of the
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development that characterizes the whole of western culture in its modem industrial form. In 
this process, communication became an instrumental means of organizing the social as well as 
of its self-organization. But at the same time, in the course of this very social shaping, it created 
the cultural conditions within which this organization could take place and assume its social 
shape. This shape was more than ever before based on law, but now the law appropriated 
qualities that changed it from being a stable and unchanging principle into a self-governing 
autonomous mechanism.
The social shaping power of communication could be seen, for example, in 
telecommunications* founding of a system that enabled different social practices to be 
accomplished in a predetermined and routinized way. What this meant exactly can be 
illustrated by referring to the numerous but formally similar implementations of different 
systems, in terms of their objectives and routinization, ranging from intra-organizational 
communication systems, including vast governmental configurations, to nationwide mass 
communication schemes, all of which were based on the transmission technology provided by 
telecommunications. In this way communication, through its own existence, that is, in the 
process of its own formalization and not in some external register of reality, prepared the 
ground and the need not only for objectification of communication relationships, but also for 
making social processes into the object of formalization.
In what follows, we will examine the practices within which communication emerged as a 
distinct subject and means of administration in the age of the computer. Because of the 
dominant positions of cybernetics and information theory as points of intersection of 
theoretical, technical, and administrative lines of discussion and practice during this period, the 
first part of the chapter will investigate formation of the concept of communication based on 
these theories, whereas the second part is devoted to the relationships these ideas opened up 
with thinking about the social through mutually articulated theoretical discourses and their 
practical applications.
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5.1. Automating Communication
The engineering and managerial models in and through which communication was concretized 
into rational systems and which were first formulated at the beginning of the Progressive era, 
found their highest expression in the 1950s and 1960s.269 It was the rise of the so-called 
system sciences with their mathematical tools that ultimately embedded them in institutional 
practices in science and management270 According to Thomas Hughes and others, it was the 
emphasis on science and method that linked the postwar spread of the systems approach to the 
spread of the earlier scientific management movement with equally revolutionary results.271 In 
fact, the formal techniques developed during and after World War II, the use of which was 
common to all the systems sciences, also provided a response to some of the problems of 
Taylorism. Although claiming to be able to overcome these problems, these techniques 
departed from Taylorism only in their methods, not in their premises, remaining thus inside the 
conceptual domain of bureaucratic management272 Yet not unlike Taylorism, they developed 
into an influential conceptual vision that immensely shaped contemporary sentiments and 
practices regarding communication.
These forms of knowledge, in turn, developed hand in hand with information and 
communication technologies that made it possible to fashion practical applications from 
systems theoretical thinking. If the conceptual models of communication can be said to have 
their origin in the need for control and surveillance, it was the coalescing environments of 
communications technology, computerized information processing, and their fields and 
methods of application, coupled with the developing disciplines of systems thinking, that 
marked the culmination of the control perspective from around the middle of the century. 
During this period, the emergence and establishment of theoretical discourses based to a great 
extent on these technologies allowed diverse questions and traditions to be bound together into 
a unified theory of control.
As for how communication became both a means of administrative strategies and a subject for 
research, the years after World War II were crucial. At that time, a new communicative whole 
began to take shape as a result of an intertwining of several theoretical discourses, 
technological inventions, institutional organizations, and political ends and practices. For our 
purposes, two theoretical contributions of this period sharing the same view of communication 
are of foremost importance. The first can be identified as centering around the work by 
Norbert Wiener, whereas the second is based on the ideas of Claude E. Shannon. Taken 
together, these two figures laid the most important part of the theoretical foundation for a new
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communicative constellation and specified the conceptual principles which enabled subsequent 
schemes for automated systems as a managerial response to the shortcomings of Taylorism to 
be formulated. In what follows, cybernetics and information theory will be discussed from the 
point of view of administrative communication, as well as the administration of communication. 
After this, some general remarks will be made concerning the recast concept of communication 
in the new form of knowledge.
Cybernetic Constructions
One of the most central cornerstones in the formal approach to communication, synthesizing 
much of the previous work done during the war on self-regulating machines, was a 
mathematical theory of control mechanisms by Wiener for which he coined the term 
cybernetics in 1947.273 As a general theory of self-regulation, it created a language that, 
together with information theory, allowed for the integration of disciplines and themes 
traditionally held as separate from each other. In and through this integrating language, a set of 
diverse questions, ranging from animal goal-seeking behavior to the operation of anti-aircraft 
weaponry, and a whole range of disciplines such as statistical mechanics, communication 
engineering, the theory of control mechanisms, and biology, could be brought together and 
dealt with within the same perspective, made coherent by the theme of “communication.”274 
Thus the cybernetic discourse made it possible to compare disparate chains of questioning, 
fields of institutional practices, and physical machinery and technical solutions as 
commensurable elements of a single conceptual framework. It is hard to overrate the 
significance of this approach to the self-formation of a wide range of academic disciplines 
during a period of over three decades. As regards thinking about communication, its influence 
was absolutely fundamental.
Wiener was well aware of the central position of communication and particularly of the 
institutional role of it for the modem age as the “cement which binds [society’s] fabric 
together.”275 In seeking to construct a unifying basis for the interpretation of this “cement,” 
he interwove “communication” with “control”—concepts that appeared in the subtitle of his 
Cybernetics. This was the age of perfection of a line of thought through which communication 
became inextricably understood in terms of system, the structure of which was thus 
systematized and explained within the frame of reference set by automated control structures 
rather than by purely mechanical ones. “If  the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries are 
the age of clocks,” he proposed, “and the later eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries
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constitute the age of steam engines, the present time is the age of communication and 
control.”276 On the basis of the interconnection between these two notions a whole new 
landscape for thinking about communis was opened up.
Wiener combined these concepts under circumstances in which their former contents had 
changed. He redefined their respective contents in a way that took into account recent 
improvements in technological development, particularly in computer technology, and laid the 
ground for thinking about communication as an automated process. The notion of 
communication as something with not only a systemic but also a self-maintaining nature can be 
seen as an effort to accommodate the concept to new computerized conditions. In this way, 
cybernetics bridged the ages of the telephone—which was a product of the industrial 
organization—and of the computer—which became a model for the new concept of 
organization. At the same time, interest in questions relating to energy and energy 
consumption, which largely determined the direction of analysis in the technocracy movement, 
had to give way to issues of communication and information. Hence, modem control theory, 
coupled with computer technology, seemed to synthesize the routines and practices of a given 
system—what efficiency engineers, culminating in the efforts of Frederick Taylor, have tried to 
do since the beginning of the twentieth century.277 Thus, if Taylorism mechanized production, 
then Wiener wished to automate Taylorism. As a result, generalized control began to shift from 
bureaucratic organizations to computer technology, as Beniger has pointed out.278
What is absolutely central in Wiener from our point of view is that his project was to formulate 
the logical form of exactly the same operational model facilitated by the telecommunication 
systems from the telegraph to the telephone and implemented in a number of organizations and 
industries over the previous decades. For him, this model became a general form for any 
system, in that every system is necessarily a communication system. Thus,
“the operation of the living individual and the operation of some of the newer 
communication machines are precisely parallel. Both of them have sensory receptors as 
one stage in their cycle of operation: that is, in both of them there exists a special 
apparatus for collecting information from the outer world at low energy levels, and for 
making it available in the operation of the individual or of the machine. ~  In both of them, 
their performed action on the outer world -- is reported back to the central regulatory 
apparatus.”279
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The functional division of a system, analyzed with the help of biomechanical comparisons, was 
thus reorganized in the light of the principle of self-regulation. Whereas still in Taylor it was 
divided between decision-making and action, in which the manager was responsible for the first 
and the worker for the second part, self-regulation split the first of these over again. If 
previously it was the manager who performed both the monitoring and control functions, now 
supervision became an inbuilt part of the automatic system. The decision-making element 
turned into two structurally distinct components concentrating on perception, on one hand, and 
control, on the other. So, whereas with mechanical systems the functional whole was organized 
on the basis of an interplay between two independent elements, the self-regulative system 
required a functional distinction between perception, decision-making, and action. This 
distinction could be achieved by three separate yet interrelated elements comprising perceptors, 
controls, and effectors, respectively. Control was thus relegated to self-regulatory structures 
and became immanent to its functioning.280
Issues such as self-regulation and control naturally have long premodem histories, but it was 
not until World War II that they were subjected to consistent critical review in terms of a 
scientific approach and regarded as a source of general metaphors. The background to interest 
in the theory of control and communication was provided by the work done during the war on 
tracking radar and anti-aircraft guns, which brought to the field a large number of 
mathematicians and physicists. At that time, hand in hand with the formulation of cybernetic 
theories by mathematicians, computer engineers, and neurobiologists, the formal parallels 
between machines dealing with information and organisms—especially the brain as part of the 
nervous system—formed the central object of analysis.281 It was because of the new interest in 
machine-organism analogies that the nervous system was introduced again as an object of 
explicit theoretical analysis. The nervous system no longer, however, functioned merely as a 
general metaphor for a communication system, as was commonly the case during the early 
development of telecommunications, but its similarities and differences with digital 
communication technology were investigated at neurobiological level also.
As in the era of the telegraph, it was both the structure and function of the nervous system that 
was of primary interest. The structure was known as a reflex arc. In it, the sensory nerve 
endings, after they have detected what is happening, pass the information back to the central 
nervous system via the “afferent” nerve fibres, after which the nervous system passes 
instructions back to the muscles via the “efferent” nerve fibres.282 What the cyberneticists 
were interested in was the quite automatic, or reflexive, functioning of this system, called an 
autonomic nervous system, to maintain constant conditions inside the body. Because the
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regulation process of this system corresponded to those of some machines, it seemed possible 
to create a general language to discuss the operations of self-maintenance in both machines and 
organisms. Accordingly, as a result of discussions Wiener had with Howard Aiken, one of the 
pioneers in computer technology, and John von Neumann, the remarkable mathematician, on 
the interrelationships between, for example, communication engineering and the 
communication and control aspects of the nervous system,283 the engineering and neurology 
aspects coalesced into essentially one because they seemed to follow the same mechanical 
laws.284 Given the group’s interest in control mechanisms, the central nervous system was 
viewed more as an automaton than as an organism: whereas Wiener treated it “like an 
automaton,”285 for von Neumann it was a “large natural automation.”286 Against this 
perspective, it is not surprising that the thermostat was taken as the mechanical symbol of the 
functioning of the nervous system of the body.
During this close collaboration von Neumann and others sought to systematize the 
communicative functioning principle of the nervous system and devise logical models of so- 
called formal neuron structures that, in turn, would lay the conceptual foundation for a range of 
organizational structures, whether mechanical or social.287 The nervous system and the 
automatic machine were considered functionally alike for they made decisions on the ground 
of past decisions. In both cases, information about the environment is fed back from the nerve 
endings/sensors over nerve fibres/closed loops to the nervous system/central control system, 
which directs the muscles/effectors in such a way as to maintain the desired state inside the 
system. Consequently, exactly as perceptors (nerve endings) transform the energy of a 
stimulus into nerve impulses, the system sensors convert environmental changes into 
information. Moreover, just as the brain passes instructions back to internal muscles, so the 
control system executes the necessary internal readjustments on the grounds of the information 
received. In both cases, finally, whether in an organism or in a machine, the information flows 
around a functionally closed system.288 The logical relationship between perceptors, controls, 
and effectors, became the pivotal frame for analysis and a reservoir of more analogies for the 
study of communication and control mechanisms.
In this fashion, while elaborating the theoretical possibilities of the notion of the nervous 
system, Wiener came to the conclusion that “the closest mechanical analogue to the nervous 
system is the computing machine.”289 Thus the computer assumed in his thinking, but also 
increasingly in other sciences and popular culture cutting across cybernetic circles, a 
symbolical place as the central nervous system of modem industrial society, a role previously 
played by the telegraph and after it the telephone. The latter, nonetheless, retained its central
140
position because computers constituted a proper system only through a telephone network. 
This popularity of the computer metaphor ran parallel with the spread of system thinking 
through the sciences.290 The idea of a connection between the brain and electrical 
communication has, however, a history preceding the computer age, in that John Mills, for 
instance, spoke as early as 1934 about the telephone system as an “electrical brain.”291 Yet, it 
was not until the forties, with the development of computer scientific analyses, that this 
relationship could be taken as a subject for more precise theoretical investigation, and with 
Wiener, it became finally a primary focus of analysis and the conceptual center for his 
cybernetics.
In connection with electrical communication and related discourses, it is possible to identify 
another source of the interest in the old biological analogy within this context After it became 
known that the activity of the nervous system was based, along with some chemical interaction, 
on electrical discharges, the old link with the analogies provided by telecommunications 
rhetoric assumed an ever more exact, scientifically justified character. The similarities between 
the nervous system and telecommunications made it possible to analyze both in the light of 
signal transmission. Thus, while it was shown in the 1930s that the intensity of the signal, 
caused by strong stimulation of nerve endings, was based on the time interval between 
successive discharges, its precise equivalent seemed to be found in telecommunications. In the 
latter, the same type of frequency-modulated system of signaling, in which intensities were 
translated into frequencies, was known as “pulse frequency modulation.”292 More generally, 
the joint question was about the electrical discharge—ultimately information in an electrical 
form—that propagates along either the nerve fibre or the coaxial cable. Yet at the same time, 
although a common point of departure, the electronic aspects were de-emphasized after 
realization of the significance of logical functions by von Neumann and others. Both nervous 
and communication systems are not only electrical but also, and above all, logical systems, and 
it was this logic that needed to be developed in mathematical form. Cybernetics, therefore, can 
be conceived of as a project that aimed at formalizing the nervous system by inteipreting it as a 
mechanical principle whose logical form could be transcribed into elegant mathematical 
equations.
The pivotal role granted to the computer in Wiener justifies considering him as a kind of 
culmination in our age (insofar as computers and computer networks can be viewed as 
determining the age we live in) of the discontinuous sequence of development of which the first 
formulations were presented by William Channing in the middle of the 1900-century in 
connection with the plan for the Boston telegraph system. This is to say that Wiener can be
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understood as a theoretician who rearticulated and reworked thematically interlinked system 
analogies to meet the requirements and theoretical promises of the computer age. At the same 
time the concept of the entity that unifies a community and supervises and coordinates its 
functions—the nervous system of a modem society—changed from being an organism to a 
mechanical apparatus, and in Wiener further to a digital automaton—a computer. Despite his 
cautiousness when trying to avoid overgeneralizations concerning the suitability of automatic 
control to social processes, Wiener still used the same analogy that thinkers who worked with 
communication systems and sought to conceptualize their functioning had used throughout the 
whole history of electrical communication: “[T]he computing machine furnishes us the 
greatest promise for an adequate central nervous system in future automatic-control 
machines.”293 The computer now began to form the conceptual terrain from which thinking 
about communication started out and to which it returned.
While the control mechanism of the nervous system, from the cybernetic point of view, allowed 
diverse disciplines and orientations to be gathered under a common concept, it was the 
principle of feedback that designated the nature of this mechanism. The thermostat became in 
this discourse a central conceptual node for it was the general technical model of this principle. 
The feedback mechanism, which characterized the whole of cybernetic thinking to the extent 
that the latter can be characterized as a theory which investigates its conceptual scope and 
possibilities, has a long history that can be traced back to antiquity. In Europe, it was known in 
the late eighteenth century especially in the form of the steam engine governor developed by 
James Watt.294 However, the modem meaning of the notion of feedback is related to the 
emergence of communications engineering. The idea of feedback, which subsequently strongly 
affected views of how a communication system functioned—especially in military defense 
systems—derives from the invention in 1927 of the negative feedback amplifier, made in the 
Bell Laboratories by H.S. Black, which gave birth to the modem transmission technology of 
the telephone.295 By the end of the decade, the mathematical basis of feedback structures for 
control devices, then called servomechanisms, was established.296 Hence it was a question 
which related directly to communication, namely of how to design a dependable telephone 
network, not a theoretical problem external to i t
This principle of negative feedback, to which H. Nyquist subsequently gave a theoretical basis, 
and which led to the development of the theory of servomechanisms,297 can be seen as having 
been generalized by Wiener from a technical question of amplification to a general principle of 
a communication system. This was shown in a seminal article written by Wiener with engineer 
Julian Bigelow and neurobiologist Arturo Rosenblueth in 1943, in which the concept of
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“negative feedback” provided an essential tool for a unified description of the behavior of 
living organisms and machines.298 It has been pointed out, though, that it was in the end 
Black’s discovery that opened up a perspective from which cybernetic generalizations could 
evolve.299 However, the roots of the feedback principle in telephone engineering did not go 
unnoticed by Wiener either. If cybernetics is a method for conceiving and organizing 
information and communication essentially by means of feedback mechanisms, it is this veiy 
communication that defines the field in which cybernetics found its origin. Wiener stuck firmly 
during the early phase of the cybernetic research program’s formation to the thought that 
cybernetics as a distinct discipline or orientation was based on the communications 
engineering. “The newer study of automata,” he held, “whether in the metal or in the flesh, is 
a branch of communication engineering — .”300 Hence cybernetics, which subsequently 
strongly influenced the development of a number of diverse disciplines, emerged and was 
articulated precisely from studies undertaken within the sphere of communication systems. 
Even all the cardinal notions such as “noise,” “quantity of information,” “coding 
technique,” and so on, were taken over from communication engineering.301 It was thus not a 
theoretical perspective external to the domain of communication, but sprang from the immanent 
progression and occurrence of communication itself by simultaneously reorganizing this 
process of development of which it was itself a part Cybernetics, seen from this angle, was the 
very self-image of modem communication.
The feedback principle, coupled with the vacuum tube, transformed the basis of machine 
technology from a highly constrained to a flexible one. Whereas in the former only the 
predetermined sequence of actions is executed, in the latter the feedback loop develops a 
sequence of actions that achieves the fixed outcome by making corrections in line with 
changing conditions.302 So, what was unchanging in the former was invariant mechanical 
performance, as manifested in the Taylor System, while in the case of feedback-based systems, 
instead of a sequence of actions, the goal desired was fixed. Although such a machine 
responds to changes in its context, it is however unimportant for the machine, as it pursues the 
target value through the feedback mechanism, to recognize what caused any variation in 
particular or its nature. Of course, this is exactly what makes this principle so efficient. When 
responding to its context, this system does not recognize the cause or nature of the changes in 
itself, but only to the extent that they trigger continuous compensations for maintaining the 
prefixed outcome. The system with a feedback mechanism, hence, takes context into account as 
a source of information from which it can correct its own behavior. While it is not untrue to 
state that it is changes in the environment which control the changes in the system,303 the
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environmental changes have a significance only in terms of maintenance of the system. This is 
why the behavior of the system is based on a prefixed norm rather than any particular context
External variation is both a source of error that must be eliminated and a factor that 
continuously checks and corrects the coherence of the system. Hence it represents, on one 
hand, a hostile element the influence of which is to be abolished in order for equilibrium to be 
restored, but on the other hand it is itself a prerequisite for this self-correcting system since 
without it the system would not have any identity of its own. Without this change the system 
would not have any means to monitor and control its own functioning, and it is the monitoring 
and control that makes what the system is about.
The concept that designated the principle against which cybernetics was directed, and hence 
what defined cybernetics as a project, the “noise source,” as it was first termed in Shannon’s 
communication model, was later associated with the notion of entropy. The second law of 
thermodynamics, according to which entropy is steadily increasing, postulated disorganization 
as the inescapable fate of the world. In cybernetics, entropy appeared as a problem immanent in 
communication. For Wiener the major problem of communication lies in the fact that it can be 
distorted in transmission. The principal opponent of “normal communicative discourse,” says 
Wiener, is the “entropic tendency of nature itself.”304 Entropy, thus, was a name for the object 
against which cybernetics was organized in the first place. “In control and communication,” 
he states, “we are always fighting nature’s tendency to degrade the organized and destroy the 
meaningful; the tendency -- for entropy to increase.”305 Against this background, it was the 
task of cybernetics to develop a means by way of which the organized could be maintained and, 
if possible, enhanced as well. Cyberneticians saw themselves fighting against the unavoidable 
disintegration of order, not unlike the Clerk Maxwell demons, by devising control systems that 
represented islands of negative entropy in the ocean of growing disorder.306 In this picture, 
“entropy” meant very much the same as “change” or “variation” did in relation to the self- 
regulating system, as demonstrated in the last chapter.
What is important for us here is that means of preserving the organized are communicational in 
their nature. Communication represents order and meaning, against which the lack of it is 
contrasted as disorder and chaos, or more precisely, as a state of disintegration. This 
disintegration is noncommunication: it is both incommunicable and uncommunicational. 
Because it is not within the sphere of communication, it is designated as the “other” of 
communication. Yet, exactly because this other of communication, what we cannot understand 
through everyday communication but what can be depicted in terms of science, is, according to
144
Wiener, a characteristic of nature itself. Communication, not unlike science, is conceived as a 
struggle against nature. Consequently, while communication is for Wiener something always 
organizing and being organized, this double process is thought of as belonging to the sphere of 
the rational. This is what paves the way for formal systems of representation as a more exact 
way to formulate methods of maintaining the self-identity of communication against its other.
This is also what brings in the theme of repetition. As it is of central importance for a 
communication system to develop efficient controls in order to maintain its structure and 
function, and, as we know from the discussion above, these controls are based, in cybernetics, 
on the principle of feedback, the coherence of the system depends ultimately on incessant 
repetition of the process of feeding back. Seen from this perspective, as important as the 
mechanism itself is its ceaseless repetition. Wiener generalized this idea to apply to the law. 
According to him, the problems of law are those of “orderly and repeatable control of certain 
critical situations.”307 What was dear to cyberneticians hearts was the possibility of error-free 
communication and the optimal elimination of noise. While the “key to the reliable 
transmission of information is redundancy,” noted Leonard Schwartz, “in its simplest form 
redundancy is repetition.”308 If noise is another name for politics, cyberneticians can be said to 
struggle against politics by means of controlled repetition, which led to the development of 
codes for the purpose of detecting and correcting errors.
Information as a System
In the same year as Wiener’s Cybernetics, there also appeared a very influential 
communication theory by a former student of Wiener, communication engineer and 
mathematician Claude Shannon, who worked at the Bell Laboratories. It was Shannon who 
proposed a general model of communication and a conceptual link between communications 
and the computer in two journal articles which were republished a year later as The 
Mathematical Theory o f Communication. This included a contribution by Warren Weaver 
who helped to popularize and apply the theory to the field of human communication in a 
separate chapter of the same book.309 It’s point of departure was indistinguishable from that of 
cybernetics, so the two can be viewed as sharing the same theoretical perspective toward 
communication, the main preoccupation being to discover the mathematical laws underlying 
i t310 Shannon’s theoretical project was based on the concept of “information,” superseding 
that of “intelligence,” and he approached the question of communication’s measurability by
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using the term “b it” for the unit of information. In this way, a theoretical basis was laid for 
quantitative measures of communication and of the capacity of various systems to transmit, 
store, and process information.
The theory enabled accurate determination of the capacity of a given communication 
channel—Shannon’s framing of the question was grounded in the research done on the 
telephone and telegraph systems311—with respect to the transmission of “information.” Here, 
the communication question was approached through the notion of a network of channels that 
transmit information, examples of which were not only telephone cables but also the nerve 
system—an enduring source of inspiration for a number of communication theorists.312 
Because the nervous system, it was shown, not only transmitted information in an electrical 
form, but also maintained a high degree of reliability because of the communication between 
elements of the systems, it became the reference system for information and control theorists, 
as demonstrated above.313 Hence, despite the mathematical nature of the focus on 
communication, the biological analogy was never far away. On the contrary, as the most 
common analogy regarding communication, it was the veiy object of this mathematization. As 
in the cybernetic project more generally, it was precisely the logic of the nervous system’s 
mechanism that produced adaptive behavior that it was sought to develop in mathematical 
form.314 Communication, here, received its mathematical value within the framework in which it 
was seen as an object of speech throughout the history of telecommunications; that is, within 
the nervous system.
The concept of information became a general unifying thread for a whole range of different 
approaches to communication. In this respect, Shannon did for communication what Louis 
Pasteur did for hygiene, if we follow Bruno Latour’s interpretation of the latter. According to 
Latour, the “microbe” was a tool for Pasteur to concentrate all the widely distributed and thus 
ineffective actions of the hygiene movement on one precise point with testable results.315 In a 
similar manner, “information” served for Shannon as a means of focusing on one defined 
element and thus of overcoming problems followed from attempts to take into account all 
possible variants and forms of communication.316 Information conceptualized what was 
universal, from the mathematical point of view, in communication, regardless of its particular 
type, the contents of the messages transmitted, or the persons involved. Secondly, it introduced 
a new cohesive terminology to many distinct perspectives and gathered the disparate fields of 
computing science, electrical engineering, physics, and molecular biology within the same 
conceptual terrain. Lastly, on the basis of information, Shannon rendered communication 
testable, which was crucial for the communication systems presupposed by modem society. By
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these gestures, Shannon effectively standardized the field and created a uniform conceptual 
framework for the mathematical study of communication.
The most well-known and influential contribution of the Shannon and Weaver theoiy was the 
establishment of a conceptual model for a general communication system. It is difficult to 
overestimate the long-lasting hegemony this model gained throughout the sciences and lines of 
thought that had taken communication as their object of analysis. The famous model depicts 
the transmission of information, or a “message,” from an information source to its destination, 
as traveling via a given channel from the transmitter through the receiver, with a noise source 
influencing the communication process.317 On the basis of this general communication model 
what was suggested as the fundamental question of communication started to be expressed in 
terms of a relationship between a transmitted signal and a received signal.
Although it was made clear from the outset that information or communication theory focused 
exclusively on the technical side of communication, the accurate transmission of electrical 
signals, setting aside both semantic and pragmatic questions, it is apparent that its influence 
was not limited to the mathematical problems of signal transmission but rather obtained its 
significance as a general description of communication. At the time, it was well understood 
among many contemporary commentators that “the theory in fact covers much more than 
these technical problems.”318 As a matter of fact, information theoiy can be seen from two 
different angles. On the one hand, it is an integral part of the cybernetic program in that it is the 
first attempt to formulate a precise mathematical definition of communication. It is this aspect 
of the theory that has been of the utmost importance for work done on the mathematical 
architecture of telecommunication systems, leading to the science of the digital computing 
machine. Yet on the other hand, it demonstrated the potential for a general and consistent 
communication theory. In this second sense, it can be viewed as “a precise theoiy of 
communication, which may be applied to any situation where information is passed, or 
communication takes place.”319 Albeit having its origin in telecommunications engineering, the 
theory was taken to be applicable in principle to the general structure of any communicative 
situation: “The comprehensiveness of the [communication] theoiy is undoubted. It applies to 
all possible relationships between identifiable elements in all possible systems. It can be used 
for social situations of eveiy kind, and represents the application of systematic science to that 
situation.”320
This is why the initial positioning of communication as an engineering problem and the linear 
model that was based on electrical communication not only set the framework for the study and
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construction of telephone networks, but pervaded a range of other sciences and theoretical 
orientations too. This theory seemed to give a form to otherwise indeterminate communication 
processes: information, as a universal principle, “[gave] shape to the shapeless,” according to 
Jeremy Campbell.321 As a result, Shannon’s terminology and his model were rapidly embraced 
and widely applied in thinking about communication in general, extending beyond the borders 
of information theoiy proper. In particular, in the field of communication research, a linear, 
effects-oriented approach to communication, as adapted to the practices of a new discipline, 
was eagerly adopted, not least because it seemed to provide the scientific rigidity 
communication scholars had pursued in their attempts to professionalize the discipline.322 
There is little doubt that, for communication research, Shannon’s theory was fundamental. 
According to Everett Rogers, the Shannon and Weaver paradigm was “the most important 
single turning point in the history of communication science.”323 After it had permeated the 
field, the theoretical perspective it encapsulated started to function as the standard view and as 
the basis for a growing number of revised models of the same, enduring until the 1990s.324 It 
standardized the field by defining its objects, terminology, and method. It laid a whole new 
basis for the understanding of communication, if it was desired to take this as a scientific 
concept, by establishing what was its actual structure, how to determine the relationships 
involved, and how to interpret the results.325
By jettisoning what was only circumstantial and accidental, this orientation sought to identify 
the essential and necessary variants in the innumerable forms of diverse communication 
processes. It opened up a perspective within which these processes could be seen as repeating 
similar patterns, following the same intrinsic laws, which could now be discovered by means of 
two tools: the concept of information and the model for applying i t  The formal approach to 
communication separated the relevant from the irrelevant so that the basic communicative 
relationship could be explained without the need for taking into account all the possible 
variants and contexts of its occurrence. Yet this logical form also produced the empirical form, 
insofar as researchers studied empirical communication events.
Cybernetics and information theoiy embraced a particular view of communication that was 
directed against misuse of and misunderstanding over words, while at the same time trying to 
set aside the power aspect inherent in the occurrence of communication. This it sought to 
achieve by means of a precise language, the unambiguousness of which would not allow any 
negotiation or discussion over the meaning of words. One can identify at least two separate, 
though interlinked reasons for this. Firstly, unequivocal linguistic relationships are regarded as 
necessary in order to exercise control. Although the development of a control language can be
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seen as both a technical and a historical question, the technical approach in fact also to a large 
extent sets the context for the historical question. In this sense, cybernetics (and information 
theory) marks a crucial point of intersection where the administrative dimension of language 
(language both as the object and means of control) is given a technical form. Secondly, the 
demands of scientificity required cybernetics to create a description system that would allow 
clear and precise references to be made. An adequately objective and unequivocal system was a 
precondition for reaching a scientific standard, and any linguistic structure that did not meet 
these standards was doomed to stay outside the scientific realm proper. Here, the idea of 
science, of course, comes from the narrow understanding of the practices of natural sciences, 
the ultimate goal being a system of measurement by which all relevant objects could be viewed 
as commensurable and all interrelations between objects could be precisely identified, assessed, 
and formalized. In cybernetics, both the demands of control and scientificity were met in a 
language that would harmonize its internal relationships while being capable of dealing with 
external changes.
It is misunderstandings over words, their undecidability and simultaneous utterance that 
amount to noise, the principle against which information theory is directed in the first place. 
Michel Serres has noted that the English word noise was taken from an ancient French word 
written similarly, meaning both a row and outburst of anger, on the one hand, and a quarrel or 
dispute, on the other. According to him, whereas English appropriated the former meaning, 
French retained the latter sense of the word.326 It is the task of cybernetics to, if not to totally 
eliminate this noise, in the sense of a discord and a disorder, then at least to regulate it 
according to some rational principle. This regulation can be regarded as being based on the 
idea of a contract. Shannon conceived communication as a contract—a regulated structure with 
defined relationships between the sender and the receiver. Here, one can recall the analogical 
relationship that there was between the telegraph as an intercommunication system and the 
contract principle: both the sending and the receiving stations, and ultimately the 
communicating persons, on the one hand, and the contracting parties on the other, had the same 
interest in combating the surrounding noise which could drown their own voices. It is this 
same need to stabilize and formalize interrelational conditions and thereby control noise that 
can be found at the core of Shannon’s conception of communication.
Contracts define the boundaries of a common area.327 In the dominant tradition within which 
communication has been viewed as an interrelationship between independent communicating 
parties, Shannon reintroduced the idea of a contract as a counter to noise by giving it not a 
technical or juridical but an exact mathematical formulation; all changes “in the transmitted
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signal,” in his theory, were called “ noise” the common name for all that could impair the 
transmission.328 Now the legitimacy of the contractual principle was no longer dependent on a 
formal authority but instead was built into the very communication system, the task of which 
was to guarantee that the desired signals pass through the entire system. The contract consisted 
of the promise to ensure the best possible reception of a message sent over a given channel and 
thus bounded an acoustic connection between the communicating parties. This set aside, to an 
extent, the material conditions of communication, from the point of view of the parties involved, 
and made the communicative situation look transparent and technically mundane—one reason 
why telephony, for instance, has not so far been sufficiently studied from the social point of 
view. Yet this state of affairs inevitably links communication inherently to law understood as a 
regulated set of positions and relationships by which multiplicity and polyphony is closed and 
stabilized into formalized rules.
Both cybernetics and information theory sought to formalize a mechanism by means of which 
a system would deter disorder. The former approach was based on gun-control research in 
anti-aircraft weaponry, understood as a problem of information theory. Each shell fired was 
regarded as a message, and information about its accuracy was used to direct the next shot.329 
If for Wiener the criterion for the success of “messages” was their hit rate, for Shannon it was 
the exact reproduction of the signals transmitted. Communication, for Shannon, was 
fundamentally about reproducing at one point a message sent at another point.330 Therefore, in 
both cases, a strictly determined relationship between a starting point and an end point, in terms 
of a message to be sent, exemplified the rationale and cohesion of the system. Anything that 
could compromise this relationship would undermine the self-identity of the whole system.
If incessant negotiations on ways to get a job done represented for Taylor a source of 
disturbance and disunity that were to be eliminated by a scientific approach, the “other” for 
Wiener was “entropy,”331 and for Shannon, “noise.”332 From different yet interchangeable 
angles they defined what was essentially a mutual problem. Seen from this perspective, these 
ideas pointed to the two principal subject areas against which mechanisms of exclusion were 
set in motion, as practiced in cybernetics and information theory. Thus, it is the task of 
cybernetics to exclude disorganization and loss of meaning. In fact, control systems were seen 
as islands of negative entropy which were running against the main flow of the tide of 
disintegration, thus preserving order and meaning.333 As for information theory, it excluded, 
first, distortion, and secondly, interruption, factors that could prevent accurate reproduction of a 
signal at the receiving end. The aim of both was to engender and maintain a delimited area of 
order in order to allow a coherent communicational environment within a permanent state of
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unfixedness and decay. Entropy and noise, in consequence, did not remain outside the area of 
order; rather they constituted the ever-present tendency against which order was established 
and constantly maintained. Nevertheless, they defined the other side of order and organization 
and, at the same time, the source of their self-identity.
To the extent that cybernetics and information theory brought about a concept of 
communication that was closely tied to the objective of maintaining order, they can be said as 
being a privileged example of subordination of what cannot be presented by any system of 
representation, and what has been variously termed by different theorists a multiplicity, 
becoming, or difference, for instance. This multiplicity, polyphony, or incommunicable—that 
is, politics—is here a derivative term, before which comes, firstly, complete transmission, the 
perfect correspondence between the transmitted and received message, in other words the self- 
identity of the message. Secondly, before the multiplicity but after complete transmission, 
comes a message that has been exposed to disturbance, being incompletely received, distorted 
and garbled. This second type of communication represents what should be avoided, a kind of 
failure, against which the self-identity, truthfulness, and authenticity of the message is mirrored 
and determined. Thus, the enemy proper, in this scheme, is the noise, which corresponds to 
what is unpredictable, indeterminable, undeddable, and which hides behind every meaningful 
message as a threatening and chaotic principle. It is this very noise (politics) against which 
information theory deployed its strongest weapons and defenses. At root, information theory 
was a battle against noise, on the basis of which it received its identity and meaning. It made a 
cause out of defending order, anticipation, and clarity against ambiguity and unpredictability.
Yet one of Shannon’s fundamental ideas was precisely that noise is not external to 
communication, but is rather always inherent in it. It was his aim to calculate the values that 
would show how information could be best preserved during its dispatch from sender to 
receiver. If information was garbled because of noise, one should either amplify or repair the 
flow of bits. Noise, then, was an integral part of the communication process, and information 
theory a tool to preserve and defend communication from itself; that is, from the disintegrating 
tendencies intrinsic to it. By thus separating communication from its noise, mathematics 
enabled communication as communication; in other word, as meaningful interaction through 
sensible messages. The “other” of communication in information theory, therefore, was 
nothing other than its limit as communication.
Given this, it would be too simplifying to assert that if in Taylorism the most efficient mode of 
action established the standard for expending time and removed the possibility of exercising
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one’s discretion over work, then, in the same way, Shannon excluded the noise from the 
communication system. This is because just as rest is a precondition of work and cannot be 
regarded as independent of the activity involved, noise is a precondition of communication. 
Similarly all the individual and disordered constituents that were the focus of attempts at 
systematization and uniformity proved resources necessary to the system’s functionality.
The major problem of communication, however, remained the fact that messages can be garbled 
or distorted in transmission. In the final analysis, the idea of a pure mediation or complete, 
faultless transmission is nothing other than the Enlightenment’s conception of a world entirely 
permeated and illuminated by truth. Yet, as shown above, because it was understood that 
distortion could not be totally eliminated from communication, the issue become more 
complicated. Insofar as this distortion was caused by human activity, and not just by “nature 
itself,” it belonged to the realm of power, or that of politics. An indisputable mechanism was to 
exclude the effects of multiplicity on action, in the form of law. “[Law] is the process of 
adjusting the ‘couplings,’” stated Wiener, “connecting the behavior of different individuals in 
such a way that what we call justice may be accomplished, and disputes may be avoided, or at 
least adjudicated.”334 Thus it was law which defined optimal relationships in communication. 
But even it was not insulated from the effects of distortion. What annoyed Wiener was the 
politics, or “game,” as he termed it, inscribed into the practice of law, the fact that the 
conflicting parties seek to jam the messages of the opposing side, as the situation was seen 
from his viewpoint Politics, alongside legal practices, was for him a game that only jammed the 
movement and reception of intrinsically unequivocal messages. If human life, however, is not 
conceivable, in principle, without politics in some form or another, then apparently distortion is 
a necessary part of it. As Wiener and Shannon were provenly aware of this, their project must 
essentially be regarded as an attempt to find a model of equilibrium between action and the 
necessary conditions that are always part of the action itself.
In its attempt to avoid ambiguity and vagueness, the cybernetic project (including information 
theory) was forced to view natural languages as too imprecise to allow the exact values and 
relationships required. The need for technical terminology rather than ordinary usage of words 
and precise syntax rather than natural linguistic grammar resulted in manufactured or artificial 
languages, especially in the mathematical representation system. This should not, however, be 
seen as a reduction or distortion of communication. Formalization did not impose any rule, 
structure, or principle anterior to communication. The measures or values introduced by 
formalization were always immanent to communication. Therefore, it neither established an 
external criterion nor was independent of the phenomena to which it referred. The mathematical
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relationships it produced were communication’s own relationships. Yet, the history of 
communication as an object and means of governance is not bounded by the mathematical 
domain. Shannon’s contribution, seen from this perspective, rather created a whole new 
standard for the study of communication that it was sought to generalize, as Weaver’s original 
step in this direction proves, to human communication while still trying to retain scientific 
rigour. Like many communications experts and theorists before him, Weaver thought of 
communication instinctively within the field of command. If the history of communication is 
fundamentally the history of standardization, administration, and control, then Shannon must 
be seen as the one who first articulated law not as an external rule violently imposed on its 
subject, but as the immanent principle of communication.
By and through Shannon’s work, communication, understood as information, was irrevocably 
connected to the realm of science, and especially to that of mathematics. It is because of the 
immanent logic of communication expressable as mathematical formulas that coding, 
transmitting, and decoding of signal sequences—crucial for designing and understanding self- 
regulating systems—becomes possible.335 Since this connection was made, it has been almost 
impossible for systematic thinking on communication to escape from the sway of this theory. 
Of course, communication as science cannot be said to be attributable to Shannon’s 
contribution alone, for it has its own history of knowledge irreducible to information theory. 
However, Shannon can be regarded to have perfected the project of quantification, or 
rationalization, of communication, the roots of which can be traced back at least to Ward but 
which only got its modem sense through the increasing need for and influence of formal 
analysis. Though the systematic quantification of communication can be said to have its 
inception at least in the requirements imposed by early telegraph systems, it was not until 
mathematical communication theory arrived that communication became a quantitatively 
determinable subject in a scientific sense.
Practices of Autocommunication
From the perspective of signal transmission, a system based on the feedback principle is 
circular, and circles are precisely what determine the conceptual domain of cybernetics. 
Recursive circular processes characterized not only more or less confined systems but also, in 
principle, the social, viewed as a system, which makes this perspective a general world-relation. 
“The social system,” we recall, was, for Wiener, “bound together by a system of 
communication, and -- it has a dynamics in which circular processes of a feedback nature play
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an important part.”336 In a circular information structure like this, action is manifested in terms 
of messages transmitted, processed, and fed back. It is no accident, then, that the dominant 
conception of what communication is has predominantly been message-driven since 
cybernetics and information theory.337
Now, taking cybernetics as a more or less continuous project, the ever-refining model of a 
circle can be regarded as not just a theoretical contribution but also, more fundamentally, as the 
next major break, rupture, or displacement, after the scientific management, in the administrative 
history of communication and by communication. If communication, in scientific management, 
was based on chains, here it is grounded in circles. This theoretical turn is reminiscent of one 
of a more practical nature effected by William Channing in relation to telegraph lines. As 
shown in chapter three, whereas telegraph lines were used to connect different locations distant 
from each other by means of direct lines, Channing, when planning the municipal telegraph 
system of Boston, twisted the lines together into a complex and multi-level circular structure. 
This gesture, although clearly taking place in a different age and context, implies a similar aim 
to that at play in the move from Taylor’s chains to Wiener’s loops. The circular structuration, 
intrinsic to communication systems, is given a more exact theoretical formulation in Wiener, 
and if the explanation and understanding of this structuration were based, in Channing*s 
initiative, mainly but not entirely on practical reasons, in Wiener’s case it was approached 
through an already institutionalized discursive tradition.
The theoretical legacy of cybernetics, taken broadly, was crystallized in the view that central to 
communication is its pattern, generated by its repeatable control, not its specific content This 
idea was manifest in all self-regulating systems in the form of feedback loops. How 
communication is organized according to these loops depends on control systems, which is 
why the main focus was on the theoretical investigation of the mechanics of control. As 
Shannon’s communication model and the term “information” spread and became common, 
communication appeared more and more as a patterned organization in which the mechanisms 
to code and decode—to process—the flows of information came to the fore.
To perceive cybernetics as a study of self-governance under the circumstances of constant 
change required it to be understood within the realm of control. For it was against change, 
unforeseen and uncontrollable transformation, that formal approaches to administrative 
communication and administration of communication, the history of which has been traced 
here, were constructed. Within this line of development, form has always been pitted against 
content, and method against goal. For example, it is evident in the way the Turing test
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distinguished the content of a communication process from its form, thereby laying the 
foundation for the principle that any precisely specified problem can be solved by a 
computer.338 This is to say that, notwithstanding variations and exceptions, empirical changes, 
remain irrelevant with respect to the logic of action. Whereas in the Taylor System this logic 
resided in the formal organization of the functional whole, in cybernetics it was built into the 
behavior of the system itself; yet in both cases, whether a hierarchy or a self-regulatory system, 
a preset norm, albeit of a different nature, differentiated what was acceptable from what was 
unacceptable. In both cases, in addition, the “we” of the action was determined prior to the 
action.
What connects Wiener and Taylor is the fact that they approached their respective systems 
presupposing a certain methodological identity or consistency, whether in the form of 
“negative feedback” or “the one best way,” that gathered chains of action together under one 
principle. The essential ideal for both cybernetics and Taylorism was to design a system that 
would eliminate any need or purpose for negotiations over a course of action. Instead of 
imposing a foreign principle forcefully on a system, they sought the immanent laws inside it 
and tried to incorporate them in a standardized terminology. The measures and relationships, 
although analytical, derived from communication itself. Yet it was not communication as such 
that was of central interest, but rather the mechanisms in communication that would determine 
the limits of communication.
In the case of a hierarchical structure, the line between a system and its outside, or a norm and a 
disorder, or even the field of truth and that of corruption and distortion, was drawn by a 
formally determined set of interrelationships and positions. The decision concerning the 
structure of internal relationships was made prior to, but not independently of, the action 
proper. It maintained unvarying links between its components while excluding all redundant or 
unwanted actions, thereby producing a system with invariant functioning339 Thus, its point of 
view was exterior to communication. In essence, it was an articulation of communication prior 
to its happening, from a perspective insulated from communication. When the principle of self­
regulation made this unchanging system, unable to deal with change, responsive to its 
environment, the concept of change was defined as part of the purview of the system itself. 
Environmental change, or the multiplicity that the system must cope with, does not modify in 
any way in systems based on the feedback principle, the prefixed goal or the internal state 
desired. Rather it is the system, then, that constantly maintains its unity and self-identity against 
the environment Yet the point of view here, in contrast to that of a hierarchy, is interior to 
communication. The articulation of communication takes place in communication, in the course
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of and during realization of the interrelationships between the system and its exterior, by means 
of continuous compensations. This is what is meant by the fact that control mechanisms were 
not seen as uncommunicative with respect to the information they regulate, but rather as having 
themselves communicative nature, as pointed out by Karl Deutsch, following Wiener on 
this.340 Although a distinction has been made between a signal and information, the signal 
being the operation and information the control of a communication system,341 it is clear that, 
coupled with the appropriate theories, technologies, and institutions, both information and 
signals constitute a system in which communication is both its functioning and control of this 
functioning.
Given the fact that systems thinking focused on relationships rather than on objects, these 
relationships appeared to be thoroughly communicative in their nature. If scientific 
management, too, operated from the basis that control of action was communicative, here 
communicativity of control was incorporated into the structure of the action itself as a self- 
correcting principle. Within an information system, communication, through various physical, 
social, and conceptual solutions, set the norms for its own performance. It can be argued that, 
even in the first cybernetic machines, both performance and the rules controlling this 
performance were subject to adjustment in the course of the system’s functioning.342 So in 
cybernetics, communication and its conditions were mutually defined—within certain 
predetermined limits—in the process of communication becoming articulated. It was 
communication and its mechanism, now, that defined what was fundamental, not the rules or 
hierarchies that were supposed to tie an action to a system, although this latter aspect remained 
necessary, in one form or another, to the formal approach to communication. Yet, a change in 
thinking about communication occurred when communication as a continuous, constitutive 
process began to take shape alongside thinking of it merely as a totality fo r  these processes. 
This was made evident by a conceptual shift which took place within the cybernetic project 
away from emphasis on equilibrium and homeostasis and towards the concept of feedback and 
reflexivity.343 Although communication was still thought of in and through a conceptual whole, 
the form of this whole became more porous and reflective in relation to its environment. In 
effect, this introduced a more profound change in the perception of communication.
The systems approach tied communication to a perspective in which it no longer featured in 
terms of mutual relationships between independent subjects but in which these communicative 
relationships created the subject positions involved. Communication was no longer, contrary to 
conventional wording, a bond between distinct subjects. It is true that the status of 
communication in relation to community still tended to be expressed in this way, which
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explains Wiener’s references to communication as the “cement” which binds society’s fabric 
together.344 Here, communication was regarded as a kind of addition—albeit an important 
one—to a pre-existing social whole, the actions of which it then adjusted and bound together. 
While this view was still presented in various forms in the early twentieth century, coincidental 
with the rise of systems thinking if not earlier communication itself became the central focus of 
attention, not because of its relevance as an adjunct to administration of a whole (machine, 
system, community), but because it constituted the whole. Now, as pointed out, these 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive, since it was the dimension of control that unified the 
systems approach to communication. Rather, control now found for itself an immanent basis in 
the intrinsic nature of communication: control became internalized into the self-execution of 
communication itself. This was linked to a general process in the course of which 
communicative wholes were transformed into information systems, not just in the sense that 
information was more important to their functioning than energy, but rather in the sense that 
their functions were none other than the functions of information—the interactive gathering, 
storing, processing, and transmission of information.
This is what allows us to regard this era as the one in which a new way of thinking about 
communication came into being. Here, communication was no longer about interrelationships 
between pre-existing subjects, as had been the case in discourses and practices relating to the 
telegraph and to the early telephone. Neither was it exclusively about the original whole that tied 
the subjects closely to the system, a system that enabled them to be articulated as subjects, as 
had been the case in the age of the telephone and scientific management The new conception, 
though, insofar as it was linked with systems thinking, could not shake off the idea that the 
social was a determinable totality. The social, then, was not thought of as such, but continued to 
be approached as an original whole. Communication was the mechanism which bound all self­
regulating systems and assemblages into wholes made up of interdependent parts. From the 
point of view of cybernetics, insofar as communication is defined primarily as recurrent 
transmission and control of information, then the “self-mechanisms” of a system, in other 
words, the techniques and practices that maintain self-identity, are based on the transmission of 
messages and on their serving as information for other messages, thus directing messages 
round in an endless circle. These self-mechanisms, being completely communicational, 
constitute a system, and are not subsequent additions to i t  The system is because of these 
mechanisms, it “is ” these mechanisms.
This brings us to what is new in the constellation of communication based on systems 
thinking. Although clearly remaining stuck in the perspective of a conceptual whole, because of
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the communicational nature of controls, thought about communication was directed from the 
beginning from the point of view of the “between” that communication is. Communication, 
for the first time in the course of the history of its formalization, was not approached solely 
from the viewpoint of communicating entities but rather through communication itself, not 
through objects but relationships. This became clearer in the “second order cybernetics” in 
which observation and action formed a circular system where no stable ontological basis was 
presupposed. The reference structure of communication had no substantial foundation, 
although the prefix “auto-” became increasingly important After this change in perspective, 
everything remained unchanged but at the same time was quite different.
The cybernetic system was essentially a model of equilibrium, as it represented a mechanism 
that enabled a dynamic system to be in harmony with its environment while continuously 
adjusting itself to the changes. Although remaining within the realm of closed systems, it 
positioned the mechanisms of enclosure and exclusion as immanent to the operation of 
communication. This makes cybernetics and information theory stand out, within the 
administrative history of communication and the history of its administration, as the 
culmination and final major self-articulation of this loose tradition before its gradual downfall. 
There are two related reasons for the latter. First, as control became immanent to 
communication, interest in studies concerning how control was manifested gained increasing 
grounding in theoretical discourses on communication, undermining the significance of a 
general theory of control. And secondly, a general theory of the cybernetic type could no
longer provide a satisfactory framework for thinking about communication, because
communication started to be thought of without a constituting whole. This is what gave 
communication, seen as action, an independent existence, as it were.345
Yet the model of cybernetics, it should be kept in mind, was not that of a perfect system in a 
mechanical sense. Whereas for a rigid hierarchy changes represented a potential menace, for a 
feedback-based system they were essential. Thus, the system was based on importing 
differences, not on their exclusion as was in the case of hierarchical structures. Consequently, 
not only does the intrinsic mechanism draw a distinction, following a distinct logic, between the 
system and its exteriority, thus creating a difference, it also creates the changes as difference.
Environmental variations, then, are constructed as a difference, as a source or origin of
differences, without which the system could not be functional. For this reason, the mechanism 
of equilibrium can be said to have given an impetus to the development in which the noise and 
multiplicity are no longer vieved as interference to the system but instead as a necessity.
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It is not incorrect, however, to argue that what has been at stake in the technical history of 
communication, seen from the viewpoint taken here, has been formalization of 
interrelationships between the system and its outside. During this history, these relationships 
have been defined and organized on the basis of a method intrinsic to, and thus characteristic 
of, the system. The method is thus what draws a demarcation line within a set of practices 
between those that are conducive to a given goal and those that are not, between what is needed 
and what is not or poses a risk; in other words still, between communication and noise. It 
simultaneously gathers in a new way the actions already there and excludes the rest. It 
separates a friend from a foe, and the same from the other.
This allows us to view cybernetics and information theory as interlinked efforts to formulate a 
theoretical foundation for the process of self-organization, understood as a general principle of 
communication. In this respect, it follows previous attempts to propose the telephone system as 
the model of governance for a continuously changing system.346 An issue here is the old theme 
of rational self-maintenance of a community under constant change, that is, a conscious self- 
governance in which the means of control are exposed to a process of incessant reorganization. 
The structure of communication, as it were, was here the entity that controlled its own 
operation.
This became an explicit subject for research in the next wave of the cybernetic program. It can 
be identified with Heinz von Foerster’s “second order cybernetics,” according to which 
people construct their models out of the systems they work upon all the time. From then on 
began a broader application of cybernetics and systems thinking to a number of distinct fields, 
including psychology and the study of social systems. This second wave reached its mature 
phase with Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s Autopoiesis and Cognition, which 
articulated the view that organisms, in addition to being self-organizing and self-regulating, are 
also autopoietic, or self-making.347 The technocratic dimensions of cybernetics, particularly in 
the form of the pursuit of unidirectional control, were called into question. At the same time, 
observation and action constituted a circular system without any fixed ontological 
foundation.348 Effectively, there was a change in focus from causality to autonomy and from 
action and reaction to interaction.349 Of course, it can be pointed out with good reason that the 
profound change in the theory of knowledge that seemed to occur here was already implicit in 
Shannon’s information theory, if not earlier.350 This is because noise viewed as what was 
external to the system, in his theory, was not, in fact, a quality belonging to the world itself. The 
receiver is not capable of distinguishing between noise and the signal, in Shannon’s view, 
independently of the theory. On the contrary, it is on the basis of the theory alone that the
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distinction can be made; the theory determines what is the signal and what is noise, as well as 
their mutual relationships, within a particular communication channel. This theoretical shift, in 
which communication was not regarded any longer as independent of its context (theoretical 
and/or physical) became the explicit starting point for second order cyberneticians, from whom 
it received a detailed theoretical treatment
5.2. The Rise of Information Systems
After the war, a close tie was forged between communication and politics, in the light of which 
communication became, or rather continued to be although in a different way, a political 
question, and politics became articulated more and more in terms of communication. This 
manifested itself in different forms and contexts. On the institutional level, the relationship 
appeared, perhaps in its most visible form, as one between science and government The study 
of communication, that is, the diverse disciplines from communication engineering to computer 
science as well as from psychology to linguistics, were all harnessed to serve national interests 
during World War II, and retained the close connection after the war.351 But the relationship 
between politics and communication in the post-war period also manifested itself in terms of 
the politics of administration as a general sphere of action. The theories formulated by Wiener 
and Shannon constituted a unifying conceptual terrain within which questions of control, 
whether as practices of business management or national discourses on political governance, 
could be posed in terms of communication. As in the case of Taylorism, the new approach was 
embraced in distinct projects and systems, although now their scope had grown in size and 
complexity. And as in Taylorism, what was significant in these projects was not their 
specificity but, on the contrary, their becoming part of a common perspective in which a 
number of other projects were planned, compared, and accomplished. Communication, in the 
form of new technologies, theories, and practices, became a key field of systematic 
development during the Cold War era.
Although certainly varying in their particular aims and methods, different projects, from local to 
nationwide in scope, reflected models that were essentially the same in their inherent 
characteristics. It was a model based on the deep-rooted metaphor of the nervous system which 
had remained recognizable while undergoing reinterpretation by cybernetic theorists. Thus the 
elaborated nervous system constituted, in the last analysis, the form in which different political 
interests, technical arrangements, and theoretical discourses germane to a given project were
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thought of and, taken together, articulated as a consistent whole. If it is true that the nervous 
system was precisely what allowed communication to be thought about in its essence, it was no 
doubt also the whole within which various social questions and technological imperatives of the 
post-war period were met, expressed in terms of a self-corrective and autonomous 
communicative pattern.
The discourse on generalized control found expression in and through diverse systems being 
developed throughout the country, but at the same time, construction of these systems was 
propelled to a great extent by this vision of control. With large-scale computerization and the 
formation of specific fields and techniques out of and alongside the theoretical foundation laid 
down by Wiener and Shannon, the perspective of technological control acquired a political 
meaningfulness that seemed able to overcome the previous difficulties linked with Taylorism. 
The computer, as a “tool for managing the mass society,” 352 coupled with new mathematical 
instruments, became a new social icon because it could keep up with the increasing number and 
pace of processes resulting from technological development Now, the cybernetic technology 
of governance that established an immanent mechanism between communication and control 
seemed to be applicable, for the first time, to managerial problems in general, not only to those 
in some limited expert systems, provided that they were operationalizable in principle.
This depended on the possibility of completing the project of mathematization of the social in 
its essential characteristics, as it were. Attempts to find mathematical laws governing 
communication, following and extending the program initiated by Wiener and Shannon, found 
expression in a number of system scientific disciplines and discursive practices. The general 
objective, based on communication theory, was to “produce a predictive theory of humans and 
machines in group activity, and in certain industrial situations.”353 The system theoretical 
ideals lost the position they had held, however, when the “human” component started to 
assume an increasingly important role in the planning of computer systems during the 1970s. 
At this time, hierarchical systems began to be replaced by more flexible networks based on 
personal computers.
During the era of formal automated systems society certainly did not change into an automatic 
machine based on formal rules, but the idea of this kind of machine shaped social thinking. 
This applies to all the concepts of communication dealt with throughout the technocratic 
history of communication. Our concern has not been to study how different forms of 
organization developed or to identify their mutual effective relationships. Moreover, we have 
not undertaken the task to show the specific routes and mechanisms through which the distinct
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concepts were generalized and spread throughout the society; it is doubtful if that is feasible at 
all. In other words, we have not analyzed the forms through which administrative relationships 
have been generalized and turned into immanent communicative relationships. Instead, what we 
have done here is to examine the discursive forms (metaphors, theories, models) inherently 
related to the development of modem communication systems. These discourses have been 
considered as part of the historical line along which communication has been taken as an object 
and means of administration and along with different relationships have been forged with the 
limits of communication. This does not mean, however, that we have been operating solely 
within the discursive sphere either. Certainly, these discursive practices and forms of 
knowledge do have concrete effects on the social, in its administrative, technological, scientific, 
and commercial aspects for example. The underlying idea here, however, has been that the 
social in its different aspects is indistinguishable from communication. This is why the 
processes of development have been approached as assemblages consisting of certain 
discursive forms, institutional frameworks, subject positions, national politics, cultural beliefs 
and habits, physical structures, and organizatory methods, all of which get their identities as 
part of the interrelationships, and especially the ethos, that give coherence to the given 
constellation.
In what follows, we will address the practices of automation, that is, the theoretical discourses, 
institutional routines, and technical systems that allowed the social to be conceived, in principle, 
as a self-regulating system with management of its key sectors and problem-areas to be 
automated one at a time. After this, we will look at the way the communicative constellation 
changed and the new form of communication this gave rise to. Let us start, however, from the 
local and national information and communications systems that allowed contemporaries to 
cherish the idea of the birth of a rational and predictable social environment within the 
framework of a nervous system.
Constructing Information Systems
The language of cybernetics gained popularity as the new communication and computer 
technologies became common.354 It was through this language that computer power was 
combined with the politics of management, thus emphasizing the appeal of the cybernetic 
perspective. For Wiener it was evident all the time that “the importance of information and 
communication as mechanisms of organization proceeds beyond the individual into the 
community.”355 Yet he was reluctant to generalize the methods of cybernetics to the social as
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such, as many social processes seemed to remain beyond the scope of operationalization. 
Though Wiener admitted that it was possible to formulate a mathematical description for only a 
part of all social and communicational processes, this did not conceal the fact that for him such 
a description was the ideal form through which they could be analyzed scientifically. If the 
social was not mathematizable in itself, the conceptual clarification of its formal properties as 
well as the uncovering of its logical relationships was in any case the way to scientific 
understanding of society.356 Although Wiener did not believe in the operationalizability of 
social sciences, he certainly would have wished it to be possible. For only if this had been the 
case, would the social sciences and historiology have achieved, in his eyes, the standards of 
objectivity required for a proper science. Until that moment, according to Wiener, “there is 
much which we must leave, whether we like it or not, to the un-’scientific,’ narrative method of 
the professional historian.”357 Regardless of some of his reservations, he thought, at the end of 
the day, that cybernetic principles were more applicable in social sciences the more they 
assumed quantitative methods.358
Now, if Wiener showed clear inclination for thinking about society in terms of cybernetics but 
refrained from applying this in practice, it was his followers who undertook the task of 
incessantly and assiduously testing out the applicability of cybernetics to social problems, 
especially as seen from the point of view of management While doing so, they worked out 
reinterpreted, and tested the flexibility and explanatory capacity of the cybernetic program with 
regard to the most interesting object that had been left out of the scope of the founders’ 
formulations, that is, to the whole social system in itself. In the late 1960s, cybernetics and the 
sciences influenced by it almost invariably included social organizations as a relevant 
subject.359 This is why we have to turn to these individual organizations and projects as links 
or points of oscillation between specific interests, practices, and problems, on the one hand, and 
the instances of realization and development of what was a general conceptual perspective of 
governance.
The Cold War era was marked by the design and implementation of ever more complex 
national information systems, especially in the automation of air defense. In his study on the 
speech about and the construction of national defense systems during the Cold war era, Paul 
Edwards showed the way in which the history of the computing machine was linked with the 
defense needs of the United States through the concepts and discursive practices of 
cybernetics, artificial intelligence, and cognitive psychology.360 In all these fields a central aim 
was to outline the feasibility of constructing a system in which all circumstances of a given area 
of life, in this case the concern over a nuclear attack, would be taken into account and
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programmed as possible variables enabling the system to respond automatically and largely 
independendy of human interference. In this way, discourses and related practices maintained 
the idea of a kind of transparent and self-reflective world wherein all the major characteristics 
of potential states of affairs and their mutual relationships were prearranged so that the system 
would be able to retain automatic control and dependable functioning.
The first large-scale, computerized command, control, and communications system, SAGE 
(Semi-Automatic Ground Environment), which became fully operational in 1961, divided the 
United States into eight distinct sectors, each controlled by a real-time information processing 
combat center. Not unlike the models based on functional similarities with formal neuron 
structures, it formed a huge integrated whole with simultaneous information flows on many 
hierarchical levels organized into one logical structure. Its two main functions were to gather 
information and to direct defense. Radar systems would detect all aircraft and feed their 
positions over telephone lines to be received, processed, and evaluated by the combat centers 
responsible for generating an overall view of the situation at hand. The direction centers, for 
their part, each connected to a radar installation, would produce surveillance information to 
assign and direct the defense systems.361 The important point here is that SAGE provided not 
only a technical basis for the development of militaiy systems, but also a discursive 
environment for speech about such systems, reinforcing the need to create a centralized defense 
arrangement In this way, computer technology and the related discourses that represented the 
world as a logically closed system were mutually articulated in an inherent relationship with 
each other in which each shaped the development of the other. It was SAGE that laid a 
foundation for all future military as well as industrial computer projects working toward 
centrally coordinated, real-time systems.362 Most notable among them, whether operational or 
only as prototypes in the late 1960s, were the American Stock Exchange’s computerized 
quotation service, Amquote, the American Airline’s automated reservation system, SABRE, and 
the American Bankers Association’s still unnamed real-time system.363 For all these systems, 
the overall aim and method of managing all the processes would be essentially the same, 
involving the need to keep up with constant change by means of an integrated computer 
system.
It is understandable, against this background, that the operational position of centrally directed 
communication systems grew in importance with the increase in power of electronic digital 
computers. Even though he himself was careful not to directly support centralization of 
power364 Wiener was still inclined to think about the benefits of a centrally controlled social 
system. At any rate, not only the increasing presence of systems based on computers,365 but
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also the presupposition, central to Wiener’s thinking, of the role of a control mechanism to 
maintain the stability of the system, influenced in the shaping of the frame of analysis in which 
discourses relating to and inspired by cybernetic research came to be expressed in ever more 
unambiguous formulations. Thus, for instance, in the early 1950s, Kenneth Boulding, 
Professor of economics at the University of Michigan, stated that the “the barest essentials of 
any organization — is a control mechanism consisting of a system of communication and 
transformation.”366 His views can be seen as an expression of how in cybernetics a system 
predicated on the organismic analogy was formulated into a principle of an automatically 
functioning whole. A communication system, according to Boulding, consisted, firstly, of 
receptors o f information (thermometers, sense organs, or salesmen were the examples given) 
which collected information about the environment and transmitted it over a communications 
system  (nerves, speech, letters) to an executive (furnace control, central nervous system, 
manager) whose business it was to take the received information and to transform it into 
instructions, which were finally communicated to effectors (furnaces, muscles, workmen) 
which, following the instructions, adapted their behavior to the environment or even changed 
i t367 Here, communication as an automatic system was generalized into a generic model, 
linked up with basically the same biological concepts as were operational from the early 
telecommunication systems on.
Clearly, SAGE was a perfect manifestation of this functional structure. It embodied elements 
from two direction: first from the ideas that were inherited from the old biomechanical 
metaphors, and secondly from those that were elaborated within cybernetics and information 
theory, leading to the systems sciences. These sources, of course, were not independent of each 
other, as we have tried to show in this study. On the contrary, the nervous system was exactly 
what the latter theoretical tradition aimed at formalizing, interpreting it as a mechanical 
principle. Yet both the use of biological metaphors and the tradition based on the contributions 
by Wiener and Shannon do have distinct historical origins, albeit sharing, at the same time, also 
many points of contact Now, in SAGE these ingredients seemed to have been given a solid 
physical manifestation. It was not an existing structure, the nature of which the ideas relating to 
biological metaphors and theories based on them would then attempt to explain. Quite the 
reverse, it was a purpose built defense system that was predicated on this very discursive 
tradition.
SAGE defined the functions a national computer system would need. Macbride identified 
those as follows: “a set of ‘sensors,’ or remote terminals, located wherever information from 
local sources is fed into the system,” “a central ‘exchange,’ where information from local
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sources is assembled, sorted, and stored and dispatched to those who need to use it,” “a 
central ‘control unit’ which generates programs and specifications for the use of information,” 
and “a set of ‘outlets’—again, remote terminals—located throughout the country and 
particularly throughout Government departments, to which orders, instructions, and commands 
are dispatched.”368 In a sense, then, SAGE was the first uniform nationwide realization of the 
ideas being developed in the discursive fields that aimed to find and codify the principles of 
automated communication systems. It was, in other words, the automated nervous system of 
the nation.
It was during this period that the most grandiose schemes for rationally managing diverse sets 
of transactions and processes by using real-time computer systems were proposed, 
constructed, and put into use. If computer systems resembled telephone systems in that both 
allowed multiple access, the former also made a break with the latter. Whereas the telephone 
system only enabled connections to be made, the computer system monitored the content of 
each message.369 This was something different from the telephone’s linear way of operation. 
Now information generated at many different sources could be fed, processed, and used as a 
basis for subsequent, perhaps completely automated, messages to be sent to remotely located 
devices. What is more, not only could a potentially immense system be controlled by computer, 
it could also control itself within certain pregiven limits. Computers, then, helped control 
become internalized into the system itself by directing message traffic throughout the system 
and by generating new instructions out of the data processed: it was the system’s instrument of 
self-governance. The biomechanical theme thus assumed a new, computerized identity. As 
Gerard Piel, publisher of the Scientific American put it in the 1960s:
“The new development in our technology is the replacement of the human nervous system 
by automatic controls and by the computer that ultimately integrates the functions of the 
automatic control units at each point in the production process. The human muscle began 
to be disengaged from the productive process at least a hundred years ago. Now the 
human nervous system is being disengaged”370
The theme of an automated system of governance and control presented in the framework of a 
nervous system was mainly articulated in three distinct yet interconnected discourses. Let us 
now take a brief look at each of these fields. The first of deals with “automation” and methods 
of refining a self-correcting principle, applicable to management of the social; the second is the 
vision of a national scheme emerging out of the grid of local systems; and the third is a
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perspective characterized by the end of ideology, thanks to the comprehensive national system 
with its political methods of self-regulation.
1) “Automation” was one of the most influential features that marked social development until 
the 1960s, when it became known as “technological change.”371 Automation constituted the 
prevailing conceptual framework through which technology appeared as a political question. 
The notion, coined in 1947 by Del S. Harder of the Ford Motor Company and brought to 
broader public attention by John Diebold in 1952,372 provided a way to conceptualize what was 
characteristic of a time enthused with concepts such as computers and control. It signified the 
substitution of mere mechanization by something qualitatively different, that is, by a process 
with self-regulatory characteristics.
The first public statement of the problems posed by automation and the computer revolution, 
entitled “The Triple Revolution—An Appraisal of the Major U.S. Crises and Proposals for 
Action,” was published in 1964.373 It spoke fervently in favor of managing the economic 
destiny of the nation, especially in connection with the immense power of the “developing 
cybernated system.”374 Within the same year, President Johnson established the National 
Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, which issued its first report 
in 1966. It was through these and similar accounts that, at the level of national politics, the 
concept started to take shape of computers, while being one of the most important single 
sources for sociotechnical change in “the age of automation,” being also a means of 
controlling the consequences of this change and the attendant instability. That is, computers as 
a means to control their own effects.375 This view had already been introduced, though not 
elaborated further, in the proceedings of the National Advanced-Technology Management 
Conference held in 1962, in which the issue was presented in terms of communication. So, 
whereas “— in spite of improvements in communication media -- managers of government and 
industrial organizations find communication an increasing problem —,” on the one hand, 
“technical breakthroughs in data processing equipment have provided an opportunity for 
development of integrated systems of information flow,” on the other.376 Thus, once 
information systems had become common, the computer assumed the same strategic role as the 
telephone earlier, as both the cause and the cure for increasing instability. Yet as a result of 
experience gained from the telephone, attempts were made to use the computers to harmonize 
its own adverse consequences far more purposefully than was the case with the earlier system. 
By appearing to be the major socioeconomic control devices, computers seemed to form the 
“essential stepping stones to the Great Society.”377
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The issue was considered mainly in terms of the effects of automation on manpower, which 
constituted generally the framework within which the computer was treated as a national 
question at that time. One of the first statements that articulated this view was in the final report 
of the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, formulated as a question: “Can 
the very devices which are playing an important role in present changes in manpower 
requirements contribute to the solution of manpower problems by adding to the accessibility 
and analysis of manpower data?”378 The question was motivated by a concrete proposal for an 
“early-warning employment-prediction system,” a computerized nationwide service for 
matching people to jobs. This Great Society project was included in the Automation 
Commission’s report, mentioned above, where it was depicted as a complex, hierarchical 
system to coordinate manpower allocation: “With local centers feeding into regional centers 
information relevant at that level, and these in turn feeding into a nationwide job and manpower 
bank, the service could provide detailed information on the manpower requirements of job 
vacancies and the personal characteristics of job seekers.”379 There was no need, however, to 
limit this or subsequently proposed systems to considerations of employment alone, the 
underlying idea being that a set of interconnected systems would ideally cover most aspects of 
society. These systems, with similar systems already in use in industry, would move society a 
step closer to a truly self-governing social whole in line with cybernetic machines based on the 
feedback principle. The “early-warning employment-prediction system” was clearly planned 
to be the first civilian SAGE, aimed at automating the self-governance of a crucial sector of the 
social, in which problems would be solved by unequivocal and formal techniques, not by 
politics.
This embodied and made concrete the idea of how “computer-caused problems are met with 
computer-based solutions,” as Macbride put it in 1967.380 Computer technology facilitated 
new quantitative approaches and planning schemes for forecasting and coordinating societal 
processes: mathematical models of these processes began to be used at the federal level along 
with new computer and management information systems and the contribution of physical and 
social scientists who had been integrated into American public policy381 The ultimate vision 
was of a social structure that could maintain and control itself, to a point, with the help of 
computers. By their availability, so it was thought, it would be possible “to spot trends long 
before they would otherwise be visible, to carry out the necessary discussion and to develop 
policies before the need for action develops.”382 This was not a depiction of a state to be 
reached sometime in the future but of a mechanism which, practically speaking, was already 
there; it was only the manner of proceeding that was open to discussion. All the necessary 
technical devices for social self-regulation were already in place, it was believed, and now it was
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only a question of how they would be connected together and assembled into a whole. The 
local systems already developed constituted the crucial precondition for this structure.
2) The evolution of local government computer systems was, after its initial disorganized phase, 
rapid and comprehensive. One of the early governmental systems was the New York Police 
Department’s “CORRAL,” which went into operation in 1965. It was a computer surveillance 
and detection system aimed at identifying traffic offenders and stolen cars on the streets. Once 
the computer recognized the license number that was fed into it by a police team stationed on a 
busy highway as one of a “wanted” vehicle, it reported the match back to the team who, then, 
sent the information to a second police team further up the road, which stopped the vehicle. 
This was a starting point for the planning of a “total system,” in which the computer would 
not be just an operational tool but rather become a means for integrating the functions of the 
whole New York City Police Department, according to Captain Adam D ’Alessandro of the 
Planning Board of that Department383 Yet even this “total system” marked only the 
beginning of a remarkably large-scale project wherein all local information systems would 
merge into each other and form an immense network for the Federal Government Although 
out of step with political tradition, this future loomed in the distance as the way to the Great 
Society. As it seemed in the late 1960s, “the future utilization of a vast centralized computer 
system encompassing in some respects virtually all of the ferment of the local government 
systems, and, to a lesser extent, most big commercial systems, is as probable as the use of its 
decentralized alternative.”384
What would best serve as a model for this national computer system? Although SAGE 
naturally set die pattern for future real-time systems, it seemed to be too purpose built to suit as 
a model for a system with a necessarily more unconnected and heterogeneous structure. This is 
because the national system would be assembled out of existing arrangements and in response 
to a more complex situation, whereas SAGE had been built as an individual project in response 
to a well-determined task. At this point, the Bell Telephone System was revived as a paradigm 
again.385 What was of interest here was how a balance was achieved between the functions of 
existing individual companies and the management of the network which integrated these units 
into a whole. In the Bell System, the innumerable subsidiaries throughout the countiy operated 
with considerable autonomy, while the AT&T, as the owner of the companies, took care of 
technical aspects and ensured compatibility between all these subsystems.386 This solution 
seemed to point the way for the emerging national system, too.
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It became evident in the 1960s that computer systems were not limited to a few specialized 
applications, but were bound to permeate every part of society. The line of development from a 
computer solution for a specific problem to a whole range of practices, discourses, and 
institutions enabled by a computer implied the establishment of a new framework for thought 
and action in the midst of the communicative relationships largely based on linear telephonic 
assemblages. The computer, thus, like the telegraph and the telephone previously, was not only 
an auxiliary device but rather a precondition for modem society and for the communicative 
practices characteristic of it. It was recognized that one had to acknowledge the reality and 
constitutive power of the computer, especially in the form of large-scale digital computer 
systems, and “the inevitability of their evolving into a unified national system affecting every 
important socioeconomic area of our lives.”387 In the computer’s everyday use, then, a 
relationship to the ontology of communication opened up: out of the basically mundane and 
repetitive routines of gathering, storing, classifying, and comparing information evolved a 
network of ideas and practices that was seen to be essential to society. It was within this 
framework that the growth and expansion of computerized relationships and processes could 
be seen as part of an integrated system. But, on the other hand, the spread of computerization 
formed the meaning-content of the integrative perspective; it could not be distinguished from it 
because it constituted exactly what this general system “w as.” This framework, furthermore, 
did not originate in the technological sphere alone, as if consisting only of rapid 
computerization and automation, seen as a process that reduces to specific devices and 
machinery. Rather, it was the result of a mutual articulation of technological systems and 
discursive practices. This led to a concept of politics as traditionally understood coming to an 
end.
3) Within the later cybernetic tradition, the “political sphere” as such seemed to be amenable 
to systematization and formalization. Every social and political institution was given a specific 
function in line with concepts based on mechanical models of the nervous system. Thus,
“a constitution is a program defining the nature (activities) and interrelations of the formal 
loci of political power. The outputs of the political system are enforceable laws defining 
the interrelations of persons and groups within the society. Demands on the political 
system are communicated by petition, by representatives of organized groups, by 
publicists, and other means including elections. Legislative decisions are made in the form 
of laws and resolutions. The executive puts the laws into effect and the judiciary serves a 
control function by comparing specific individual actions with the law that programs such 
action.”388
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With the political sphere being only one area of the social amenable to systerilization, politics 
appeared to be a mechanism with a particular role for receptors, controls, and effectors, inputs 
and outputs. What is noteworthy is that relationships in the realm of politics are realized here 
entirely on a formal basis. In other words, all relationships within this domain are 
predetermined in their functional characteristics, with no room for other relationships. 
Basically, then, it is a closed system in which, if the desired state can be agreed on (which is, of 
course, the endless task of politics), would maintain this state by comparing information about 
the overall behavior to the given norms and by making any corrections necessary. What is 
more, the whole process would be carried out without disputes or negotiations, thanks to 
technological rationality.
The belief that mathematics could separate administration from politics became a hallmark of 
the “end of ideology” in the late fifties.389 Political decisions were evaluated in terms of 
efficacy, with the scientific approach setting the standards for success. The underlying 
presupposition, no doubt, derived from the vision of a perfect self-enclosed machine. Within a 
total system of this sort, overall performance could be stabilized in spite of outside 
disturbances. Here, the influence of these disturbances, constituting a potential risk to the 
functioning of the system as a single determined whole with a distinct identity, has been 
actively neutralized by the feedback principle, which maintains fixed order in changing 
circumstances. In a nontrivial sense, this has been the aim of numerous influential attempts at 
social planning and system engineering since Taylorism at least. Throughout history, projects 
to develop a perfect social design, predicated on a presumed set of invariant principles that, “if 
represented in community rules, would create a self-regulating social life, free of conflict and 
change,” (namely politics), have occurred.390 Especially during what has come to be called 
modernity, these projects, accompanied by and articulated in connection with a scientific 
authority, have assumed an immense role and brought about profound effects on how the 
social has been thought of.
This is perhaps the culmination of the history of communication as an object and means of 
governance, as the explicit undoing of politics, in the sense of seeking principles of control that 
would not admit several interpretations, turns here to politics itself as an institution. Despite the 
original reservations concerning the applicability of cybernetics to social problems, this view 
already figured strongly in Wiener’s writings and highlighted society as such as the focus of 
thought. Wiener considered cybernetics precisely as a general social theoiy, not as a 
specialized discipline: the concepts of communication and control revealed the common 
principles which can be found in humans, machines, and whole communities, too. They laid the
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foundation for the universalization of the message, that is, of information content separable 
from the communicative context. In this sense, cybernetics provided a general and integrated 
theoretical framework for thinking not only about communication, but also of community in 
itself. Here it followed the discourses that aimed to conceptualize the history of modem 
communication systems into general formulations and models, which are always at the same 
time comments on society itself and its conditions. Although extremely complex in comparison 
to what Taylor could have imagined, communication as a pattern continued to be thought of in 
terms of not only a structure but also a perfectly rational one that, so it seemed, brought politics 
to an end. Not until about twenty years later was a discursive genre established that emphasized 
that communication engenders relationships and processes that defy rationalization, and 
moreover, that communication, by its nature, is not something that can be thought of or 
captured as a whole.
The idea of society as a closed circuit found cogent expression in Wiener, who considered 
society essentially as a communication system. He held that “society can only be understood 
through a study of the messages and the communication facilities which belong to it — The 
stance that communications are the integrating element of society, the cement which binds its 
fabric together, 391 was repeated in various works influenced by Wiener’s ideas. If 
communication was the cement that made organizations and societies, as Wiener put it, and if it 
was inherently unequivocal, which was what the cyberneticians had to presuppose in order to 
pursue the laws of communication, it could in principle be codified into a consistent set of 
rules, which was exactly what the cybernetic project produced as its theoretical legacy and what 
bound this project to the tradition followed in this study. Thus, according to Karl Deutsch for 
example, these rules, although far more complicated in social communication than in machine 
communication nevertheless conformed to the same grammar.392 Society, in this project, 
became a machine, and in contrast to the machine analogies in Taylorism, was capable of 
continuous self-correction. In this sense, it was more an information system than a machine 
proper.
Communication, here, was considered in the light of a functionally consistent system. This 
system, which could be defined as “an organized collection of interrelated elements 
characterized by a boundary and functional unity,”393 was not characterized by continuous 
questioning of its conditions of existence and purpose but, on the contrary, by its 
“essenceness,” the immutable principle organizing its way of existence being taken for 
granted. It was encapsulated in the concept of negative feedback, which was exactly what made 
possible erection of the theoretical frame of analysis within which communication became an
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action susceptible to automation. Thus, communication appeared to be an action implementing 
in a reflex-like manner the functional unity of a system and receiving its meaningfulness from 
its pregiven purposes. In this respect, communication in cybernetics assumed its strongest 
system theoretical expression in the set of articulations in which thinking about communication 
was linked to the concept of a system and in which its functioning was conceived through the 
category of law. For communication became substantially a mechanism for maintaining the 
system’s state of equilibrium. That mechanism was ideally completely automatic in a self­
enclosed way, an effect of the predetermined purpose of a system; communication did not have 
a part of its own in the formulation of the purpose, only in its implementation. Communication 
appeared in this line of thought as a control function, and the servomechanism was its most 
telling mechanical exemplar.
Managing Decision-Making
In the course of the development through which computer systems came to form a general 
framework for communication and control, certain discourses emerged centering around these 
systems as managerial tools. These discourses sprang also from changes which occurred in 
business organization and in the environment in which businesses operated. As organizations 
grew in size and complexity, resource coordination and allocation had to be rethought because 
the Taylorian solution based on “diagrams and maps” would no longer be adequate. More 
detailed and timely information was needed in order for management to keep up with 
complicated and rapid organizational processes.394 As a result, the systems approach was 
widely introduced into managerial practices after the war as a response to the shortcomings of 
Taylorism, especially as the systems way of thinking met the needs and aims of technocratic 
managers and social planners. The reason for the rapid spread of the systems approach resided 
in its potential, as seen by the enthusiasts, to govern complex sociotechnical systems, the 
functioning of which could be controlled and monitored through computers.395 In what 
follows, we will not provide a systematic account of the initiation of discourses resulting in the 
establishment of disciplines such as management science and information systems. Rather, we 
will show the general line of development along which ideas based on cybernetics and 
information theory were instituted in the managerial practices, systems, and discourses, in the 
framework of what came to be called “management-by-computer.”396
Systems sciences, operations research being the foremost of these, created a conceptual basis 
for the thinking and functioning of organizational strategy in terms of rational, formal models.
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Operating with a set of standardized tools, they created a language of their own that linked 
numerous institutions, technical arrangements, and discursive practices with the shared 
objective of quantitative problem management. Faith in apolitical and unequivocal system of 
governance by mathematical means not only made systems theorists part of the tradition of 
administration of and by communication, but also marked its end because these means 
internalized control as part of action.397 Control was now an immanent quality of the self- 
performance of communication. As the ideal of mechanical governance increasingly lost favor 
in the 1970s, the idea of control being immanent to communication remained, albeit in different 
forms.
Operations research formulated an academic language to translate problems to be tackled into 
technical issues in line with the formalized world of the discourse that centered on the idea of 
an automated control system. In 1951, Philip Morse and George Kimball synthesized methods 
used during the war so that they could be applied to business problems.398 Their work laid the 
ground, along with the first textbook by C. West Churchman, Russell L. Ackoff, and E. 
Leonard Amoff399 for the institutionalization of a new theoretical line of thought which 
converted militaiy techniques into standardized ones for civilian use. It aimed at formulating a 
“scientific basis for solving problems,” replacing mere “experience,” “intuition,” “opinion, 
vague generalities, or lore.”400 Thus, the “other” of scientific problem solving technique was 
not unlike that of the Taylor System. Indeed, what projects that sought to formalize managerial 
methods all shared was the attempt to substitute inefficiency and disputes originating from 
subjective beliefs and inherited habits with a standardized, systematic approach based on 
“scientific” procedures. For this reason it has been argued that no meaningful line of 
demarcation can be drawn between operations research and scientific management or between 
scientific management and management science 401 Common to all was a persistent search for 
quantification and systems in management402
Some differences, however, can be identified. Whereas the Taylorists saw a system as 
composed of isolated operations and chains of operations, operations researchers viewed it in 
terms of interrelated mathematical quantities and relationships. The systems metaphors that 
permeated operations research were appropriated from information theory and cybernetics, in 
which systems were fundamentally communication systems and communication information 
expressible in mathematical form. Moreover, the system, which for the Taylorists consisted 
mainly of the accomplishment of a set of tasks, appeared to operations researchers rather as a 
way to solve problems403 In short, then, although operations research was a response to 
similar problems to those in Taylorism, it implied an altered concept of a system. Now, the
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system was viewed as 1) a thoroughly interconnected pattern which 2) consisted of 
mathematical relationships, and 3) concerned problem solving. While retaining the whole as 
consistent, and thus maintaining connections to the historical figures of speech relating to 
communication systems, it differed not only from the Taylor System but also from the system 
of cybernetics in a crucial way. In cybernetics, the system, although equally mathematical in its 
nature, remained contained within a realm of expert systems, broadly speaking. In operations 
research, however, the processes and relationships being optimized were no longer those of 
more or less limited systems but those of the social in itself. Therefore, they came to cover all 
kinds of managerial problems, provided that they were operationalizable in principle.
Concurrently with the development of computer technology, operations research was 
institutionalized within the corporate domain as experts hired originally on a temporaiy basis 
started to be appointed as staff specialists with a permanent assignment. The growing capacity 
of computers to process large amounts of data encouraged establishment of internal 
departments to rationalize planning for a whole organization.404 With increased speed and 
improved efficiency, computerized systems processed more operations and did so more 
rapidly, creating new information that was utilized to solve other problems, thus continuously 
stimulating the whole process. In this way, computer systems themselves, while performing 
their operations became a source of new information already in machine-readable form that 
was used as a basis for new operations. Here, the crucial point was that, because of the 
automated systems, information could be used about information, not only about things.405 
Thanks to computerized systems, information was able to become autonomous to a point, in 
that it established a domain wherein information worked on information according to rules that 
were themselves, from an operational point of view, nothing other than information. And while 
it was on this domain that new management practices attempted to capitalize, its coming into 
being was largely due to systematic and intensive subjection of communication to 
administrative procedures along the lines followed in this study. Therefore, the domain of 
information, understood in this sense, was a result of historical developments in which 
communication has played a double role both as an object and a means of action.
The introduction of special departments for organizing and managing corporate information 
systems created a need to develop and systematize practices that constituted an ever-growing 
part of management in large organizations. This led to development of institutionalized 
practices to organize information so as to facilitate managerial decision making. In contrast to 
Shannonian information theory, the information systems school, as well as the later systems 
approach in general, was concerned with the meaning and effect of information. This approach
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broadened the linear communication model of Shannon by dealing “not with one 
communication link at a time but with a large number of them simultaneously, not with binary 
communication relations between a single sender and a single receiver but with many-valued 
relations among a possibly large number of communicators, not with one-way processes of 
communication but with interaction and complex circular flows.”406 It was through this 
tradition, it can be said, that the theoretical legacy of cybernetics and information theory was 
institutionalized as a technology of governance in the framework of an organizational structure. 
The organizational structure in question appeared, then, largely as a circular information 
system, with management information systems as its center. Therefore, the later systems 
approach as embodied in practices to systematize technologies, systems, and theories in terms 
of management was, to a great extent, a continuation of the cybernetic tradition in the social 
domain, as opposed to some limited expert systems the scope of which Wiener himself 
hesitated to exceed.
The growing use of operations research with its mathematical techniques for solving 
managerial problems intensified in the 1960s, with AT&T becoming one of its major corporate 
users. It was largely the faith that managerial problems could be scientifically formulated, 
modeled, and solved, thus eliminating intuition in decision making for standardized routines, 
which encouraged the use of operations research in business.407 Spreading from military 
projects into government and industry, with the help of the computer it rationalized and 
centralized administration in the Department of Defense under Robert McNamara, and 
eventually every federal agency and department, especially through Lyndon B. Johnson’s 
Great Society programs.408 This was in line with the way Herbert Hoover had attempted to 
plan the economy and coordinate interests by using apolitical, scientific experts as mechanisms 
to achieve his “associative state,” and the way associative institutions were converted into a 
regulatory state during the New Deal.409 The Great Society programs utilized the systems 
approach in seeking to introduce the mission oriented, not discipline or department bound, 
approach applied with good results in the earlier massive national projects.410 These programs, 
then, can be regarded as a way to organize the social by scientific methods, being to this extent 
an heir to the approach formulated by Taylor.
As far as business organization was concerned, new fields of knowledge and practice were 
brought into being. Management science, for instance, a new discipline emerging largely from 
the theoretical foundation laid down by cybernetics and information theory, on the one hand, 
and by experiences obtained from the 1950s’ large national projects such as SAGE and Atlas, 
on the other, in its emphasis on communication systems and organizational structure
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established itself as an independent branch of science distinct from the mechanical models of 
operations researchers.411 Yet the conceptual terrain out of which management science 
emerged, along with parallel and overlapping discourses on questions of governance, was 
influenced by the same ethos of control that had permeated a whole range of distinct 
disciplines. Therefore, these discourses were closely tied from the start not only to cybernetics 
but also to the biomechanical metaphor. Let cite three prominent theorists of the field, namely, 
Jay W. Forrester, Stafford Beer, and Herbert Simon, each of whom wrote seminal 
contributions on thought about communication in the age of the computer from the perspective 
of administration.
For an information system to be practicable, relationships between its parts have to be 
optimized to minimize the sources of error in the system. This was achieved more and more 
through a model based on the feedback principle. According to Jay W. Forrester, the feedback 
principle in information systems is involved when “the environment leads to a decision that 
results in action which affects the environment and thereby influences future decisions.”412 In 
other words, feedback concerning the functioning of a system determines the direction of 
further measures. He launched a program based on a feedback-system perspective for the 
design of industrial and social systems, which he called “industrial dynamics.” Forrester 
likened the planning of a technical system for desired performance to the planning of policies 
for social systems, and hence the task of a manager or politician to that of an engineer.413 
Certainly, this program needed the whole history of control of and by means of communication 
as a precondition. Forrester seemed to combine reliance upon formal methods with the idea of 
the feedback principle into a consistent system dynamics on the basis of experiences learnt 
from nationwide system projects. In the hands of Forrester, a social system resembled SAGE, 
with feedback loops being generalized as the hallmark of all social systems. Whereas in SAGE 
surveillance information was fed into the computer center and compared to preprogrammed 
models which determined the corrections to be made when needed, in system dynamics a 
feedback mechanism revealed whether a social project was moving toward the intended goal or 
whether it needed any adjustments.414 The essential structure of social systems, being 
abstracted from complex processes, could be modeled, processed, and manipulated by the 
computer.
In the 1960s it became clear that what was considered as the guiding center of a 
communication system was, in fact, a whole hierarchical universe of its own. It was seen as 
being composed of a number of interlinked subsystems, between which information flowed 
along both vertical and horizontal lines and was processed on several distinct levels of
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hierarchy. Stafford Beer, one of the pioneers of the information systems tradition, developed a 
theory of any viable system, based on biological connections. His model consisted of a 
complex structure of interrelating groupings of several distinct subsystems. Beer 
systematically elaborated the view of a firm as an organic information system by “ tracing the 
physiology of a control system in terms of a model of the human nervous system — .”415 
Instead of remaining at the level of neurophysiology, however, he aimed ultimately at moving 
on to neurocytology in terms of the level of detail to be taken into account.416 He saw firms, 
understood as information systems, as instances that collected, stored, processed, and generated 
quantitative information about the operational world. Starting from the general cybernetic 
framework of control, he assumed that “control is what facilitates the existence and the 
operation of systems.”417 Yet unlike in the simple mechanical model of the nervous system, 
Beer developed the idea that the control function was spread throughout the system, not located 
in one place. Moreover, and related to the former point, he held that hierarchical control was 
only one dimension of control, not its only type.418 These should not be seen as deviations 
from the classic nervous system model, however, but rather as its more rigorous and detailed 
application to management theory than before. In fact, in Beer exploitation of the biological 
model reached its peak, as it was at his hand that its potential was exhausted through a 
meticulous, scrupulous, even pedantic systematization in the service of management science.
This is not to say, however, that the conceptual formulations that were mutually articulated with 
communication systems throughout modem history would be gradually given up. On the 
contrary, they remained as a founding resource for thought, as evidenced by Herbert Simon. 
Building on Chester Barnard, Simon, who has been called the leading post-Taylorite 
theorist,419 developed theories of human and bureaucratic rationality that sought to go beyond 
scientific management. However, by sticking to the premises of centralized power and 
specialized operations, he undoubtedly remained within classic Taylorism.420 According to 
Simon, the effectiveness of bureaucratic rationality depended on communication of authority. 
Once successfully set in place, “the organizational values and situation,” not “personal 
motives,” determined “the one and only one ‘best’ decision.”421 Like Barnard, Simon saw 
organizational communication largely through the idea of the nervous system. Organizations 
were portrayed as kinds of institutionalized nervous systems that divide, routinize, and bound 
decision-making process to make it manageable.422 It was a two-way process in which 
information flows both to a decision making center and from it. Although communication 
process take place at many organizatorial levels simultaneously, the totality of this mechanism 
ultimately arranges events into one whole. Simon admits, it is true, that formal communication 
channels constitute only one part of the total network, but this part is absolutely fundamental:
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informal communication is only a supplement to a formal one.423 It was the formal hierarchy 
of an organization, not unlike that of a nervous system, which determined the nature of 
communication.
In his second phase, one influenced by developments in cybernetics, computer science, and 
artificial intelligence, Simon aimed at applying the functioning of the mechanism based on 
circular structures to human thinking and problem solving in general. In this project, he used 
computer metaphors to explain information processes common to both computers and people. 
According to Simon, both were controlled by the same laws of rationality, and therefore, both 
were similarly programmable. What this meant for the theory of management was that 
management appeared essentially as a feedback mechanism. The manager became the central 
node through which information circulated and by whom communication flows were structured 
and controlled; it was the responsibility of the manager to ensure that the action taken met the 
goals fixed. Managers, in this scheme, “were corporate servomechanisms adjusting behavior 
by communicating deviations from goals,” as Waring put i t424
In this way, the systems theory, as well as discourses inherently related to it, operated, as did its 
predecessors, within the framework of corporate capitalism which determined the position of 
communication as an object of analysis. Because of this precondition of relevance, systems 
theory made organizational goals, practices, and relationship appear to be constants inherent in 
nature.425 It did not question these relationships, but worked on the basis of them. Rather they 
designated what allowed systems science to become a distinct management theory and 
technique. In this task, it aimed at formalizing decision making by using scientific methods and 
mathematical language. It was faith in formal techniques that took Taylorism, according to 
Waring, to a logical conclusion in the systems approach.426 Of course, there was an apparent 
connection between the increasing use of mathematical tools and the fact that computers could 
efficiently handle numerical information. Therefore, ever more multifarious processes and 
relations began to be given an exact mathematical representation. So, while the mathematical 
form of information made digital computing machines possible, the increasing power of the 
latter lead more and more problems to be analyzed by mathematical tools. What marked 
discourses during this era of the computer, at any rate, was faith in the applicability of 
“automation concepts,” together with “electronic systems,” in administrative control427
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Self-Mechanisms of Communication
Establishment of systems theory as the founding framework for discussion of communication 
and control, and the computer becoming a precondition of modem social life, together laid the 
foundation for the discontinuity and displacement of the contemporary communicative 
constellation, reflected in both discourses and techniques. This emerging assemblage combined 
disparate communicative events into its circular movements, on the one hand, but it consisted of 
these events alone, being nothing external and prior to them, on the other. Cybernetics and 
systems thinking tended to capture all communicative events into their recursive circles and 
thus to defy the ineluctable yet slow process of the disintegration of order and dispersion of 
communication. They made, it can be said, the collective process of social development appear 
as inherently structured and, thus, controllable by rational means. What ultimately unified the 
whole tradition of communication seen as both an object and a means of administration is this 
perspective of control. This perspective was not only the common thread within this history of 
communication, forming a way for the theorists to conceptualize communication in terms of a 
whole, but also forged a relationship between this whole and the limits of communication. Let 
me finally try to characterize the emerging shape of communicativity in relation to what we 
have discussed above.
The taking shape of several discursive and institutional practices that exploited the heritage 
largely based on the work of Wiener and Shannon can be seen as having instituted, in diverse 
ways, a new conception of communication. At the same time it is clear that these distinct 
theoretical discourses on communication were articulated with each other in the framework of a 
society that was becoming increasingly computerized. These discourses constituted not only 
the conceptual terrain where this computerization could be thematized, but also, insofar as they 
resorted more and more to formal systems of representation, the source of quantitative 
information that encouraged and intensified the very process of computerization. Large 
national projects as well as business specific schemes engendered, besides the technical 
environment, new discursive forms which buttressed and legitimized similar projects in the 
future.
If cybernetics and information theory laid down the theoretical framework within which 
communication was conceptualized, three separate yet related lines of influence, taking shape 
within this framework, were central to the formation of the new communicative constellation. 
While irreducible to any single idea, practice, or technique as such, the convergence and 
codevelopment of the emergent science and technology of digital computing, institutionalizing
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theory and research into communication, and the discipline of operations research along with 
management science and management information systems set the stage for the displacement 
of the communicative assemblage. This displacement, although inevitably heterogeneous in 
nature, brought about, to a certain extent, a shared conceptual terrain on the basis of which 
communicativity could be approached in a new way in its diverse manifestations. It yieldd the 
same conception of communication, fundamental to which was the idea of a number of 
hierarchical levels and controls which, taken together, constitute a complex information system 
within which the functions, meanings, and effects of an individual channel could be identified 
and analyzed. It was this aspect that came to dominate the communication research.
Modem communication theory was formulated within the same discursive field in which the 
cybernetic perspective was introduced to the social sciences. A most important conduit through 
which this took place was a series of conferences arranged between 1946 and 1953, sponsored 
by the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation. Working within this discursive environment, a sociologist 
called Paul F. Lazarsfeld, who was one of the initial members of the Macy group but who 
subsequently dropped out, articulated, with Elihu Katz, an approach to communication that laid 
the theoretical basis for what became American communication research, later renamed as mass 
communication research.428 It was the empirical-quantitative approach of this program that 
formulated the conception of communication that became the standard view at least until the 
1970s. The vision and perspective set up here presented mass communication as a new 
unifying force, analogous to the nervous system, which reached every single individual.429 As 
the leading paradigm under which communication processes were studied was taken from the 
practices of natural sciences, narrowly defined, it was thought possible to independently 
measure communicative processes and reliably demonstrate their causal relationships, much as 
in a laboratory environment. The process of communication was held as being divisible into its 
smallest natural components and the elements isolated in this way could be named, their 
respective roles and functions determined, their interrelationships conjectured, and the whole 
process given a cogent scientific basis.
Upon further scrutiny, the treatment communication has been subjected to here does not 
constitute a break in the way the subject has traditionally been approached in scholarly 
practices. On the contrary, the same type of methodological approach that found sophisticated 
formulation in Taylor has only been redeveloped here according to modem scientific standards 
under the influence of cybernetic discourse. If Taylor discovered the irreducible prime particles 
of a circumstantial performance, the standard view of Lazarsfeld and Katz sought a generalized 
structure for any effective communication process. So, whereas Taylor divided a given work
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process into its smallest relevant elements, here the same has been done to human 
communication in general, regardless of the context in which it occurs. Thus it also 
simultaneously extended Wiener’s conception of communication whilst following the same 
ethos and the idea of science.
Yet there is no doubt that it was the Shannon and Weaver paradigm that unified American 
communication research. To a great extent, the whole field from the sixties to the eighties was 
based on the conception of communication to which Shannon gave an influential theoretical 
form, and for which he bequeathed the perspective of linear causality. This encouraged 
subsequent, relatively straightforward research programs, which attempted to identify and 
isolate the linear impact of one or more variables on another variable. The point to be noticed 
here is not, however, so much related to the linear logic of the model, or to any single 
constitutive part of the communicative constellation, but rather to the underlying concept of the 
explainability of everything relevant to human communication, and particularly media effects 
that were of interest at the time, becoming common. It opened up a theoretical perspective 
within which effective relationships could be identified and the structure of a communicative 
process, once isolated, formalized. Yetjust as theoretical contributions create, enable, and open 
up, they also dissolve, efface, and conceal. What this orientation missed in particular, so the 
critique held, was the collective nature of communication, the fact that the positions of sender 
and receiver are not isolated and independent nodes which define the communicative situation, 
but on the contrary are conceptual entities that are defined already by and in communication.430 
It is not accidental that the tradition of functionalism that gained a strong footing in social 
sciences during that time was criticized for similar reasons, as it constituted one of the 
foundations for the rise of communication as a theoretical concern 431 The perspective of a 
functional system did not, however, provide the conceptual framework for thought about 
communication, pure and simple, because it was, in the last instance, communication itself from 
which the idea of functionality can be derived.
System scientists retained a close relationship to research going on into communication 
systems, which was one cause for systemness emerging as an object of systematic 
investigation in social sciences. Yet the “being” of the communication systems cannot be 
separated from the scientific theories and conceptualizations they presuppose as practicable 
systems; it was precisely these kinds of theory that formed part of the conceptual texture of 
cybernetics. Thus, Peter Galison, for instance, has pointed out that the impact of the system 
perspective on social sciences which was particularly strong in the 1940s and 1950s had its 
origin in the tum-of-the-centuiy networks of telephony and power 432 The Macy conferences,
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held at that time, introduced the cybernetic perspective, with its inherent relationship to 
communication engineering, to social sciences. If the notion of system did find inroads into the 
conceptual framing of broader social questions independently of systems sciences, it was 
precisely the perspective adopted by cybernetics, however, that subsequently permeated a wide 
range of social sciences and became used in contemporary social and political rhetoric. During 
this process, a system became a dynamic concept and lost its static character of hierarchically 
arranged elements with an intrinsic nature.
While communication research largely adopted the linear interpretation of the Shannon and 
Weaver model, a number of different disciplines from organizational theory to political theory 
and social psychology started to analyze social groups as communications systems 
characterized by a multiplicity of feedback loops.433 Moreover, along with the shift within the 
cybernetic movement itself, many theorists influenced by the ideas being developed in this 
movement turned to the concept of feedback instead of to that of homeostasis, as did, for 
instance, Karl Deutsch434 What the diverse theorists and disciplines shared was the same 
information-processing metaphor that differentiated a system from its outside by means of an 
inbuilt mechanism of control. In the process of cybernation of communication, so to speak, the 
mechanical metaphors through which it used to be conceived were replaced by new ones. 
Though they bore traces of mechanical technology, too, what was essential was that they 
exploited the new world of computing technology in that the relationships they conceptualized 
were logical, not physical. The world portrayed by the systems approach was based on a view 
of the mutual internal relationships of nodes of communication, the overall structure of the 
continuous exchange of these dispatched messages being organized by the principle of self­
regulation. This view of a system correcting its own functioning took the place of the 
previously held view of rigid mechanical performance. Gradually leaving mechanical 
metaphors, communication now entered the sphere of influence of information system 
analogies.
The inevitable consequence of systematic recourse to formal systems is that the more the 
technical or methodological aspect was emphasized, the more attempts were made to integrate 
the human element into the system as component part as it implied a factor of insecurity. To 
control this element, the machine metaphor still provided a useful tool; on the other hand, it was 
within this very conceptual framework that human behavior became seen as problematic in the 
first place. In order to overcome this strange situation, there was an inclination—especially 
among systems scientists and practioners—to emphasize an unambiguous formalism, coupled 
with refined conceptual tools.
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The reformulated machine metaphor, that is, the information system metaphor, provided a 
model for thinking about and planning the social in a similar way as the previous metaphoric 
conceptualizations did in their time. Especially, the idea of a computer system played an 
important role in both understanding and organizing the social. In fact, the computer system, it 
was thought, tended to determine the form of socioeconomic planning systems.435 This is not, 
of course, surprising, as many of the key concepts that have come to account and symbolize 
some central aspect of society can be traced back to communication and transportation 
systems, lik e  the telephone system earlier, the computer system seemed to provide a model for 
the entire organizational structure of the social, with the model being understood at this time 
largely in terms of an information system.436 The computer, then, was used to build, in the 
words of an air force colonel, “a servomechanism spread out over an area comparable to the 
whole American continent.”437
As for organizations, the information systems view had a powerful effect, as many 
organizations increasingly came to rely on information systems 438 In the 1960s, Ulric Neisser 
grasped the profound influence the metaphoric use of the computer had come to have in public 
intercourse. By referring to the impact of cybernetics in several notions such as “the brain is 
like a computer,” “man is like a machine,” and “society is like a feedback system,” he 
brought out the increasing role of the computer in contemporary sentiment439 It is clear that 
the displacement in the communicative constellation did not imply just some adjustments in 
technological development or in theoretical thinking: it changed the scope of what was possible 
within the social. It forged a new relationship to conception of what was possible and what was 
not and in so doing updated the ontological presuppositions of the age. Thus, the computer and 
related discourses and practices did not operate only on an instrumental level. Rather they 
introduced a new conceptual framework through which novel ontological conditions were 
consolidated and intensified. Surely, although the emergent constellation could not claim any 
independent consistency outside of its case-specific realizations, its influence nevertheless was 
very concrete in contemporary practices in the administrative use of communication and the 
administration of communication.
As it was agreed that an information system was necessary for management to carry out its 
primary functions, the system itself was conceived fundamentally in terms of cybernetics, 
through which the feedback structure became the model for the system. Even the classic 
cybernetic terms, along with those derived from communication technology, remained in use 
for framing problems of information management. Thus, “the senders and receivers [in an 
information system],” as was stated at a conference held in 1962, “must be ‘tuned,’ and there
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should be a minimum amount of ‘noise’ in the channel.”440 In fact, the perspective of 
information systems seen as feedback structures was not only fairly coherent, it was also very 
widely adopted. It constituted the conceptual framework for many contemporaries through 
which they could explain to themselves what was going on in their societies. Jay Forrester 
encapsulated this view by proclaiming that “everything we do as an individual, as an industry, 
or as a society is done in the context of an information-feedback system.”441
If at the beginning of the cybernetic line of research, information handling became a more 
central problem to systems analysis than handling of energy, now questions relating to 
transmitting, storing, and processing information began to be connected ever more directly to 
institution of the social: they were seen as properties characterizing profoundly the social as 
such. In this framework every system was treated as an information system that opened up a 
whole new territory for methods of control. The convergence of computer technology and 
systems scientific methodologies seemed to finally provide the necessary means for 
overcoming politics in governing the social. “Given the resources of modem technology and 
planning techniques,” stated Macbride, “it is really no great trick to transform even a country 
like ours into a smoothly running corporation where every detail of life is a mechanical 
function to be taken care of.”442
This constituted, then, the new whole within which communication became conceptualized. It 
had four main characteristics. It had the capacity to, first, sense and monitor its environment; 
second, relate this information to the operating norms that guide system behavior; third, detect 
deviations from these norms; and finally, initiate corrective action when discrepancies were 
detected.443 What is of interest here is that communication became a function of this whole, 
which defined its nature and its identity. It could not have been thought of independently of 
this whole, since it was only because of its functionality that communication appeared as 
communication, that is, as an object and means of administration. On the other hand, this whole 
did not exist prior to the communicative functions, because it was nothing other than the 
“whole” of these functions, the “totality” of their taking place. It was held that the 
information processing system was discovered rather than constructed, implying that the 
principle resided in all natural systems. If it in fact replaced some traditional modes of human 
interaction, this was because of conscious utilization of an innate principle of nature; in other 
words, it was a natural evolution of communication itself. Thus, it did not impose any external 
qualities on communication; on the contrary: it “was” only what this communication 
represented. Order emerged from ongoing communicative processes themselves, not from any 
unchanging set of artificial instructions. Given this, despite the discontinuity and displacement
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in the communicative assemblage which determined what communication “is ,” it did not lose 
anything of its “naturalness.” The whole—the model of equilibrium between communication 
and its environment—retained its close relationships to the origin of communication or original 
communication. Thus, if a new relationship to its conditions opened up from communication 
itself, these conditions appeared as profoundly original, it was only their form that changed.
Thinking about communication has always been dependent on a totality that has been the 
source of its identity. Communication, as such, could not have been conceived without this kind 
of whole, for it is dependent on the discourses and relationships that form a context for its 
becoming an object of speech. On the contrary, the nature of communication in being relative 
to its conditions of existence is what made it conceivable in the first place. As is known, these 
conditions, understood as a whole, were seen in terms of a system in the tradition in question. 
It was exactly the systemic nature of communication therefore that allowed it to enter into the 
sphere of control. Now, it seems that the character of this system underwent a change as we 
move to a new constellation of communicativity. It made communication appear in a form that 
could be managed by numbers, as Waring has put i t444 In fact, one can go further and propose 
that communication, here, was nothing other than numbers, a system of numbers. In a similar 
vein, the intrinsic nature of communication, revealed by and within the theoretical framework, is 
what enabled it to be controlled. Whereas this nature was earlier associated with the concept of 
a system, now this system was thoroughly mathematicized. Mathematical relationships, as the 
rational basis for control, thus became the immanent relationships of communication itself.
This is also a conjunction that helps us to see systems approach’s relationship to the question 
of the limits of communication, which continued to be conceived in the framework of an 
original whole, whether in an animal or in a machine, as the subtitle of Wiener’s Cybernetics 
proposed. Systems thinking conceived communication as a mechanism that was constitutive of 
the preceding whole (nervous system, machine, community). In this tradition, the whole of 
communication was always an immanent totality, because it is self-sufficient and does not 
include any relationships to anything else except the mechanism of exclusion. This mechanism, 
of course, implies the existence of something (other) to be excluded, but this other assumes its 
form from the immanence of communication itself. For this reason, all the new departures 
relating to bringing communicative relationships themselves to the fore, instead of focusing on 
phenomena separated from each other, must be seen as subordinate to the concept of dominant 
totality. In fact, although it is correct to ascribe thought about communication itself to the 
systems approach, it was only after the dissolution of the formalistic program that 
communication could be thought of as independent of a constituting whole.445 This
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development was linked with many contemporaneous processes, including the spread of 
microcomputers and computer networks and the proliferation of instances and relationships of 
communication, leading to a change in the whole communicative constellation.
A good example of the simultaneous tension between remaining attractive and becoming 
problematic to thinking from and through the basis of a closed whole was the Strategic 
Defense Initiative, which attempted to replace the idea of a semiautomatic system by a fully 
automated one. Although the large-scale military arrangements in question could not take into 
account the inevitably changing and unpredictable nature of real world situations at the level 
required, this state of affairs did not hinder the ascendancy of the computer as the central factor 
in both a high-technology nuclear shield and a vision of centralized command and control.
Generally speaking, however, an increasing tendency toward a decentralized system seemed to 
point the way for the future of communication. Large system projects since the 1960s, along 
with the development of computer networking and the launching of ARPANET, changed 
decisively the way complicated processes and dynamic organizations were approached. 
Moreover, in the 1970s the technocratic strand of management science lost much of its former 
appeal because of the American manufacturing crisis, and came to be replaced by “so ft” 
techniques developed by Ackoff and Churchman.446 Hard mechanisms aimed at producing 
efficiency only veiled disagreements about values and goals which were never eliminated and 
the inevitable political nature of governance. Technique, then, is always indissociable from the 
political. Accordingly, a new communicative constellation, with a novel concept of 
administrative communication which opened itself up to the political more than previously, was 
brought into being, coming from the business realm. Thomas Hughes has depicted it, from an 
administrative point of view, as including “a flat, collegial, meritocratic management style as 
contrasted with a vertical, hierarchical one; the resort to transdisciplinary teams of engineers, 
scientists, and managers in contrast to reliance on discipline-bound experts; the combining of 
diverse, or heterogeneous, physical components in a networked system instead of standardized, 
interchangeable ones in an assembly line; and a commitment by industry to change-generating 
projects rather than to long-lived processes.”447 Basically, what is at play here is a change in 
the way a communication system worked. Whereas these systems, from the telegraph to voice 
telephony, were traditionally built top down; computer communication systems, by contrast, 
were constructed bottom up.448
Hand in hand with the development of new information technology, with its undermining 
effects on hierarchical structures now viewed as rigid and inflexible, a whole literary genre
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criticizing hierarchical systems emerged. This cannot, of course, be called a direct causal 
relationship, for whereas the new technical systems and organizational forms based on them 
made up an object and a place for discursive investigations, these discourses generated new 
institutional practices and structures too. It is nevertheless at this stage that a change in 
perspective from hierarchical to horizontal communication occurred. This was largely because 
of two converging trends. Firstly, rigid corporate hierarchies were replaced by more flexible 
systems based on horizontal relationships. Secondly, improvements in information and 
communications technology facilitated decentralization whilst maintaining managerial 
control.449 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4.2, the horizontal aspect has never been missing 
from the technical history of communication, but during this period it certainly come to the fore 
and paved the way for the concept of contemporary communication. On the other hand, 
centralized power hierarchies, although entering into a new era, did not vanish either. It is rather 
a question of a new power distribution in a constellation that facilitated horizontal relationships 
more and with different intensity than previously was the case.
The line of development in communications that could be construed as a comprehensible 
sequence from the early telegraph to the rise of microelectronics weakens in the age of 
information networks. This seems to be because these networks do not have any single model 
or functional dynamics. The information technology environment consists of distinct 
overlapping and parallel strata that cannot be unified under any single conceptual principle. 
Whereas the systemicity pertaining to the telephone system, for instance, still had identifiable 
boundaries, current computer networks are in a state of constant alteration with continuously 
shifting boundaries. This is why, in the age of computer networks, a centralized system could 
no longer provide a model for an experience of the changed conditions of what was going on. 
Although centrally directed systems did not lose their social position—rather the 
contrary—they could no longer furnish a conceptual model for thinking and speaking about 
society. This state of affairs did not, however, prevent continuing use of the biomechanical 
vocabulary. Thus, once switches are computerized and transmission digitalized, all elements of 
a communication system belong to the same digital circuit, forming nothing other than—a 
“digital nervous system.”450
However, if society became undepictable by means of a single communicative model, the 
identity of communication itself underwent a radical transformation and lost its consistent 
nature. During the eventual dissolution of the systems scientific project, at the same time that 
information technology and microelectronics became common, the lucid and positive nature of 
communication gave way to its infinite transformability and flexibility. With this development,
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the hopes for a unified science of communication that arose in the 1970s from general systems 
theory proved unrealistic. Seen from this perspective, communication could not retain any 
specific administrative characteristics, such as those referred to in bio-mechanical metaphors, 
and instead assumed innumerable convertible and variable qualities, not reducible to any single 
structure or function. Endless reconstructability was a theme pointing the direction for the 
development of communication.
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6. Conclusion: Communication and Its Modern Fate
Although inevitably schematical, this study has tried to bring out the essential points of 
intersection in the history of the relationship between communication and telecommunication. 
It is through these constellations (or dispositives) that distinct chains of command, 
bureaucracies, managerial theories, committees, as well as telephone lines and digital circuits 
can all be conceived of as an integral part of the history of governance of and by 
“communication.” What unified this path of development was the idea that questions of 
communication could be seen as administrative problems. In other words, communication 
manifested itself as an object and means of administration.
It is possible to conceive, as we have done here in this study, of the irreducible discourses 
operating in different registers of speech, from the emergent analogy of nervous system to 
sophisticated mathematical models, as historically determined attempts to define 
communication, its “essence” and “limits.” Surely, the clumsy biological metaphor, while in 
its infancy, articulated a different “communication” and its social occurrence than did the later 
formal theories and models of research, emerging from the institutionalized study of 
telecommunication. All the same, they had without doubt the same object and aim: to seek to 
explain and understand, by means of the conceptual tools at hand and within prevailing regimes 
of cultural practices, the core of “communication.” In other words, they sought to capture the 
essential characteristic of what had come to be thought of as communication, in whose 
formation the new communication systems played a crucial part. It is also clear that these 
conceptualizations of communication were not independent of each other, but rather mutually 
articulated. In fact, it is the metaphor of the nervous system itself that has served as the central 
conceptual stage for understanding and explaining communication throughout the history of 
telecommunication. The nervous system gave a name to the whole that made different and 
heterogeneous systems and projects ultimately uniform in terms of their objectives and 
functioning, bringing a certain unity to the different mechanisms and constellations of 
communication. It constituted the whole in which communication was positioned as a focus for 
systematic thinking throughout the history of administrative communication and the 
administration of communication.
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The nature of the whole, designated by the nervous system, did not remain the same but 
changed according to changes and displacements in and of communication from an organic to 
a feedback structure, and it is precisely this change that has been the line of development of and 
by communication studied here. Thus, while it has constituted the whole within which 
communication has been able to be formalized, it has also become formalized itself in the 
course of this process, and gained more and more precisely articulated structure in a scientific 
sense. In other words, the nervous system, being increasingly formalized, has formed the whole 
within which communication has become both the object and means of action. Yet at the same 
time, during this development within which thought about communication has been formalized, 
ever more accurate mathematical systems have come to represent the essence of the nervous 
system, since thought about communication is, in the final analysis, dependent on the 
formalization of the whole that is its precondition.
For this reason thought about communication, within this history, has always been closely tied 
to an anterior whole, from which it has not been able to dissociate itself. This origin, then, has 
drawn the line that distinguishes communicative relations from noncommunicative ones. 
However, this cannot be directly conceived of as a restriction or as some kind of shortcoming 
because the conceptual whole represented by the nervous system is the very entity that has 
made it possible to think theoretically about communication, as well as being an outcome of 
this very thinking. At the same time, it has influenced the practical design of communication 
systems in many local contexts, which have been the points of origin for certain general 
communicative assemblages, discourses, and practices.
Communication takes its place as a finite relationship between the occurrence and withdrawal 
of instances of i t451 Communicative manifestations and relationships bring something into 
being; they appear in communication but are not communication itself. On the one hand, this 
communication in “itse lf ’ cannot be expressed in communication, because a manifestation of 
communication is not capable of expressing the fact that there is communication, but on the 
other hand, in order to “work” communication presupposes linguistic representations of the 
whole of communication, in other words, the objectification of communication. This 
objectification, essential for the functioning of a communication system, is manifested in two 
related registers that constitute each other. While communication needs conceptual, necessarily 
reductive descriptions that represent it as a “whole,” it also requires technical systems with the 
attendant quantification of communication for its practical fulfillment. Both of these ways of 
objectification are inherently linked together so that even though it is possible to analytically 
distinguish between “conceptual” and “technical” elements, in a given historical process they
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are indistinguishably tied together. The nervous system has provided a concept that, throughout 
the history of communication followed in this study, has amalgamated these aspects into a 
concrete whole. This continuous oscillation between the necessity to objectify communication, 
on the one hand, and the fact that while being objectified communication is not expressed in 
“itself,” on the other, determines the scope of communication.
This scope of communication has, in this tradition, always been conceived of within a 
conceptual whole, which has both enabled it to be thought of it in itself and set its limits. 
Communication, here, was a function of a whole constructed as a hierarchy of channels with a 
control unit organizing the flow of incoming and outgoing messages. Moreover, it was mainly 
a formal function in that the type of communication regarded as constitutive of the whole was 
determined through formal lines of communication. Finally, what was fundamental was its 
repetitive character, not any single meaning-content as such. Although constitutive of the whole, 
communication, at the same time, depended on it, because it was only within this pregiven 
totality that communication could emerge as communication. It integrated the plenitude of 
diverse events and relationships into a conceptual whole and allowed them to be seen as 
controlled by some underlying laws amenable to formalization.
Although the whole was nothing other than the realization of communication, nothing prior to it 
as such, it provided the means for organizing communication. Throughout the whole history 
studied, attempts have been made to codify communication in formal procedures, routines, and 
designs. By means of these, engineers, managers, and theorists set the boundaries between the 
system and its outside, enabling systematic regulation of their interrelationships in many 
different situations. Yet this history in and of communication is not a “cause” or a “source” 
of it becoming formalized. Instead, the constellations involved embodied and reflected a more 
general principle, the ontological condition of our modem existence, which Heidegger termed 
Gestell, translated into French by Michel Haar as dispositif— a term used also by Foucault, 
albeit in a somewhat different sense. According to Haar, “science that pursues the 
mathematization of nature is not an autonomous project. It reaches conclusions beforehand 
about what the real is; it only admits of the objectifiable and calculable. It is in the service of the 
more general project of technological enframing (Gestell) — .”452 Thus, the drive to render 
communication quantitative, seen from this perspective, came about because of an already 
established worid-relation, namely, because of the modem Gestell. What made this project so 
consistent is that the key figures and discourses belonging to it operated firmly within the 
limits of this relationship simultaneously articulating its nature and scope in terms of 
communication. The history followed here, as well as scientific research and technological
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development as inherent parts of the history of communication, are therefore indistinguishable 
from this project which characterizes the whole modernity.
The history of administration of and by communication has, since the beginning of the century, 
been closely tied to the idea of total control. This is not to say that the history studied here is 
alone in its connection to this idea. Naturally, many other systems, typically of a technological 
nature, have been connected to the idea of total administration, so that this idea has been 
expressed in and through these systems and related practices. Yet communication systems and 
related discourses constitute a central part of this history. Now, it is possible to conceive of 
Heidegger as a thinker relevant to the modem processes of communication and the 
administration of communication, as his thinking was themed, especially during his later 
period, largely in relation to the idea of generalized technical control. He thought especially 
about communication’s modem lines of governance, but at the same time, these lines set the 
limits within which this thinking could operate as a contemporary critique or as a philosophical 
analysis of modernity. Heidegger was preoccupied with, even bound to the idea of centralized 
power, which is why he is—also—a major philosopher of bureaucratic power, insofar as it is 
this veiy power that is seen as characteristic of technological dominance. Communication has 
been inherently connected to the history of control and domination, not least because of the fact 
that it was largely in the sphere of institutional intercommunication that the systems, 
discourses, and images of communication that were subsequently generalized and established 
culturally were brought into being. The threats and hopes invested in these were the main 
object of commentary by contemporary intellectuals. This was emphasized with the 
improvement of communications when the technological “system” seemed to assume a 
strongly consistent and even autonomous character. Although clearly Heidegger’s thinking 
cannot be reduced to it, the very threat of this total system constituted the intellectual context of 
thinking on technology for Heidegger and for his contemporaries.453
Subsequent developments and especially the advent of computer networks altered, however, 
this general pattern and undermined the concept of the dominating center. Thought about 
community could not rely any longer on the idea of a strong center, method, or law, although it 
was clear that implementation of centrally directed systems certainly did not reduce but rather 
increased and sped up. Let us now, however, turn to Heidegger, as he is undoubtedly the 
leading figure in twentieth century philosophy when it comes to theoretical analysis of the 
conditions of the history of communication pursued here. After this, we will make some 
remarks on the position and fate of modem communication and communicativity on the basis 
of the historical lines of development traced here.
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Heidegger and Communication
It has been prevalent in the twentieth century to think of technological development in terms of 
increasing domination. As is well known, Max Weber considered that the inner logic of 
scientific-technological development would finally lead up to an “iron cage” where there 
would be no room for divergent modes of action. Subsequent critical sociology, especially its 
leftist variant from Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer to Jurgen Habermas, has 
appropriated this concept of the colonizing nature of “instrumental rationality” and the 
ensuing standardization and homogenization of the social. This line of thought took on, among 
certain intellectuals, new vigor with the rise of information technology that was seen, partly 
justifiably, as enabling a more integrated control over society. Information technology did 
indeed support concentration of power as the use of large and expensive mainframe computers 
was confined to the principal societal institutions. The introduction of microcomputers and the 
principle of networking changed that situation, but the threatening potential of information 
technology together with its ever-increasing influence have not evaporated from the minds of 
contemporary commentators.
What has been common to many thinkers of this school, drawing mainly on Heidegger, is to 
conceive of the present state in terms of a closure. In order to get access to the system of public 
communication, according to this line of thinking, one has to already be formally part of it 
through having adjusted to its rules. This, however, prevents the flow of anything new into 
communication and cuts off the relationship between communication and a living communality. 
Although popular, this idea is also problematic, because the system, it can be said, is nothing 
other than the order that becomes articulated in mutual relationships between discourses, being 
the “wholeness” of these discourses. Therefore there could be no “basis” for a 
transcendental principle that would transgress this continuously reconstituting whole and be 
expressed as a consistent set of rules. It follows that if we are looking at the (later) modem fate 
of communication, we must indubitably locate the types, areas, and systems in which it 
manifests itself and through which it is given its current forms. Yet historically, and particularly 
during the modem period of our study, this approach has been subordinated to the line of 
thinking that wishes to retain the idea of communication coherent. Communication is, here, in 
its essence One, for its vaiying forms have the same foundation, which often however remains 
unexplained. The view relating to the claim of a formal consistency for individual discourses 
and interests as a precondition for their access into the public domain reduces discontinuity 
and the multiplicity of contextual conditions into one conceptual category which does not 
acknowledge differences. This comes down to the idea that public communication has formally
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only one context. What is at issue here is a concern for something original that threatens to be 
eliminated or become estranged in the maelstrom of abstract and formal system dynamics.
According to the melancholic view of Heidegger, which influenced a whole set of subsequent 
contributions, the linguistic and communicative capability intrinsic to humans is becoming 
more and more commoditized and separated from human commonality. This is also one of 
Giorgio Agamben’s themes in his book La comunitd, che viene.454 But whereas the thorough 
technicization opened up for Heidegger, ultimately, a possibility which he characterized in 
terms of ereignis, and whereas language becoming independent enabled eventually for 
Agamben the experience of language itself, that is, the fact that there is language, there is a 
tendency within this approach to ignore the perspective of solace or salvation and to remain 
obsessed with the idea of a more and more tightening net of social communication. The central 
commanding view is the idea of a confrontation between unique singularities and an 
instrumental system of communication, in which the latter controls and regulates the free 
articulation of singularities so that their independent sphere of expression is almost reduced to 
nothing. It is this ethos that has characterized the line of thought that, moving from Heidegger 
through the Frankfurt School to Habermas and beyond, has ended up defending human 
communicativity against instrumental system logic, the forming of which we have traced in the 
study at hand in relation to communication.
Yet it is also possible to think of communication, at least today, without having recourse to the 
consistency of the concepts of singularity and system. Insofar as singularity is not anterior to 
its context or a message to the communication system in which it is expressed, it cannot be 
thought of any longer as a primary or original instance. Singularity is concurrent with the 
relationship that articulates it as a singularity, and the concrete, nameable communication 
systems, all of which have a contextual historicality of their own, have a central part in forging 
this relationship in our times. On the other hand, social communication loses its primary 
consistency, because it always consists of relationships and fields of relationships between 
singularities without having any integrating principle. It does not have only one logic or form 
of expression, but is divided into a plurality of distinct discursive chains, irreducible to each 
other. In this way it is also possible to question Heidegger’s idea of the completion of 
metaphysics as the technological domination of the world, as Alain Badiou, for example, has 
done. Yet, as his influence cannot be overstated, we must now delve a little deeper into 
Heidegger, not least because the concepts presented above owe their inspiration mainly to his 
contribution.
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Heidegger was without doubt one of the most influential contemporary thinkers to articulate 
the perspective which framed technology and themes such as automation and mechanization 
for intellectuals and commentators by the end of the period under discussion. For this reason 
alone, he must be taken into account in discussion on philosophical technology critiques of the 
twentieth century. Heidegger’s central concern can be regarded as Being {das Sein) becoming 
thought through what is {das Seiende) and consequently through category of technology, in 
that Being is approached as an issue requiring technical solutions. Thus this theme of a 
sweeping technicization of western culture, characteristic of the whole of his thinking, seems to 
have been given perhaps its most lucid icons, within the line of thought followed here, in the 
systems of scientific management and cybernetics. At the same time, the underlying ethos of 
this tradition can be seen as having found its most profound philosophical analysis in 
Heidegger himself. As is known, when arguing that sciences had assumed the role traditionally 
held by philosophy in his famous Spiegel interview Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten, 
Heidegger named “cybernetics” as the very field of knowledge and practice that was about to 
take the place of philosophy.455 It was above all cybernetics instead of philosophy, so it 
seemed, that determined the fundamental formation of the modem world by providing the 
generalized form for its becoming a calculable object for rational action.
This is why Heidegger held cybernetics as the moment that marked the coming to fruition of 
metaphysics in the form of all-encompassing technology. In cybernetics, everything becomes 
actualized as an object of rational calculation. As the science of self-regulation, it was based on 
the instmmentalization and operationalization of communication to the extent that every central 
ontological relation was dispensed with.456 Thus, as is well known, Heidegger held that 
presence becomes finally completely reduced to objectness in technological domination: 
metaphysics has reached its end in the total technological organization of the world. In this 
phase, the thinking that has aimed at establishing a grounding and a stable basis, ends up 
seizing beings in a comprehensive structure of design and calculation. Here representation 
becomes established as the mode of being of thought that lays the foundation for being as 
such. Technology represented for Heidegger a kind of total closure, an absolute extreme of 
reduction of everything into the present at-hand, calculable, codifiable structure of objects, in 
which the whole sphere of human life is wrapped in systematic, technological rationality. As 
mentioned above, Heidegger characterized this total system of reification by the concept of Ge­
stell, translated by William Lowitt as “enframing.”457 It is to be understood as the totality of 
putting eveiything in place, determined by modem technical imperatives. As metaphysics is 
propelled by the will to attain the truth, and thus to put everything in place, so modem 
technology, especially in its cybernetic form, can be characterized as the final phase of
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metaphysics for it integrates everything into its circular structures and puts everything in the 
system of its own rationality.
According to Heidegger, Ge-stell as the name of the essence of modem technology reveals the 
actual as standing-reserve. This can also be regarded as a common feature in thought about 
communication in the age of modem science and technology. Following Heidegger, it can be 
stated that during this period communication does increasingly “report itself in some way or 
other that is identifiable through calculation and — remain orderable as a system of 
information.”458 Communication, appearing here as a kind of field of calculation, does not 
display “the character of the occasioning that brings forth.”459 In other words, what is 
characteristic of communication, namely its inexhaustible unfolding which is not based on or 
derived from any figure or form anterior to it as such (communication takes always place in 
and through some form, but the latter does not close or exhaust communication), is excluded 
from its appearing.
Although Heidegger conceived the essence of modem technology, namely enframing, as a 
mode of revealing that sets upon what is as standing-reserve, it is possible to think, although he 
seemed not to, that this particular mode of revealing, regardless of its immense power in our 
time, does not suppress all the other potentialities and practices of revealing. Although he 
insists that “where enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve 
mark all revealing,”460 one can question, to some extent, this line of thinking. This is because 
even if there were no room within the enframing for different ways of revealing, this particular 
mode is not capable of monopolizing the whole of bringing forth, but remains as only one yet a 
central form of revealing, and thus, of truth. On the other hand, this form can be regarded as 
porous and discontinuous rather than seamlessly consistent, as Heidegger tended to think. It is 
in this sense that his thinking can be seen as still being under the sway of the idea of strong 
center in which a dominant, formal principle, whether in the form of a method or a law, sets the 
limits and forms of human experience. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that it was no 
doubt the apparently totalizing perspective created by the systems of science and technology at 
the time that was invoked in the way Heidegger spoke of enframing as the “ostensibly sole 
way of revealing.”461 This was not unusual, as it was common among contemporary 
continental intellectuals to regard growing technical rationality as a frightening instrumental 
order that would trample down everything humanly unique 462
There is, in fact, a dimension in Heidegger’s thinking that precludes any straightforward way 
of reading his critique of the technological organization of the world as including a view of
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technology as a totality or foundation. This is due to the fact that Heidegger considered the Ge­
stell not only as the totality of placing, but also as Heraus-for derung, pro-vocation.463 The 
technological system puts nature continuously to new uses, connects it with novel aims and 
functions, and is itself transformed because of these new demands. Although remaining 
objects, things lose their rigidity in the process of instrumental organization as they are 
continuously pro-voked, that is to say, put to new uses. This universal manipulability 
undermines the immutable characteristic of Being that metaphysics has attributed to i t464 Yet 
technology, insofar as it displayed a particular world-relation maintained its rather consistent 
nature in Heidegger’s thinking, and there is an apparent reason for this.
This relates to the fact that, as Gianni Vattimo has proposed, Heidegger remained stuck in a 
vision of technology dominated by the image of the motor and of mechanical energy. 
Technology, according to him, could only engender a society dominated by a central power that 
sends its orders to a passive periphery.465 What Vattimo thinks is that we have to change our 
conception of technology in order to be able to dissipate the metaphysical representations that 
are dominant in our age. Yet the technology that holds the greatest potential in this respect is 
not “the technology of the engine—with its rigid, unidirectional movement from the center to 
the periphery,” argues Vattimo, but rather “the technology of communication: the techniques 
of collecting, ordering, and distributing information.”466 The increase in the number of 
interpretive agents that comes with this technology could bring about the dissolution of 
objectivity as something given and make room for the notion of a world that would derive its 
meaning only from a resonance between interpretations.
According to Vattimo’s interpretation, therefore, Ge-stell undergoes a fundamental 
transformation as we move from mechanical technology to the technology of information and 
communication, for now it becomes possible to think of technology without presupposing a 
dominating center. Increasing social communication makes it impossible to maintain the idea 
of a unilinear history, as it would require the existence of a center around which historical 
events are ordered, whereas the most evident consequence of the generalization of new 
communications technology has been the birth of “new centres of history.”467 The 
development of easily available communications facilities has unleashed local and singular 
expressions of interest and liberated differences. With the demise of the idea of a central 
rationality of history, the world of social communication, according to Vattimo, has split into a 
multiplicity of local languages and rationalities. This liberation of local elements, which leads to 
the loss of a single, objective, and fundamental reality, can be seen in positive terms, according
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to Vattimo, as disorientation468 an experience of ambivalence constitutive of the being which is 
not, but happens.
It is evident that the concept of a mass society, associated with the rise of an industrial society, 
has been replaced in the course of societal development by the notion of ever more scattered 
and fragmented communities gathered around special interests. The mass society, linked to a 
central organizating principle, has splintered into quickly moving, heterogeneous, and unstable 
interest groups, forming complex, ever changing networks of interactive relationships. 
Simultaneously, the forms of publicity of modem age are changing and becoming organized 
with new media that are arranging the social communication economy around ever more 
specialized issues, on the one hand, and ever more diverse possibilities for communication, on 
the other. This is the reason why the total, general domination by technology, feared by 
thinkers from Weber onwards, has become unthinkable. The advent of new media allows 
plurality of interpretations of reality, thus undermining the authority of any single dominant 
concept as the final truth. The categories of impurity, plurality, inconstancy and unfounding 
have become increasingly important throughout this process of generalized communication to 
account for the experience of our current condition. In so doing, they no longer allow us to 
stick to metaphysical paradigms, as man and being have lost precisely the qualities with which 
metaphysics has endowed them. In Vattimo’s thinking, it is this fact to which the liberating 
potential of the Ge-stell is linked.
This is a concept that is found in many contemporary commentators in different forms. What 
they all share is an optimistic view of the emancipatory potential of new communications 
technology, as opposed to the older, mechanistic technology.469 However, the change in 
question is not as much of a change in technology as one might conclude from the discussion 
above. As this study has tried to demonstrate, the idea of a center and communications 
technologies are not at all on opposite sides of an assumed axis. On the contrary, the ideas of a 
center as an organizating principle and communications technology were mutually articulated 
right from the beginning. Therefore, the change, in fact, does not occur between technologies 
but rather in communication, that is, in the communicative constellations. The disintegration of 
models predicated on organic and subsequently on mechanical metaphors took place in 
communication, within the constantly unfolding networks of communicative relationships and 
practices. Hence, it is neither alien nor newer to the historical process of the realization of these 
relationships but rather has to do with the self-formation of communicative constellations 
themselves.
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Given this, there is perhaps no point in trying to find a positive place for the thought on 
technology that admits the disorientation or homelessness of being. Its location is not thinkable 
in any institutional sense: the thinking of being does not occupy any specific place—it is 
homeless (spaesamento). At most, it can be allocated a non-space, in a similar way as thought 
on communication. For this reason the idea of a fundamental ambiguity of being should not be 
thought in terms of an imaginary totality, but rather as an outcome of specific historical 
processes and thus as reflecting our contemporary experience.
Insofar as there occurred a change, discontinuity, or displacement in the communicative 
constellation dominant in the middle of the century, it seems possible to rethink some of 
Heidegger’s concepts. In the 1960s, several events that contributed to the change came into 
being, of which just the three most significant ones suffice to be mentioned here. Firstly, a 
critique of technological systems and the systems approach was intensified and organized 
because of the rise of counter cultural activism and of the influence among students and 
intellectuals of theories linked with the Frankfurt School. Secondly, management questions, 
broadly, ceased to appear predominantly as technical problems and were rearticulated in 
corporatism’s terminology. And lastly, the leading edge of technological systems moved from 
large hierarchical structures with tangible powers to interactive, computer-based information 
networks, the effects of which, although immense, could not be located in relation to any given 
system. Thus, the fragmentation of Being and loss of a consistent meaning-content, brought 
about by metaphysics itself, seems to be incompatible with the idea of a rational world-order 
and a total organization of human life, brought about by modem technology according to 
Heidegger.
Insofar as occidental history has been closely tied to the formulation of ever more precise 
definitions and formal analytical frameworks, it is inevitably also about the multiplication of 
these forms and practices and the emergence of novel, mutually incompatible and alternative 
discourses. This is exactly what Vattimo referred to when speaking about the birth of new 
centers of history in his La societa transparente470 as well as, in somewhat different terms, in 
the paper discussed above. As a result, although these discourses incessantly generate ever 
more accurate fields of calculation, as Heidegger holds, it is not possible to conceive any 
general and unifying perspective. This is due to the fact that rival interpretations, at times 
conflicting and at times overlapping with each other, render impossible any single and 
consistent frame of analysis. Likewise, it is increasingly difficult to imagine a dominance of 
any one discursive interpretation, especially in human and social sciences, although this still 
seemed conceivable, to a point, up to the first half of the twentieth century. Although discourses
200
have perhaps become more technical, this tendency is not apparent in all discourses, and above 
all, there is nothing holistic in this as the processes of technicization are numerous.
At the same time, it must be noted that neither do discursive practices based on formal modes 
of representation comprise anything that could be characterized as universal. It is true that 
formal representation, regardless of the intrinsic nature of a given problem, has made it 
possible to bring together and examine diverse, otherwise incompatible processes and 
relationships within a single framework. In this respect, it has created a general enframing in 
the Heideggerian sense as a way of revealing and conceptualizing. Consequentiy, it constitutes 
the way our world-relation is organized, though this organization is not solely a formal 
relationship. However, the possibility of a formal system of representation should not be 
associated with the development of anything total and consistent as such, as Heidegger tended 
to think. Expositions exploiting formal tools are always expressed as part of the given context, 
as circumstantial enunciations in a dialectical relationship the structure of which is constantly 
being changed as the discourse progresses. Because the structure of the discourse is, by 
definition, not static but always in motion, then naturally the respective positions of 
interlocutors change in line with the course of the discourse, and no individual enunciation can 
express the “whole” of the discourse, only refer to i t
This becomes clearer, I think, in the era of computer networks. It is true that a technical 
approach to the engineering problems of communication is a prerequisite of dependable 
telecommunication. Yet whereas this approach could still be seen as supporting the idea of a 
rational and uniform system in the heyday of the telephone, as this was in any case the 
environment in and to which it was most intensively applied and developed, in the age of 
computer networks this concept does not seem to work anymore. This is because the 
digitalization and networking of information have increased users’ choices in organizing 
information as they please. At the same time, technology forfeits its former consistency. A 
flexible, open-ended network allows many routes through the system, and as many sources of 
errors, breakdowns, and blockages.471
Against this historical background to the tradition of critical thinking, computer networks and 
especially the Internet are presented as natural new objects for reflection on the extension of 
technological rationality. In this connection, the concern is not only related to establishment of 
a comprehensive technological structure, but also to the whole process of objectification, of 
making everything present at-hand through the principle of representation, as noted by 
Heidegger. Let me take a litde closer look at the Internet, as it exemplifies many of the technical
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and institutional characteristics of new information and communications technology. The 
Internet can be seen, justifiably I think, as a complete system of representation in its own terms. 
From the point of view of its “internal” structuration, its whole functionality, what the Internet 
is, is based on the principle of representation. The system of representation is the way the 
Internet works, being the principle of mediation between the computers of a customer and a 
server, and between a user and the resources. Furthermore, the Internet clearly represents a 
world without a history. We can speak about the history of the Net, but what we cannot do is to 
speak naturally about its “internal” history, a history that would take place within i t  All that 
there is is ready at-hand without previous modes of representation contributing to current ones 
in any actual sense. On this basis, it would be possible to suggest a closer relationship between 
Heidegger’s assertion of the completion of metaphysics in the form of technology and the 
Internet as an excellent example of this closure.
This conclusion, however, is precipitate. The Internet is not a stable and closed system. Quite 
the contrary: it is an inherently open system consisting of heterogeneous and ever-changing 
configurations of connections, standards, communities, and sites. There is no single 
institutional or principal instance that could control i t  The representations, for their part, refer 
not to essences but rather to events. This is because the reference points of representations are 
themselves representations; they are interlinked and supplementary to each other, and fleeting 
and shifting rather than firm and fixed, in the same way as the representations themselves. As 
the Internet has often been seen as a crystallization of the characteristics of new information 
and communications technology, observations made about it can be applied at a more 
generalized level; for what applies to the Internet, applies to a large extent to information 
technology in general. In immense variety, the forms and convergences of information 
technology are in an ever-changing process of movement, lacking any single common 
denominator that could determine the nature or “essence” of i t  Concept like that of “family 
resemblance,” coined by Ludwig Wittgenstein, is much more useful in understanding the 
mutual relationships between the diverse forms of this technology. Thus, information 
technology consists of processes that interconnect, but not without gaps and changes.
The Internet destroyed the concept based on the model of modem media that publicity consists 
of a sequence of similar messages from one to many. It is, however, not solely a 
communications medium. It can be considered as a first multidimensional communicative 
space proper that enables, in addition to communication, various interactive activities. This is 
the central illustrative notion of the Internet: the metaphor of space. The concept of space used 
here is not equivalent to a neutral, objective field mutual to all parties who can encounter each
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other in a genuine sense, simultaneously retaining their own singularity. The public space thus 
produced is rather fragmented and incoherent, as it is distributed among all the computers and 
resources connected to it. To speak about a space in a real sense is misleading, since publicity 
is a fabric scattered in different locations and in which the individual parties do not have a 
relationship of dialogues between each other. In the Internet there is no objective frame of 
reference acceptable in principle to every potential party, by virtue of which it would be 
possible to evaluate the relative position of each in relationship to any other, and thus no 
genuine meeting of interests on the level of resources or information sources. In other words, 
diverse interest groups as well as information resources appear to the user as a rich fabric of 
distinct sites and locations. On the other hand, the identities of connected parties and their 
expressions of interest retain their original forms; the formulations are not translated into any 
more general form as in the journalistic publicity.
The concept of spatiality in relation to the Internet illuminates, however, the change occurring in 
communication in the age of computer systems, that is, the dissipation of assemblages based 
on one whole. It seems to me that it is at this very conjunction that we must locate Vattimo’s 
argument concerning the liberating potential of a new concept of technology that would no 
longer rely on a dominating center. Meanwhile, centralization and the control of processes with 
unforeseen complexity, supported by information and communication technology, made new 
strides again. Yet at the same time, distributed communicative activities, unmanageable through 
any single whole, became diversified, proliferated, and assumed novel forms and modes of 
realization. The change in question cannot be satisfactorily encapsulated in the conceptual 
dichotomy of centralization and decentralization. Instead, it has rather to do with reaching a 
certain saturation point where communication lose its instrumental, object-like character and 
becomes something environmental-like that defies objectification. Here, it changes from being 
an object waiting to become explained and categorized to one that cannot be similarly 
accounted for because it is no longer a thing conceivable prior to theoretical definitions. It is 
true, of course, that if computer networks are embedded in the systems they enable, so 
mechanical technologies too could only exist as parts of the local communities and the systems 
of institutional, commercial, and cultural processes and components they consisted of. The 
interdependence and mutual constitution of the various elements involved underlines the fact 
that it is not possible to make the traditional distinction between technology and the social, as 
technical systems are always already social, just as the social always presupposes and produces 
technical solutions. The way in which information technology is differentiated from mechanical 
technology lies in the fact that unlike the latter, the former is dispersed into logical, functional, 
and institutional relationships which do not constitute a whole outside of popular rhetoric. If
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traces and effective relationships were difficult to be identified in systems of mechanical 
technology, they have became undetectable in principle in the age of information systems. For 
this reason information technology as networks of overlapping and parallel assemblages 
cannot be viewed as a distinct socio-technical entity, like for instance a solitary hydropower 
station or a factory, which are similarly part of a larger system, although there has been a 
tendency in popular commentaries to do just this.
This is an analogous turn to the one Paul Edwards has thematized within computer networks as 
the move from systems with one or several well-defined functions and central control, via 
networks consisting of groups of related functions and partially distributed control, to 
internetworks with clusters of networked functions and widely distributed control.472 Whereas 
singular systems still had fixed or slowly-changing boundaries, internetworks, or “w ebs” 
according to Edwards, have fluid and rapidly changing ones. Seen from this perspective, the 
shift in the way technical systems are constituted has profound reverberations in the ontology 
of communication and communicativity. For if it is true that in the age of internetworks there is 
no locatable focal point of control, only innumerable heterogeneous networks with complex 
functional structures, the terms through which communication is conceptualized have to be 
revised. Internetworks, it can be said, created a communicative environment that broke the 
privileged relationship with centers of hierarchy and hierarchical centers, thus becoming 
impossible to think of in terms of a whole as traditionally understood in the history of 
communication.
This loss of certain object-likeness is perhaps the most fundamental reason why information 
and communication technology has become a very difficult object for national regulation. 
Whereas relationships and practices with an adequately steady character can still be controlled 
by means of traditional policy instruments, current information technology has become a 
general environment of ours, not unlike Foucault’s ubiquitous relationships of 
power/knowledge. Although always exploited by established concentrations of power, such as 
the sovereign or the state, because of their inevitably local and circumstantial nature, these 
relationships could not be defined solely in terms of traditional political terminology. In a 
similar manner, the forms and practices of current “information technology” cannot be 
captured in terms that are still suitable for describing the previous mechanical technologies. 
This brings us back to the question of the ontology of communication. It could allow us to 
regard this transformation of technology from a nameable practice, relationship, or system to a 
general condition of the objects and entities to be identified as the very kind of event which
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Heidegger called ereignis—an event that reveals the transcendental dimension of the 
development of technology.
The Fate of Communication
Let us now, lastly, complete our study by presenting some general insights on communication 
in the modem period. What characterized the tradition followed here was an emphasis on a 
common code, form, or method, a contract perhaps, that maintained and protected meaningful 
communication from misunderstanding or distortion.473 It was this common order that set the 
limits of communication by excluding the multiplicity that always risks blanketing it out. It is 
here that the shared form was protected at the expense of what was purely idiosyncratic by 
virtue of a mechanism of exclusion: it eliminated what could not be shared, the “irrational” 
part of communication, in other words noise. The form of communication, thus, is primary and 
noise, from the point of view of communication’s functioning, a disturbance. At the same time, 
however, communication cannot do without noise, because it is an inherent quality of the 
substance in and through which communication takes place; that is, it is the empirical part of 
communication. Noise, therefore, is essential to the possibility of communication.
As such, noise is the absolute prerequisite to communication and the place in which multiplicity 
finds its expression. It is not something that would or should be abandoned in order to agree 
common ground, but rather the origin of all communication. It exposes communication to 
interference and disorder—to contention, it is true, but without this communication would not 
be possible. Communication is about constant exposure to what is undividable in noise, which 
incessantly threatens to swallow it up. This is why any successful communication, of necessity, 
is about excluding noise. As noise remains an integral part of communication, this exclusion 
both takes place in and is directed at communication: it is here that communication is bom as 
communication. When succesful, communication finds equilibrium between the noise that all 
the time threatens to overwhelm it and the commonly agreed form that would enable accord. 
Communication cannot totally remove noise because it is its precondition, but what it can do is 
to optimize the relationship between a multiplicity and a unity in a manner conducive to 
continuous communication. For this it needs a method immanent to the system of 
communication, the task of which it is to maintain this equilibrium. To establish this kind of 
mechanism, however, requires the formalization of communication.
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Michel Serres has noted that formalization is a process whereby one can move from noise to 
consensus, from contention to unanimity, or from politics to technology. Formalization, here, is 
about optimal elimination of noise, not about its complete eradication. Nevertheless, it breaks 
the relationship with the historical context of its origin, because for the common form the 
particular context in which it manifests itself is not important Moreover, it is formalization and 
the ensuing elimination of the empirical that enables science to be created. Of course, a 
common form or communication is possible only empirically, and cannot be separated in its 
appearance from the practices, forms, and technical systems in which it manifests itself. Yet 
communication does not reduce to the empirical, but presupposes something common that 
exceed its practical forms of realization; and it is not possible to recognize what is common 
without excluding the very empirical it relies on.
As we move from the early analogies to a nervous system to a systematic modeling of 
communication, the link with the historicity of communication is continuously reconstructed. 
Whereas the first biomechanical analogies sought to conceptualize experience of the prevailing 
understanding of the social, the description and explanation of communication by means of 
mathematical tools presenting themselves as objective and apolitical that continued to be carried 
out within the framework of the nervous system constituted a field for thinking about the 
historicity of communication in a decidedly more technical way. Of course, this shift is 
inseparably interlinked with the development and professionalization of the scientific estate, 
and with its opening up of new research practices and object definitions for the academic 
institution, spearheaded by modem natural sciences. This approach created the basis for the 
apprehension of communication in a technical framework and for relating it to the question of 
efficient organization of action. It is in this sense that thought about the conditions of 
communication as a technical question corresponds to and expresses the prevailing experience 
of the social. But at the same time this historical experience conflicts with the fundamental 
historicity of the social.
On the other hand, these processes of formalization did not emerge outside communication. 
On the contrary, they came into being within the very communicative networks that they sought 
to formalize. Communication cannot be separated either from the whole that makes it 
communication, nor from the technical system that embodies this whole in a practical 
organization. Yet it is not reduced to these wholes and systems; they are no more “real” than 
communication, and, in fact, “are” only because of communication. The scope of 
communication is thus defined as a continuous and indeterminate relationship between the
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“absolute structure” of communication (what enables communication as communication), on 
the one hand, and the forms assumed by communication, on the other.
Communication has always operated here as a tool for cutting across, eliminating, and ignoring 
conflicts and disputes. This is one apparent thematical line that integrates the history traced 
here. Communication has performed the task of undoing politics, although it is itself nothing 
other than politics, in that it can be understood only on the basis of politics. If politics 
constitutes community, then it can be said that communication, in this line of development, was 
also a mechanism for undoing community as community. That is, it undid community as a 
social whole characterized by endless negotiations and discussions concerning the coexistence 
of people. In its place, it laid a regimented whole that was based on constellations consisting of 
relationships, practices, and systems of communication.
We must emphasize, however, that there is no single figure for a given historical 
communicative constellation. Rather what is at issue here, is an attempt to localize and specify 
the telos of communication at work in each constellation: that is, the aim and goal of its 
formulation and use, the projects it serves, and the mode of being it enables and supports. It is 
not a question of totalizing descriptions of particular concepts and practices, but rather of the 
way by which, to use Mitchell Dean’s formulation, “various programmes of conduct and 
regimes of practices have enfolded within them definite teleologies.”474 Thus, although distinct 
communicative constellations have “definite teleologies” that allow us to draw a line between 
them and consider them as having certain individual consistency, and although the nervous 
system no doubt has operated as a conceptual model enabling this consistency in each case, the 
communicative “wholes” should be not understood as general terms but rather as names for 
related regimes of discursive practices and fields of technology.
Now, it was not until after the appeal of cybernetics and information theoiy started to vanish 
that there occurred a kind of “French Revolution” in thought about communication. Whereas 
previously communication was conceived of from the perspective of good governance, it now 
began to be regarded as a unit that governs itself as control became immanent to 
communication. Yet these two perspectives on communication are not necessarily separated 
from each other in a clear-cut manner. In fact, the whole history of communication, where it is 
seen as both an object and means of governance, can be depicted in terms of steersmanship, or 
the “science of piloting,” from which cybernetics obtained its etymological roots. It is 
indissolubly tied to concepts of command and control, but these have to be understood in the 
marine context in which there is no possibility of withdrawing to a private place as one can do
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on land. Captain, crew, and passengers, taken together, constitute a social whole that is based 
on constant coexistence. As Serres has pointed out, this community is closed behind a line 
drawn by the safety fence, and the only option outside the rope is drowning.475 This is why the 
governance put into practice is necessarily self-governance, too. It deals with the course and 
actions to be taken within a dynamic community sharing the same goal. So, work in Bethlehem 
Steel Company or AT&T was not suspended while it was rationalized according to Taylor’s 
program, and the air defense system was not made idle during its automation. For this reason, 
too, the telephone system could be seen as the model for self-governance under circumstances 
of constant change. Here, as in a ship, there is no place to withdraw to from the unceasing 
responsibility for the functioning of the whole.
The methods used, however, especially if followed to their end as a principle, do not conceal 
their nature as formal, general rules of steersmanship. This is what makes the history of 
communication, ultimately, the history of control. In a closed community as in a ship, it is of 
foremost importance to eliminate any misunderstanding or ambiguity over the course of action. 
What is essential is to do away with any possibility for negotiation whatsoever. This calls for a 
system of perfectly understood set of rules and routines of action that stabilize complex 
activities into a uniform system under the command of a supervisor. In many organizations 
with clearly defined goals, formal methods for setting up lines of command and the respective 
relationships between actors were thus absolutely necessary.
It is true that the environments these formal methods were applied to did not resemble a ship in 
any literal sense but had a much more open and systemic nature. They were, however, the loci 
in which the means and structure of intercommunication became of central importance. It was 
in these veiy settings, understood as distinct systems, that communication began to be 
systematically thought of as a fundamental ingredient of a given action. In addition, from these 
local and specific contexts emerged the theories, models, and systems of communication that 
spread throughout society and were generalized to be applicable to various different yet ever 
broader environments outside their sites of origin. Wiener understood this well, which makes 
him, for our purposes, theoretically the most interesting figure at the end of the line of 
development followed here.
At the same time, it is clear that because of these reasons communication, insofar as it has been 
considered within the sphere of systematic thinking, has always been linked to some pre­
existing origin. Within the history of communicative governance and the governance of 
communication, communication has continuously been thought of on the basis of an origin, of
208
an original whole. Typically, communication systems, along with the various discursive 
practices and metaphors with which they have always developed in tandem, have served as this 
type of privileged whole. As a result, this privileged essence has distinguished communication 
from what does not belong to it, encapsulating the criteria for demarcation. Yet this essence is 
not and has not been noncommunicative but is communicative in nature, with the demarcation 
stemming, hence, from communication itself. Consequently, discourses of communication are 
usually practices of exclusion, in and through which the mode of communicativity proper is 
constantly engendered and its boundaries monitored and maintained—within communication. 
Whether it is a question of incessant negotiation, signal distortion, or increasing 
disorganization, the operation of exclusion is always the same, as is the aim of this operation; 
namely, to strengthen the communicative whole and to give it an identity of its own.
Common to all the thinkers and theorists discussed in previous chapters is the fact that they 
thought about communication in the light of a method or a technique. They conceived of 
communication largely as a rationalization process that was “perfected” with the help of 
scientific method. The main stages and experimental scenes of this rationalization were modem 
business organizations. For this reason, the thinkers discussed viewed communication—its 
rationalization—naturally from the point of view of the objectives and functions of these 
organizations; the business-driven approach was inbuilt in rationalization of communication 
becoming an issue in the first place. Yet this is also the reason that connects these thinkers to 
the tradition of metaphysics, where communication does not appear as a precondition of 
identities and structures but a determinable structure in itself. Because the aim of these thinkers 
was to optimize a system’s functionality by formulating its intrinsic scientific laws, they 
remained stuck within this functionality. Their thinking remained subordinated to the particular 
organizatory forms in and through which this functionality was realized and which provided 
the historical context for their theoretical work. This is not to be taken as a judgment, however, 
as it is the very modem fate of communication which cannot be disentangled from the 
administrative history of communication that has been our concern here. The lineage from 
Sumner to Simon and from Ward to Wiener can be seen as representing and epitomizing what 
have been the most influential and lasting elements in the formation of thinking about 
communication in the modem period.
The attempt to exclude the actual multiplicity and variety from communication must be seen as 
an attempt to think about the transcendental conditions of communication, or to put it another 
way, the limits of communication. This is not only because the formalization of 
communication, the history of which we have followed here, was never external to
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communication but rather immanent to it. This in itself meant attempts to represent its intrinsic 
structure were necessarily constructions in which the limits of communication, variously 
understood, became articulated. However, it is also because the formalized structure of 
communication was conceived as a universal form which would underlie all meaningful 
communication processes irrespective of their variable contents and historical contexts. It 
captured in a coherent form what was within the limits of all thinkable communication in a 
given constellation. In this respect, both scientific management and cybernetics, from their 
respective points of departure, can be seen as attempts to seriously think about the limits of 
communication. For Wiener, at least, this seemed clear from the outset. Thus, much of his 
book The Human Use o f Human Beings, according to him, concerned “the limits of 
communication within and among individuals.”476
The more definitely the system draws the demarcation between communication and the 
incommunicable, in other words, defines the conditions for communication, the more 
rigorously it excludes what is external to it; which, however, is in itself a condition of all 
communication. This was absolutely clear in Taylorism, which excluded the multiplicity that 
did not fit the code of its functionality. The system was defined here as a machinery that does 
not take new ingredients from its environment; on the contrary, these were exactly what it 
aimed at eliminating. In the cybernetic system, however, the field of action has to be defined 
time and again, unlike in Taylorism where, once defined, it was regarded as remaining 
unchanged. It was characteristic of cybernetics to integrate the multiplicity into a common 
framework. It did not recognize any instance that would have been excluded in principle from 
communication, implying that ontological difference between communication and 
noncommunication, or the common voice and noise, could not be sustained as rigorously as in 
Taylorism. This is because it incorporated change and variety into the system. This was 
implicit in Shannon, and became the starting point of analysis in the second wave of 
cybernetics. Therefore, whereas the Taylor System had to anticipate in one solution all the 
contingencies it could face, the feedback-controlled system did precisely the opposite; it 
exploited contingencies as information that directed its behavior within certain pregiven limits. 
Although also in the latter system, it is true, the “state” or “internal unity” had to remain 
stable in order to enable continuous communication, the idea of a system differed: whereas for 
a mechanical system it was a perfect and unchanging machine, for a cybernetic one it was a 
continuously self-correcting one.477
This perspective was a precondition to thinking about these limits as an ontological structure 
for all communication, and thus to generalizing it as the condition of existence of
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communication as such. But, of course, these conditions are inarticulable, because if they were 
articulable, communication would not exist, for it would be self-enclosed into the stillness of its 
unbroken sameness. On the other hand, what was going on in these communication projects 
was crystallized in the fact that they objectified communication according to the model of 
ontology of presence, to borrow Derrida’s expression, and disregarded its fundamental 
irreducibility. Not only were these types of projects attempts to think of a permanent 
“essence” as an unchanging condition of historical communication, they were also 
manifestations of a cultural sentiment which was encapsulated in the concept of the intrinsic 
nature of communication, and thus of society. They expressed an aspiration to understand the 
“sense” of a community as something that can be presented in terms of a general law. Yet, 
insofar as it is impossible to articulate the conditions of communication, it is equally 
impossible to formulate the law of this communality as a law.
This does not, however, deprive these kinds of communication projects of the meaning they 
have as testimonies to the need to think about our own present time and to conceptualize related 
problems in a way that speaks directly to us. As marks of the present, they open up a historical 
relationship to the absolute basis for communicability, although this opening is not entirely 
dependent on subjective decision. In fact, one can say more than that. Although we cannot 
know the absolute basis or the enabling condition in its difference from what is, we 
nevertheless inevitably make references to it. Even if thought cannot conceptualize it, making 
this difference is necessary to communicative existence. As Walter Benjamin held, philosophy 
actually anticipates it in the existent478
In the history of administrative communication and the administration of communication, 
“communication” was interpreted in terms of efficacy and legitimacy, for it was impossible to 
separate it from those instances that promoted and implemented social efficacy. As we move 
from an instrumentality of this kind to the constitutive dimension of communication, it 
becomes clear that communication not only produces effectiveness but that the latter, combined 
with the scientific-technological rationalization of society, becomes increasingly a general 
social category, within which communication takes place and gets its meaningfulness. Yet, this 
category of effectiveness does not constitute any system of coordinates or unitary frame of 
reference for communication, for it is the latter which gives rise to these measurement systems 
and to their social establishment. It is also the actual “mechanism” for the rationalization of 
society: communication paves the way for it and marks its course, but this course is nothing 
other than communication itself, the rationalization of this communication.
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If communication was conceived of through a mechanical model inspired by the engineering 
and natural sciences, this is not to say that historical thought about communication need have 
been constantly in decline. Firstly, what we have done above is to bring out a history of only 
one thread of communication. The presentation has followed a lineage in which communication 
has to an increasing degree been rendered an ahistorical object, but it goes without saying that 
communication is not reducible exclusively to this single history. As it is constituted 
historically in and through the process of its being-articulated, communication cannot be 
thought of as a single, unified, and continuous entity, the history of which could be placed in a 
preexisting and unchanging framework with respect to the everyday realization of 
communicative relationships. A line of the thinking about communication can never be 
coherent, let alone linear. The path of development highlighted here is rather a sequence of 
interrelated but discontinuous formations and constellations of thought and practices. They are 
united by like style, manner and purpose, and the same historical destiny that is also our 
destiny, and it is precicely due to this community of fate that this path of development becomes 
significant for us.
Secondly, and related to the previous point, the processes of increasing technicization of 
communication cannot be conceived of exclusively in terms of a value judgment, because what 
they express and at the same time constitute is the historical context in which thinking about 
and articulation of communication can take place and in which it can assume its historical 
modes. The instrumental processes of thought about communication, being attempts to 
comprehend the always-incommunicable conditions for communication, thus reflect the 
particular historicity of the development of communication itself insofar as it is thought of as 
being historically determined. This is because, as concepts of communication open up and 
establish a relationship to conditions for the social and give birth to temporary and 
discontinuous forms by way of which this relationship can be thought of and be exploited, they 
necessarily express the historicity of the social which is only conceivable within the realm of 
communication. Attempts to conceptualize communication are therefore always at the same 
time endeavors to think about the conditions for community. And, in the process of this 
thinking, they constitute a historical domain or perspective within which thinking about 
community is possible. This is why communication is nothing other than the unfolding of the 
social and thought about this historical unfolding.
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